Summary
In Best v. Keenan (E.D. Pa. No. 03-5651, filed October 14, 2004), 2004 WL 3186305, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27000 (Best I), the plaintiff filed a complaint against the City of Philadelphia (Philadelphia) and several police officers alleging excessive force.
Summary of this case from McGuire ex rel. Neidig v. City of PittsburghOpinion
Civil Action No. 03-5651.
October 14, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
By way of the current motion, plaintiff Edwin Best seeks to compel the City of Philadelphia to pay the Judgment and Attorney's Fees awarded against defendant Police Officer James Keenan. For the reasons which follow, it is recommended that the motion be denied.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 10, 2003, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court alleging a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, together with state law causes of action for assault and battery. According to the complaint, plaintiff charged the City of Philadelphia and several police officers with unlawful use of excessive force during a confrontation. The City of Philadelphia and Officer Oldrati were dismissed from the action by voluntary stipulation on March 11, 2004. Nonetheless, the Philadelphia City Solicitor's Office continued to represent the remaining defendants.
Trial began on June 16, 2004 and, on June 17, 2004, the Court declared a mistrial due to improper introduction of evidence by defense counsel. A new trial began on June 21, 2004, and the next day, Officers Sarris and Dragon were dismissed from this action, leaving Officer Keenan as the sole defendant. Following Officer Keenan's failure to appear on the second day of the new trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty against him and awarded plaintiff $100 in compensatory damages and $500 in punitive damages. Thereafter, the Philadelphia City Solicitor's Office sought to withdraw as counsel for Officer Keenan due to his failure to cooperate with the defense. This Court denied the motion and, subsequently, awarded attorney's fees against defendant in the amount of $15,225. The City of Philadelphia has refused to pay any judgment on behalf of Officer Keenan.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff now argues that the City of Philadelphia is responsible for the money damages awarded against Officer Keenan. The City, in response, claims that the current motion must be denied on three grounds: (1) the motion is procedurally defective; (2) plaintiff lacks standing to compel the City to indemnify Keenan because plaintiff suffered no invasion of a legally protected right; and (3) Officer Keenan is not entitled to indemnification because the jury determined that he engaged in willful misconduct. As we find that the standing argument has merit, we deny the motion on those grounds without consideration of remaining arguments.
Under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (the "Tort Claims Act"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541, et seq., an employee of a government agency is generally entitled to both legal assistance and indemnity for claims brought against him arising from actions committed within the scope of his employment. Specifically, section 8547(a) states that "[w]hen an action is brought against an employee of a local agency for damages on account of an injury to a person or property, and it is alleged that the act of the employee which gave rise to the claim was within the scope of the office or duties of the employee, the local agency shall, upon the written request of the employee, defend the action, unless or until there is a judicial determination that such act was not within the scope of the office or duties of the employee." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8547(a). The statute goes on to note that, "[w]hen an action is brought against an employee of a local agency for damages on account of an injury to a person or property, and he has given timely prior written notice to the local agency, and it is judicially determined that an act of the employee caused the injury and such act was, or that the employee in good faith reasonably believed that such act was, within the scope of his office or duties, the local agency shall indemnify the employee for the payment of any judgment of the suit." Id. at § 8548(a). The indemnification includes any awards of reasonable attorneys fees and costs. Wiehagen v. Borough of North Braddock, 594 A.2d 303, 307 (Pa. 1991).
Plaintiff, in the case at bar, relies on these provisions to assert that the City of Philadelphia must now satisfy the judgment entered against Officer Keenan. This argument, however, fails to recognize the doctrine of standing. "In essence the question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues." Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2205. The "[s]tanding doctrine embraces several judicially selfimposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's legal rights . . ." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3324, reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S. Ct. 51 (1984).
Nothing in Tort Claims Act suggests that a plaintiff in an underlying cause of action may directly seek indemnification from the defendant's employer. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the indemnification provisions ". . . is to permit local agency employees to perform their `official duties' without fear of personal liability, whether pursuant to state or federal law, so long as the conduct is performed during the course of their employment." Wiehagen, 594 A.2d 303, 306 (Pa. 1991). Such language is indicative of the statutory intent to protect the employee, not the injured plaintiffs. Indeed, at least two courts from this Circuit have held that the Tort Claims Act "is not meant to provide a cause of action for a plaintiff in an underlying action." Johnson v. City of Erie, Pa., 834 F. Supp. 873, 877 (W.D. Pa. 1993); see also Talley v. Trautman, Civ. A. No. 96-5190, 1997 WL 135705, *6 (E.D. Pa. March 13, 1997) ("It does not follow, however, from that a governmental agency may have to indemnify one of its employees for intentional torts committed in the course of his duties to that the governmental agency therefore becomes directly liable to the plaintiff under the doctrine of respondeat superior under a different section of the Act."). In turn, our research has not revealed, and plaintiff has not cited, any case allowing a plaintiff in an underlying cause of action to pursue an indemnification action under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8548.
While plaintiff relies on the Wiehagen case in support of his motion, he fails to recognize that that case involved a suit by the employee, who was held liable under § 1983, against his employer for indemnification. The court recognized only that a public employee has a right of indemnification against a government agency, not that an injured plaintiff has standing to assert that right. See Wiehagen, supra.
In light of this jurisprudence, it remains abundantly clear that plaintiff does not have any legal entitlement to compel the City of Philadelphia to satisfy the judgment against Officer Keenan. The City was dismissed as a defendant from the lawsuit. Thereafter, the trial proceeded only against individual officers, with Officer Keenan remaining as the sole defendant by the time the case went to the jury for deliberations. The jury reached a verdict against Officer Keenan for acts committed in the scope of his duties as a police officer and this Court entered a judgment against him for compensatory damages, punitive damages and plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs. Individually, he remains responsible for this judgment. While the officer is now entitled to bring an indemnification action against his employer under the Tort Claims Act, plaintiff has no standing to pursue such a claim. Accordingly, we deny plaintiff's Motion to Compel.
The City of Philadelphia also argues that even assuming plaintiff did have the legal right to compel it to indemnify Officer Keenan, the motion must fail because the City had no legal responsibility to indemnify him under both 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8548©), which states that the indemnification provisions do not apply if the employee does not fully cooperate with the local agency in the defense of the action, and 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8550, which states that the City need not indemnify an employee if the employee's actions were judicially determined to constitute willful misconduct. As we find that plaintiff's motion to indemnify is legally improper, we think it unnecessary to comment upon the merits of a possible indemnification action by Officer Keenan against the City.
The City also claims that plaintiff's motion to enforce the judgment is procedurally defective since it fails to com ply with Pennsylvania Rule of C ivil Procedure 3103, as incorporated by Federal R ule of C ivil Procedure 69. We likewise decline to reach the merits of this argument, since we deny the motion on other grounds.
ORDER
AND NOW, this day of October, 2004, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Payment of the Judgment and Attorney's Fees and the City of Philadelphia's Response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.It is so ordered.