Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 20-0306
02-23-2021
GREGORY BEST, Plaintiff/Appellant, v. WALTER JACKSON, Defendant/Appellee.
COUNSEL Gregory Best, Phoenix Plaintiff/Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CV2017-000578
The Honorable Rosa Mroz, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Gregory Best, Phoenix
Plaintiff/Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Samuel A. Thumma delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge Brian Y. Furuya joined. THUMMA, Judge:
¶1 Plaintiff Gregory Best appeals from a judgment in favor of defendant Walter Jackson. Because Best has already unsuccessfully challenged that judgment, the judgment is affirmed. In addition, given Best's recent appeals to this court pressing meritless arguments that have previously been rejected, this matter is referred to this Court's Chief Judge to determine whether an administrative order should be entered deeming Best a vexatious litigant and barring him from filing further motions, special actions or appeals without prior leave of this Court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 This Court previously affirmed a Maricopa County Superior Court ruling, in consolidated cases CV2017-000578 and -004846, granting summary judgment against Best and in favor of Steve Villarreal, the 12th Street Property Trust (Trust), Lucas Land Consortium, L.L.C., and Walter Jackson. Best v. Villarreal, 1 CA-CV 19-0199, 2020 WL 2499776 (Ariz. App. May 14, 2020) (mem. dec.). Best did not seek review of that May 2020 decision by the Arizona Supreme Court, and the mandate in that appeal has long since issued.
¶3 In this case, Best has again appealed from the very same grant of summary judgment that was affirmed in the prior appeal by the May 2020 decision. He reiterates the same allegations against Jackson, Villareal and the Trust that the May 2020 decision rejected. And he likewise requests the same relief that the May 2020 decision denied, other than a claim for attorneys' fees relating to counterclaims that Jackson voluntarily dismissed while the prior appeal was pending. This Court has jurisdiction over Best's timely appeal from the dismissal of those counterclaims pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1) (2021).
Absent material revisions after the relevant dates, statutes and rules cited refer to the current version unless otherwise indicated.
DISCUSSION
I. The May 2020 Decision Precludes Best's Arguments on Appeal, Other than Those Addressing Attorneys' Fees and Costs Arising from Jackson's Counterclaims.
¶4 Given the May 2020 decision, this court issued an order allowing Best to show any cause for why this appeal should not be dismissed and why sanctions should not be imposed for failing to reference the May 2020 decision in this appeal. Best's filing in response claimed that the May 2020 decision was "irrelevant to the facts argued in this appeal" because "[t]his Court simply erred by prematurely adding Jackson" to the May 2020 decision while Jackson's counterclaims remained pending. Therefore, Best argues, the May 2020 decision has no preclusive effect here. But even if his challenge to Jackson's inclusion in the May 2020 decision was timely — and it is not, for several reasons — Best's argument fails.
¶5 In this appeal, as in the prior appeal resulting in the May 2020 decision, Best seeks (1) the reversal of summary judgment in favor of Jackson and (2) sanctions against counsel for the Trust. The May 2020 decision rejected those same requests. Best, 2020 WL 2499776 at *5-6, *7-9 ¶¶ 28-31, 37-43. Accordingly, the May 2020 decision precludes Best's appeal on all issues other than his request for fees and costs arising out of Jackson's counterclaims. See In re Monaghan's Estate, 71 Ariz. 334, 336 (1951) ("[T]he decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of that case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be considered on a second appeal . . . in the same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same . . . .") (quoting Com. Credit Co. v. Street, 37 Ariz. 204, 207 (1930)).
Best also asks this Court to (1) rule in his favor against Jackson, (2) impute a default judgment Best obtained from Jackson's employer against Jackson himself and (3) strike Jackson's pleadings as "unlawful[ly] ghostwritten." Because this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant those requests, they are not considered here. See Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 14; A.R.S. § 12-123(A).
II. The Superior Court Properly Allocated Attorneys' Fees and Costs Arising Out of Jackson's Counterclaims.
¶6 The sole issue this Court considers on appeal is whether the superior court properly allocated attorneys' fees and costs when it granted Jackson's motion to voluntarily dismiss his counterclaims for assault, battery and conversion of property with prejudice, pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). A superior court's ruling on fees is reviewed for an abuse of discretion and will not be reversed "if there is any reasonable basis for it." Orfaly v. Tucson Symphony Soc'y, 209 Ariz. 260, 265 ¶ 18 (App. 2004) (citation omitted). For several reasons, the superior court's order resolving the fees and costs arising out of Jackson's counterclaims was not error.
¶7 Best's motion for attorneys' fees and costs arising out of Jackson's counterclaims was untimely. In addition, as a self-represented litigant, Best had no right to recover fees. See Munger Chadwick, PLC. v. Farwest Dev. & Constr. of the Sw., LLC, 235 Ariz. 125, 127 ¶ 5 (App. 2014). And finally, Best has mounted no colorable challenge to the superior court's conclusion that it was appropriate for each party to bear its own fees and costs. See ARCAP 13(a)(7); Stafford v. Burns, 241 Ariz. 474, 483 ¶ 34 (App. 2017) (arguments not meaningfully developed on appeal are waived). For these reasons, Best has shown no error.
For the same reason, and because he is not the prevailing party, Best's requests for fees and taxable costs in this appeal are denied. --------
III. Referral to the Chief Judge.
¶8 Recently, another panel of this Court recited Best's history of meritless litigation and highlighted this Court's efforts to curtail it:
This Court has previously sanctioned Best for similar behavior under either ARCAP 25 or A.R.S. § 12-349. See, e.g., Best v. Villarreal, 1 CA-CV 19-0199, 2020 WL 2499776, at *9, ¶ 44 (Ariz. App. May 14, 2020); Best v. Driggs Title Agency, Inc., 1 CA-CV 19-0037, 2019 WL 7182582, at *4, ¶ 18 (Ariz. App. Dec. 24, 2019); Best v. Hillard, 2 CA-CV 2014-0154, 2015 WL 530138, at *4, ¶ 13 (Ariz. App. Feb. 10, 2015); Best v. Warrick, 1 CA-CV 12-0043, 2013 WL 1653586, at *3-4, ¶¶ 15-18 (Ariz. App. Apr. 16, 2013).
As far back as 2009, this Court stated: 'The record demonstrates that Best is engaging in a practice of litigation that is intended to harass, is groundless, and is not made in good faith.' See Best v. Carson Messinger Elliott Laughlin & Ragan, P.L.L.C., 1 CA-CV 08-0702, 2009 WL 3115835, at *7, ¶ 35 (Ariz. App. Sept. 29, 2009).Best v. Nieblas, 1 CA-CV 19-0312, 2020 WL 6065961 at *5 ¶ 26 (Ariz. App. Oct. 15, 2020).
¶9 As this decision illustrates, Best continues to file meritless appeals in spite of this long-standing history of monetary sanctions. See id.; ARCAP 25 (purpose of sanctions is to "discourage similar conduct in the future"). Because the "[r]epeated filing of . . . requests for relief that have been the subject of previous rulings by the court in the same litigation" qualifies as vexatious conduct under A.R.S. § 12-3201(E)(1)(f), and because there are no appropriate monetary sanctions to impose in this appeal, this case is referred to this Court's Chief Judge to determine whether an administrative order should be entered barring Best from filing further motions, special actions, or appeals in this matter without prior leave of this Court. Accord A.R.S. § 12-3201(B).
CONCLUSION
¶10 The judgment is affirmed.