Opinion
C. A. 8:20-cv-03189-MGL-JDA
02-22-2021
Ty'Shun Mario Kal'Liem Bessellieu, Plaintiff, v. Jana Hollis, Bryan P. Stirling, Defendants.[1]
ORDER
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order (?TRO”) and a preliminary injunction. [Doc. 48.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on September 3, 2020, alleging violations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Clerk docketed an Amended Complaint from Plaintiff on September 23, 2020. [Docs. 1; 14.] On January 13, 2021, the Clerk docketed from Plaintiff a motion for TRO and a preliminary injunction. [Doc 48.] On January 27, 2021, Defendant Hollis filed a response in opposition to the motion. [Doc. 55.] Accordingly, the motion is ripe for review.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint states that it is only intended to supplement the Complaint and that the two should be construed together. [Doc. 14 at 1.] Accordingly, the Court construes Plaintiff's Complaint and his Amended Complaint together as the Complaint in this action.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”) and is currently incarcerated at the Broad River Correctional Institution (?Broad River”). [Doc. 60.] Plaintiff alleges that the conduct giving rise to his claims occurred on January 30, 2020, at Kirkland Correctional Institution (“Kirkland”) in the Maximum Security Unit (“MSU”). [Doc. 1 at 5.] He had just been escorted to his assigned living quarters and told officers that he had been held in the SSR Unit without a hearing as provided by SCDC policy. [Id. at 6.] Hollis responded by aggressively approaching Plaintiff's cell, stating that they did not have time to put up with Plaintiff's claims, and telling him to “get off the flap.” [Id.] Plaintiff again attempted to explain his situation, but Hollis again told him to “get off the flap” and unholstered a can of chemical munition. [Id.] Plaintiff then attempted to speak to another officer, at which time Hollis discharged an extended burst of chemical munition to his face. [Id.] Plaintiff was blinded, lost his breath, and felt a sharp pain as Hollis repeatedly slammed his hand in the service flap. [Id.] Plaintiff's hand became stuck in the flap and Defendant again sprayed him with a burst of the chemical munition. [Id.] Plaintiff was then able to free his hand and move out of range of the chemical munition. [Id.] Plaintiff was left in his cell for an extended period of time with his skin burning from the chemical munition bursts. [Id.]
Plaintiff alleges that Hollis's actions violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id. at 4.] For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges that he experienced a severe burning sensation on his skin, which was never treated by medical staff. [Id. at 7.] He also received lacerations on his wrist and hands, and he experienced respiratory issues due to inhaling chemicals, for which he was never treated. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks money damages for his injuries and asks that Hollis be terminated from her employment. [Id.]
In his motion for a TRO and for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff appears to allege that Hollis, with the assistance of other SCDC employees, has prevented Plaintiff from accessing the Court and engaged in a pattern of threatening behavior against him in retaliation for his continued litigation of his rights. [Id. at 4-10.] He asserts, without any supporting evidence, that Hollis and others SCDC employees have limited his access to the law library computer and threatened to harm or murder him, and that SCDC employees also stabbed a different inmate. [Id.] He requests that the Court order that he be allowed access to the prison law library computer, that Hollis refrain from engaging in conduct that serves to threaten Plaintiff's safety, and that Hollis and any other person or entity acting in concert with her remain at least 25 feet away from Plaintiff unless Hollis provides Plaintiff with prior notice. [Id. at 2, 11-12.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the Court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
This action is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999). Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Requirements for a Preliminary Injunction
A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy involving the exercise of a very far-reaching power, which is to be applied only in the limited circumstances which clearly demand it.” Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery Cty., 722 F.3d 184, 188 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Direx Israel, Ltd. v. Breakthrough Med. Corp., 952 F.2d 802, 811 (4th Cir. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 524 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because granting a motion for preliminary injunctive relief “requires that a district court, acting on an incomplete record, order a party to act, or refrain from acting, in a certain way[, ] [t]he danger of a mistake in this setting is substantial.” Hughes Network Sys., Inc. v. InterDigital Commc'ns Corp., 17 F.3d 691, 693 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010); Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).
The current standard for granting preliminary injunctive relief is set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). Under Winter, to obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party must demonstrate:
1) he is likely to succeed on the merits,
2) he will suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction is not granted,
3) the balance of equities favors him, and
4) the injunction is in the public interest.555 U.S. at 20; see also League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 (4th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Winter requires that each preliminary injunction factor “be 'satisfied as articulated.'” Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 320-21 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 347 (4th Cir. 2009), vacated on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), aff'd, The Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). Therefore, the movant bears a heavy burden in seeking a preliminary injunction. Id. at 321.
DISCUSSION
After Hollis filed her response to Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Change of Address indicating that he is now confined at Broad River and no longer at Kirkland. [Doc. 60.] Accordingly, it appears his claim for injunctive relief is moot. See Incumaa v. Ozmint, 507 F.3d 281, 286-87 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he transfer of an inmate from a unit or location where he is subject to the challenged policy, practice, or condition, to a different unit or location where he is no longer subject to the challenged policy, practice, or condition moots his claims for injunctive and declaratory relief ....”). The Court therefore recommends that Plaintiff's motion for TRO and a preliminary injunction should be found as moot.
Even were Plaintiff's motion not moot, Plaintiff would not be entitled to the relief he seeks because he has not shown that he can satisfy the test articulated in
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Plaintiff's motion for a TRO and a preliminary injunction [Doc. 48] be FOUND AS MOOT.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on September 3, 2020. [Doc. 1-2 at 1 (envelope, stamped as received by the prison mailroom on September 3, 2020).]
Winter. First, he has not shown he is likely to succeed on the merits of his action. Second, both with regard to his access to the law library and with regard to his claim that he is being targeted or threatened, Plaintiff has not shown that he will be irreparably harmed if injunctive relief is not granted. Indeed, he has not even shown that the established grievance procedure would not be sufficient to remedy his complaints. And third, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the public interest would favor this Court's upending the operation of the MSU's normal security procedures or that equitable principles would favor such a result. Finally, Plaintiff is also not entitled to the injunctive relief he seeks because the wrong or wrongs that Plaintiff's requested injunctive relief would protect against fall outside the scope of the Complaint, which concerns an isolated incident involving alleged excessive use of force by Hollis when Plaintiff was housed at Kirkland. A “party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship between the injury claimed in the party's motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint.” Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994). “The purpose of interim equitable relief is to protect the movant, during the pendency of the action, from being harmed in the manner in which the movant contends it was or will be harmed through the illegality alleged in the complaint.” Martin v. Stokes, No. 8:17-3391-MGL-JDA, 2017 WL 6888826, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 20, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 368962 (Jan. 11, 2018). “Thus, a preliminary injunction may never issue to prevent an injury or harm which not even the moving party contends was caused by the wrong claimed in the underlying action.” Id.