Opinion
4:23-CV-415 RLW
06-06-2023
PHILLIP A. BERRY, Plaintiff, v. ST. LOUIS PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER OF REMAND
RONNIE L. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
This matter is before the Court on review of the file. “Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists[.]” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). “Federal Courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter springs from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is inflexible and without exception.” Kessler v. National Enters., Inc., 347 F.3d 1076, 1081 (8th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and quoted case omitted). The burden of proving all jurisdictional facts is on the party asserting jurisdiction. See McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., Inc., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936).
Procedural Background
Before addressing whether the Court has jurisdiction over this action, it is necessary to review the procedural history of the parties' state court matter. See Berry v. St. Louis Pub. Schs., No. 2222-CC09336 (22nd Jud. Cir., St. Louis City). Because specific dates are important to the Court's analysis, a detailed timeline is necessary:
The information in the timeline comes from Case.net, Missouri's online case management system, unless otherwise indicated. The Court takes judicial notice of these public records. See Levy v. Ohl, 477 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir. 2007) (explaining that district court may take judicial notice of public state records); Stutzka v. McCarville, 420 F.3d 757, 760 n.2 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that courts “may take judicial notice of judicial opinions and public records.”).
October 1, 2021
Plaintiff files charges of discrimination against Defendant with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights (“MCHR”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). (ECF No. 16 at 1). Plaintiff alleges violations of the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). Id.
May 24, 2022
The MCHR issues a Notice of Right to Sue to Plaintiff, granting him 90 days to file suit concerning the alleged violations of the MHRA.
August 22, 2022
Plaintiff's last day to file suit for the alleged violations of the MHRA.
August 24, 2022
Plaintiff sues Defendant in the Circuit Court of St. Louis City, Missouri, alleging sex discrimination in violation of the MHRA.
August 30, 2022
Plaintiff amends his petition as a matter of right under Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 55.33(a) and adds claims of age and race discrimination under the MHRA.
September 21, 2022
The EEOC issues a Notice of Right to Sue to Plaintiff, granting him 90 days to file suit concerning the alleged violations of Title VII and the ADEA.
October 6, 2022
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Petition on the basis that Plaintiff's MHRA claims were time-barred under the MCHR's 90-day deadline.
December 19, 2022
Without first obtaining leave of court, Plaintiff files his Second Amended Petition and adds claims under Title VII and the ADEA.
December 20, 2022
Plaintiff's last day to file suit under Title VII and the ADEA.
Defendant did not move to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dated October 6, 2022, addresses the timeliness of Plaintiff's First Amended Petition, and precedes the Second Amended Petition by more than two months. Thus, although the state court purported to deny Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Second Amended Complaint, there was no such motion to deny.
Discussion
Defendant asserts that this Court has federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1441(c). (ECF No. 1 at ¶ 17). As the removing party, Defendant bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Prempro Prod. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). All doubts about jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand. Id. (citation omitted). “[U]ntil the state court grants leave to file the pleading [upon which removal is based], the [Federal] Court has no basis for asserting . . . jurisdiction, and the notice of removal is premature.” Gustafson v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Missouri-Illinois Metro. Dist., 358 F.Supp.3d 861, 863 (E.D. Mo. 2019) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff was required to obtain leave from the state court before amending his petition for a second time. See Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 55.33(a). Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Petition on December 19, 2022, without first obtaining leave of court. Plaintiff did not seek leave until nearly a month later. A review of the state court matter reveals that the state court never addressed Plaintiff's Motion for Leave. Although the state court did not dismiss or otherwise strike Plaintiff's Second Amended Petition, it also did not grant leave for Plaintiff to file the same. Thus, this Court lacks jurisdiction. Gustafson, 358 F.Supp.3d at 863.
CONCLUSION
Because the state court never granted leave to file the pleading upon which Defendant's removal is based, this Court has no jurisdiction. Gustafson, 358 F.Supp.3d at 863. The Court must remand this matter to the state court. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”).
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as moot. (ECF No. 15).
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of St. Louis City, Missouri, from which it was removed, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.