Opinion
24-CV-1753 (LTS)
07-22-2024
TYANNA BERRY, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, et al., Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, who is detained at Riker's Island and is appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants violated her constitutional rights. By order dated July 3, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. For the reasons that follow, the Court dismisses the complaint with leave to replead within 60 days of the date of this order.
Plaintiff filed this action without an IFP application and prisoner authorization. The Court, therefore, by order dated April 24, 2024, granted Plaintiff 30 days to either pay the filing fees or submit a completed and signed IFP application and prisoner authorization. (ECF No. 2.) Because Plaintiff did not comply with the Court's April 24, 2024 order, the Court, by order dated June 7, 2024, dismissed this action without prejudice. On June 17, 2024, after Plaintiff's time to comply with the Court's April 24, 2024 order had expired, Plaintiff filed an IFP application and prisoner authorization. (ECF Nos. 5, 6.) Because Plaintiff complied with the Court's April 24, 2024 order, the Court vacated its June 7, 2024 order of dismissal and civil judgment (ECF Nos. 3, 4) and directed the Clerk of Court to reopen this case.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Rule 8 requires a complaint to include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Tyanna Berry brings this complaint relaying various events that occurred in her life from 2015 to the present. She names 17 Defendants, many of whom are not proper parties in a federal civil rights action. Plaintiff names as defendants the Federal Bureau of Investigation; a state court judge; the New York City Department of Correction; the 83rd Precinct; the Brooklyn District Attorney (“the Brooklyn D.A.”); New York City Mayor Eric Adams; the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“C.D.C.”); the United States Military; Elmhurst Hospital, which is part of the NYC Health + Hospitals network (“H+H”); the “2nd and 11th Circuit U.S. District”; two New York County Defender Services Investigators, Daniel Blair and Travis Knoppert; a Dr. Cooper; the State of New York; the City of New York; and the “Tri-State Area.” Plaintiff also alleges that the events giving rise to her claims occurred in “Brooklyn (Kings County), NYC, Tri-State Area, and Boston, M.A.” from “(2015-2018), (2020-2023), and (2024 to Present).” (ECF No. 1 at 7.)
The Court understands the Tri-State Area to include New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
The majority of Berry's complaint reiterates legal standards and contains few discernable facts. However, Berry does allege, with regard to her conditions of confinement, that she was: placed under mental observation for over three months, not produced for court appearances, and subjected to red I.D. and maximum-security restraints. (ECF No. 1 at 10-11).
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and injunctive relief. She also seeks to have her pending criminal cases in Brooklyn and Manhattan dismissed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff's complaint is short, but it does not comply with Rule 8 because it does not make clear that she is entitled to relief from any of the named Defendants. Plaintiff attaches several documents to her complaint, but these documents also do not help to clarify her allegations.
The Court has closely scrutinized Plaintiff's complaint and attachments, but because they are unclear, the Court is unable to determine whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Plaintiff does not make any comprehensible allegations against any of the named Defendants. It is not clear what these Defendants allegedly did or failed to do that harmed Plaintiff. The Court therefore dismisses the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Even if the Court could discern each claim Plaintiff is attempting to assert, her complaint suffers from other deficiencies. As explained below, Plaintiff has not stated a viable claim against any of the named Defendants. It also does not appear that Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants, which occurred in at least four different places at three different time periods, are properly joined.
Under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “in the absence of a connection between Defendants' alleged misconduct, the mere allegation that Plaintiff was injured by all Defendants ‘is not sufficient to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit.'” Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F.Supp.2d 154, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting Pergo, Inc. v.Alloc, Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Rule 20(a)(2) permits a plaintiff to join multiple defendants in one action if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions . . .; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action. Although courts have interpreted Rule 20(a) liberally to allow related claims to be tried within a single proceeding, Barr Rubber Products Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 425 F.2d 1114, 112627 (2d Cir. 1970), “the mere allegation that Plaintiff was injured by all Defendants is not sufficient to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit pursuant to Rule 20(a),” Deskovic, 673 F.Supp.2d at 167; Webb v. Maldanado, No. 3:13-CV-144 (RNC), 2013 WL 3243135, at *3 (D. Conn. June 26, 2013) (“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits . . . to prevent the sort of morass” created by a complaint with more than twenty defendants and countless unrelated claims.”) (quotation and citation omitted). Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.” Id. In determining whether to sever a claim, the court considers “the two requirements of Rule 20 and additional factors, including (1) whether severance will serve judicial economy; (2) whether prejudice to the parties would be caused by severance; and (3) whether the claims involve different witnesses and evidence.” Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 596 F.Supp.2d 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (relying on Laureano v. Goord, No. 06-CV-7845, 2007 WL 2826649, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2007)).
A. Immune Defendants
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to assert claims against Judge M. D'Emic, the Brooklyn D.A., the Military, the F.B.I., the “2nd and 11th Circuit U.S. District,” the C.D.C., and the State of New York, her claims must be dismissed.
1. Judicial Immunity
Plaintiff's claims against Judge M. D'Emic, of the Kings County Supreme Court, Criminal Term, are barred by judicial immunity. Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.” Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009). “Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Id. (citations omitted). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be subject to harassment and intimidation ....” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994). In addition, as amended in 1996, Section 1983 provides that “in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes specific action “outside” his judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10; see also Bliven, 579 F.3d at 209-10 (describing actions that are judicial in nature). But “the scope of [a] judge's jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Judge D'Emic acted beyond the scope of his judicial responsibilities or outside his jurisdiction. See Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. Because Plaintiff sues Judge D'Emic for “acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before him,” he is immune from suit for such claims. Bliven, 579 F.3d at 210. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Judge D'Emic because she seeks monetary and injunctive relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, as frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous' for purposes of [the in forma pauperis statute].”).
2. Prosecutorial Immunity
Plaintiff's claims against the Brooklyn D.A. must also be dismissed. Prosecutors are immune from civil suits for damages for acts committed within the scope of their official duties where the challenged activities are not investigative in nature but, rather, are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Simon v. City of New York, 727 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)); see also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (holding that absolute immunity is analyzed under “functional approach” that “looks to the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it”). In addition, prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for acts that may be administrative obligations but are “directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009); see also Ogunkoya v. Monaghan, 913 F.3d 64, 7072 (2d Cir. 2019) (holding that ADAs' direction as to where criminal defendant would be arraigned was in preparation for a court proceeding in which the prosecutors were acting as advocates, and ADAs were therefore shielded by absolute immunity (citing, inter alia, Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344)). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the Brooklyn D.A. because she seeks monetary and injunctive relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to assert claims regarding events that occurred in Kings County, venue for these claims is not appropriate in this court. Kings County is located in the Eastern District of New York. See 28. U.S.C. § 112(c).
3. Sovereign Immunity
Plaintiff's claims against the “Military,” “F.B.I.,” “2nd and 11th Circuit U.S. District,” and the C.D.C must also be dismissed. The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars federal courts from hearing all suits against the federal government, including suits against federal agencies, unless sovereign immunity has been waived. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980); see Robinson v. Overseas Military Sales Corp., 21 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Because an action against a federal agency.. .is essentially a suit against the United States, such suits are. . . barred under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, unless such immunity is waived”).
The Federal Tort Claims Act, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (“FTCA”), provides for a waiver of sovereign immunity for certain claims for monetary damages arising from the tortious conduct of federal government officers or employees acting within the scope of their office or employment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The facts as alleged, however, do not suggest that the FTCA is implicated here.
The Court therefore dismisses all of Plaintiff's claims brought against the “Military,” “F.B.I.,” “2nd and 11th Circuit U.S. District,” and the C.D.C. under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
4. Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiff's claims against the State of New York and the “Tri-State Area” are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. “[A]s a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity ....” Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). “The immunity recognized by the Eleventh Amendment extends beyond the states themselves to state agents and state instrumentalities that are, effectively, arms of a state.” Id. New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut have not waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states' immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977) (New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in Section 1983 cases); Mierzwa v. U.S., 282 Fed.Appx. 973, 976 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Ritchie v. Cahall, 386 F.Supp. 1207, 1209-10 (D.N.J. 1974)) (New Jersey has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in Section 1983 cases); Hamilton v. Lajoie, 660 F.Supp.2d 261, 264 (D.C.T. 2009) (Connecticut has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity in Section 1983 cases). Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut are therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment and are dismissed.
B. Claims Against the New York City Department of Correction and the 83rd Precinct
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to sue the New York City Department of Correction, and the New York City Police Department's 83rd Precinct such claims must be dismissed because an agency of the City of New York is not an entity that can be sued separately from the City itself. N.Y. City Charter ch. 17, § 396 (“[A]ll actions and proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the violation of any law shall be brought in the name of the city of New York and not in that of any agency, except where otherwise provided by law.”); Jenkins v. City of New York, 478 F.3d 76, 93 n.19 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Emerson v. City of New York, 740 F.Supp.2d 385, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff is generally prohibited from suing a municipal agency.”). Plaintiff's claims against the New York City Department of Correction and the 83rd Precinct are therefore dismissed.
C. Private Defendants
To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege both that: (1) a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) the right was violated by a person acting under the color of state law, or a “state actor.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-49 (1988). “[N]either a state nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons' under [Section] 1983,” except in certain circumstances not at issue here. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Daniel Blair, Travis Knoppert, and Dr. Cooper must also be dismissed. A claim for relief under Section 1983 must allege facts showing that each defendant acted under the color of a state “statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private parties therefore generally are not liable under the statute. Sykes v. Bank of America, 723 F.3d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)); see also Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 323 (2d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties.”). Because these Defendants are private parties who are not alleged to work for any state or other government body, Plaintiff cannot state a claim against these Defendants under Section 1983.
D. Mayor Eric Adams and the City of New York
Any claims that Plaintiff seeks to assert against Mayor Eric Adams must be dismissed because Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing that Adams violated Plaintiff's federal constitutional rights. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [Section] 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To hold a state official liable under [Section] 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official ....” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir. 2020). Plaintiff does not allege any facts suggesting that Adams was personally involved in the alleged violations of his rights. Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim under Section 1983 against this defendant in his individual capacity.
Any claims that Plaintiff seeks to assert against the City of New York must also be dismissed. When a plaintiff sues the City of New York under Section 1983, it is not enough for the plaintiff to allege that one of the City of New York's employees or agents engaged in some wrongdoing. The plaintiff must show that the City of New York itself caused the violation of the plaintiff's rights. See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“A municipality or other local government may be liable under this section [1983] if the governmental body itself ‘subjects' a person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.” (quoting Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978))); Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011).
In other words, to state a claim against the City of New York under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) the existence of a City of New York policy, custom, or practice, and (2) that the policy, custom, or practice caused the violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Jones v. Town of East Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012); see Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (internal citations omitted). Because Plaintiff does not plead facts showing a constitutional violation, she has not stated a municipal liability claim against the City of York, and thus, her claims against the City of New York must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
E. Venue
Under the general federal venue statute, a civil action may be brought in:
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . .; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). And “an entity with the capacity to sue and be sued in its common name made under applicable law, whether or not incorporated, shall be deemed to reside, if a defendant, in any judicial district in which such defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2).
To the extent that Plaintiff asserts that her rights were violated in Brooklyn, New York (Kings County), New Jersey, Connecticut, and at Elmhurst Hospital in Elmhurst, New York (Queens County), this Court is not an appropriate venue under Section 1391(b)(1) or (2) to consider her claims. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim, the Court declines to transfer these claims in the interest of justice.
Plaintiff has not asserted that any Defendants with respect to these claims reside in this District or any other reason why this Court is an appropriate venue for these claims. See Section 1391(b)(1), (2).
F. Younger Abstention Doctrine
A review of the New York State Unified Court System records indicates that Plaintiff's next court appearances are scheduled for July 31, 2024 at the Kings County Supreme Court, Criminal Term and for August 15, 2024 at the New York County Supreme Criminal Court.Because Plaintiff, in bringing this action, asks this Court to intervene in proceedings pending in state court, the Court must dismiss those claims. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court held that a federal court may not enjoin a pending state-court criminal proceeding in the absence of special circumstances suggesting bad faith, harassment, or irreparable injury that is both serious and immediate. See Heicklin v. Morgenthau, 378 Fed.Appx. 1, 2 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1973)).
See https://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcrimattorney/DefendantSearch [perma.cc/JYK7-J7GM] (last visited July 3, 2024).
Younger abstention seeks to avoid federal court interference with ongoing state criminal prosecutions, state-initiated civil enforcement proceedings, and state civil proceedings that involve the ability of state courts to perform their judicial functions. Jones v. Cnty. of Westchester, 678 Fed.Appx. 48, 49-50 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order). Thus, abstention is appropriate in only three categories of state court proceedings: (1) state criminal prosecutions; (2) civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to criminal prosecutions”; and (3) civil proceedings “that implicate a State's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72-73 (2013).
If a “federal lawsuit implicates the way that New York courts manage their own . . . proceedings-a subject in which ‘the states have an especially strong interest'-a State's interest is most likely implicated, warranting abstention under Younger. Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cnty., 805 F.3d 425, 427 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509, 516 (2d Cir. 1973)).
When any of these types of proceedings are pending in state court, the Younger doctrine bars federal courts from ordering injunctive relief that interferes with the state court proceedings. “State proceedings are pending for Younger purposes until all appellate court remedies have been exhausted.” People United for Children, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 F.Supp.2d 275, 290 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Plaintiff's requests that this Court take specific action in the criminal proceedings implicate how the state court performs its judicial function and manages its proceedings. Younger abstention therefore applies, and this Court refrains from exercising jurisdiction over the criminal actions and will not intervene in those proceedings. Falco, 805 F.3d at 428.
G. Conditions of Confinement
Plaintiff alleges that, while she was detained at RMSC, she was subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Because it appears that Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee during the events giving rise to her claims, her claims arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29 (2d Cir. 2017). “[A] detainee's rights [under the Fourteenth Amendment] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.” Id. (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)).
To state such a conditions of confinement claim, a plaintiff must satisfy two elements: (1) an “objective” element, which requires a showing that the challenged conditions are sufficiently serious to pose an unreasonable risk to her health or safety, and (2) a “mental” element, which requires a showing that a correction official acted with at least deliberate indifference to the challenged conditions. Id.
For the objective element, a pretrial detainee “must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health” or safety, which “includes the risk of serious damage to ‘physical and mental soundness.'” Id. at 30 (citing Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013), and quoting LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 978 (2d Cir. 1972)). “[P]rison officials violate the Constitution when they deprive an inmate of his basic human needs such as food, clothing, medical care, and safety and sanitary living conditions.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
For the subjective element, a pretrial detainee must allege “that the defendant-official acted intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. The mere negligence of a correction official is not a proper basis for a claim of a federal constitutional violation under Section 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986).
Here, Plaintiff alleges incidents such as placement under mental observation for over three months, failure to be produced for court appearances, and subjection of red I.D. and maximum-security restraints. (ECF No. 1 at 10-11). Plaintiff fails to indicate when the events giving rise to her claims occurred and she does not name any Defendants involved in the alleged deprivation of her rights. She also alleges no facts suggesting that any individual defendants knew or should have known about each of the risky conditions but recklessly failed to act to mitigate the risk of each condition.
The Court therefore grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, solely with respect to her conditions of confinement claims, to name as defendants the individual DOC officers or employees who were personally involved in the events giving rise to her claims, lists the date(s) during which these events allegedly occurred, and to allege facts suggesting these defendants were deliberately indifferent to an objectively serious condition.
H. Timeliness
The statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims is found in the “general or residual [state] statute [of limitations] for personal injury actions.” Pearl v. City of Long Beach, 296 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989)). In New York, that period is three years. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(5). Section 1983 claims generally accrue when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of the claim. Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518 (2d Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff asserts that her claims arise out of events that occurred from 2015-18, 2020-23, and 2024 to the present. Plaintiff signed her complaint on March 5, 2024. Under the applicable three-year statute of limitations period, any claims based on events that occurred prior to March 5, 2021 are likely untimely.
Because the failure to file an action within the limitations period is an affirmative defense, a plaintiff is generally not required to plead that the case is timely filed. See Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2007). Dismissal is appropriate, however, where the existence of an affirmative defense, such as the statute of limitations, is plain from the face of the pleading. See Walters v. Indus. and Commercial Bank of China, Ltd., 651 F.3d 280, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss an action sua sponte on limitations grounds in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations in certain circumstances where the facts supporting the statute of limitations defense are set forth in the papers plaintiff himself submitted.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming sua sponte dismissal of complaint as frivolous on statute of limitations grounds); see also Abbas, 480 F.3d at 640 (concluding that district court should grant notice and opportunity to be heard before dismissing complaint sua sponte on statute of limitations grounds).
The face of the complaint indicates that any events that occurred prior to March 5, 2021 are likely time-barred. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants her 60 days to file an amended complaint containing facts that show cause why any conditions of confinement claims that arose prior to March 5, 2021 should not be dismissed as time barred. Plaintiff's amended complaint should state facts showing that equitable tolling should be applied in this case. See In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 318 F.3d 432, 436 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that the doctrine of equitable tolling permits a court, “under compelling circumstances, [to] make narrow exceptions to the statute of limitations in order ‘to prevent inequity'”). The statute of limitations may be equitably tolled, for example, when a defendant fraudulently conceals from a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has a cause of action, or when the plaintiff is induced by the defendant to forego a lawsuit until the statute of limitations has expired. See Pearl, 296 F.3d at 82-83.
LEAVE TO AMEND
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Because Plaintiff may be able to allege facts to state a conditions of confinement claims, the Court grants Plaintiff sixty days' leave to file an amended complaint.Accordingly, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend her complaint solely to allege conditions of confinement claims and to show cause why any conditions of confinement claims that occurred prior to March 5, 2021 should not be dismissed as time barred. First, Plaintiff must name as the defendant(s) in the captionand in the statement of claim those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of her federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint.The naming of John Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “John Doe” defendants and amending her complaint to include the identity of any “John Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires. Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, she must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Plaintiff must not name as Defendants in her amended complaint any Defendants who have been dismissed in this order. Should Plaintiff reassert claims against these Defendants in her amended complaint, those claims will be summarily dismissed.
The caption is located on the front page of the complaint. Each individual defendant must be named in the caption. Plaintiff may attach additional pages if there is not enough space to list all of the defendants in the caption. If Plaintiff needs to attach an additional page to list all defendants, she should write “see attached list” on the first page of the Amended Complaint. Any defendants named in the caption must also be discussed in Plaintiff's statement of claim.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2021, at Rikers Island, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights and how; when and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief.
Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wants to include from the original complaint must be repeated in the amended complaint.
CONCLUSION
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint,” and label the document with docket number 24-CV-1753 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The Clerk of Court is instructed to keep this action open on the docket until judgment is entered.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
SO ORDERED.