Opinion
No. 6:18-cv-01976-AA
12-19-2018
SHELTON BERRY; LAKRISHIA WATTS, Plaintiffs, v. C.P.S. EUGENE OREGON a.k.a. CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES; ALEX LAZAR; HOLLY WEAVER, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
:
Plaintiffs LaKrishia Watts and Shelton Berry seek leave to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") in this action. (doc. 3). For the reasons set forth below, the Amended Complaint (doc. 8) is DISMISSED with leave to amend and defendant Child Protective Services is dismissed with prejudice. The Court shall defer ruling on plaintiffs' IFP petition and Motion for Appointment of Pro Bono Counsel (doc. 9) pending submission of an amended complaint.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the Amended Complaint and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs LaKrishia Watts and Shelton Berry met in August 2017 and have been in a romantic relationship for over a year. Throughout that time, Mr. Berry has been a father figure to Ms. Watts' minor children, supporting them emotionally and financially. At some point in mid-2018, plaintiffs and the children moved into a house together.
Mr. Berry is subject to supervision, either as part of parole or court-imposed probation. It generally appears that one or more terms of Mr. Berry's supervision are inconsistent with his having care or custody of Ms. Watt's children. Plaintiffs assert that on October 1, 2018, defendant Child Protective Services ("CPS") took custody of the children while they were in Mr. Berry's care. The children were subsequently placed in foster care and their custody is the subject of an ongoing juvenile dependency proceeding in the Oregon state courts.
Plaintiffs initiated this action on November 13, 2018, by filing a pro se Complaint (doc. 1), Motion for Emergency Injunction (doc. 2), and an IFP petition. On November 14, 2018, plaintiffs also filed a Petition for Emergency Injunction (doc. 4). On November 15, 2018, the Court issued an Opinion and Order (doc. 6) denying the motion and petition for emergency injunction. On November 28, 2018, Mr. Berry filed the operative Amended Complaint (doc. 8), adding Alex Lazar and Holly Weaver as defendants.
LEGAL STANDARD
Generally, all parties instituting any civil action in United States District Court must pay a statutory filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). However, the federal IFP statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), provides indigent litigants an opportunity for meaningful access to federal courts despite their inability to pay the costs and fees associated with that access. To authorize a litigant to proceed IFP, a court must make two determinations. First, a court must determine whether the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Second, it must assess whether the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
With respect to the second determination, district courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) to screen complaints even before service of the complaint on the defendants and must dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Courts apply the same standard under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standards, the complaint must include a short and plain statement of the claim and "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard . . . asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. The court is not required to accept legal conclusions, unsupported by alleged facts, as true. Id.
Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent standards than pleadings by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). That is, the court should construe pleadings by pro se plaintiffs liberally and afford the plaintiffs the benefit of any doubt. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988). Additionally, a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and the opportunity to amend, unless the complaint's deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment. Id.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs allege that CPS took the children without evidence of abuse or neglect and that the agency has vaccinated the children without notifying Ms. Watts or obtaining her consent. Defendant Holly Weaver is a CPS caseworker. Ms. Watts met Ms. Weaver during an intake meeting at CPS after the children were first taken into custody. At that meeting, Ms. Watts asked that her children be able to attend their regular church while in foster care. Plaintiffs allege that the children have not been to any church services while in state custody. Defendant Alex Lazar is the children's current CPS caseworker and he supervises Ms. Watts' visits with her children. Plaintiffs allege that Mr. Lazar fabricated allegations against Mr. Berry and induced the children to endorse the allegations by, among other things, bribing them with ice cream.
Plaintiffs appear to assert claims for constitutional violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of his federal rights." Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). To maintain a claim under § 1983, "a plaintiff must both (1) allege the deprivation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or statutory law, and (2) allege that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). In the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs assert that defendants violated Mr. Berry's First Amendment rights and Ms. Watts' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth amendments.
The claims against defendant CPS are dismissed with prejudice because it is immune from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. The remaining claims, against Holly Weaver and Alex Lazar, are dismissed without prejudice. As explained in greater detail below, Mr. Berry's claim against the individual defendants is dismissed because it fails to state a claim for a First Amendment violation and Ms. Watts' claims are dismissed because she seeks relief that the Court cannot provide.
I. Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity
CPS is an Oregon state agency and is part of the State of Oregon's Department of Human Services. See Or. Rev. Stat. § 418.005 (describing the powers of the Department of Human Services); Or. Admin. Code 407-045-0820(10) (defining "CPS" as "a specialized social service program that the Department [of Human Services] provides").
The Eleventh Amendment provides that a state is immune from suit in federal court unless Congress has abrogated the state's immunity by appropriate federal legislation or the state itself has waived it. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253-54 (2011). This grant of immunity covers not just the state itself, but also the state's agencies. P. R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf, 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).
As noted, plaintiffs appear to bring their claims under § 1983. Congress has not abrogated state sovereign immunity in § 1983. See Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp., 683 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiffs' claims against CPS arise under § 1983, those claims are barred by sovereign immunity. This jurisdictional deficiency cannot be remedied by amendment; therefore, those claims are dismissed with prejudice.
The Court is mindful of the fact that pro se plaintiffs should be given the benefit of the doubt, so plaintiffs will be given leave to restate their claims on some other basis, if they are able to do so. II. Mr. Berry's First Amendment Claim
Mr. Berry asserts a claim for a vague and undefined First Amendment violation. Mr. Berry fails to explain how any of the defendants violated his First Amendment rights. In the absence of any clear factual allegations, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint fails to state a claim for violation of Mr. Berry's First Amendment rights and that claim is dismissed without prejudice.
To the extent that Mr, Berry meant to join in Ms. Watts' claims, those claims are also dismissed, for the reasons discussed below in Section III. III. Ms. Watts' Claims are Barred by Younger Abstention
Plaintiffs assert that defendants' actions have violated Ms. Watts' rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments. At the core of the Amended Complaint, plaintiffs seek an order granting them custody of the children. See Amend, Compl. at 5 (asking the Court to act "before it's too late to save a loving normal family"). As such, plaintiffs seek relief that this Court cannot grant.
Plaintiffs specifically ask the Court to intervene in ongoing state court proceedings by removing the pending juvenile dependency case from state to federal court and by ordering the state court to delay its "settlement hearing" in that dependency case. See Compl. at 4 (asking to "have this case moved from the state courts to the Federal District Court" and for "an injunction against the state to stop them moving any further with the case" until the Court reviews plaintiffs' alleged constitutional violations); Amend. Compl. at 5 (asking the Court to "postpone [the] safety meeting or settlement hearing").
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54 (1971), the Supreme Court held that federal courts must abstain from deciding a case when the plaintiff seeks relief that would interfere with an ongoing state criminal prosecution. Later, the Supreme Court extended the Younger abstention doctrine to a limited category of state civil cases, including civil enforcement actions "akin to" criminal proceedings, Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604 (1975), and to suits challenging "the core of the administration of a State's judicial system," Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977). In federal court cases involving state civil cases, abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: "(1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state's interest in enforcing orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges." ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Sprint Commc'ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 80-82 (2013)). If those four elements are established, the Court then considers a fifth element: "whether the federal action would have the practical effect of enjoining the state proceedings and whether an exception to Younger applies." Id. Exceptions to Younger abstention arise if bad faith, harassment or some other extraordinary circumstances in the state proceedings would make abstention inappropriate. Middlesex Cnty Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982).
In Sprint, the Supreme Court explained that the kinds of quasi-criminal enforcement actions that implicate Younger abstention include "state-initiated proceeding[s] to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents." Sprint Commc'ns., Inc., 571 U.S. at 80 (citing Moore v. Simms, 442 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1979)). In Moore, the Supreme Court specifically held that claims related to ongoing juvenile proceedings in state court are properly dismissed in federal court under the Younger doctrine. 442 U.S. at 415.
In this case, all four threshold elements are present. First, the claims clearly relate to an ongoing juvenile dependency proceeding in Oregon state court. Second, based on Moore and Sprint, the ongoing dependency proceedings related to this case are the kind of quasi-criminal enforcement actions that implicate Younger abstention. Third, the dependency proceedings implicate important interests of the state, including the safety and well-being of children; safeguarding and promoting healthy relationships between children, their families, and other adults; and guarding parents' rights to protect the rights and interests of their children. See Or, Rev. Stat. §§ 419B.090(2)-(4) (describing the constitutional and statutory rights of children and parents and the State of Oregon's role in safeguarding and promoting those rights), The Supreme Court has also recognized that "[f]amily relations are a traditional area of state concern" and that such state interests are implicated in state court dependency proceedings. Moore, 442 U.S. at 435. Fourth, Ms. Watts will have an opportunity to challenge the removal of her children and to litigate the placement of her children in the state court proceedings.
The fifth element of the Younger analysis also indicates that abstention is appropriate. Because the only remedies that plaintiffs seek are removal of the dependency case to federal court and orders staying the state court proceedings, any action taken by this Court with respect to plaintiffs' claims would have the effect of interfering with currently pending state court proceedings. And plaintiffs' allegations do not describe any "exceptional circumstances" to warrant this Court's interference in the state court dependency proceedings.
The Court therefore concludes that the Younger abstention doctrine applies and dismisses Ms. Watts' claims without prejudice. Howard v. City of Milton, 63 F.App'x 978, 978 (9th Cir. 2003) ("When Younger abstention applies, it is appropriate to dismiss the action without prejudice.").
Because it is not clear that the deficiencies of the Amended Complaint could not be cured by amendment, plaintiffs are granted leave to file a second amended complaint. In drafting the second amended complaint, plaintiffs must bear in mind that the Court does not know anything about the facts of their case, other than what they choose to include in the second amended complaint. Plaintiffs should carefully explain what has happened, who has done what, how they believe they were injured by the actions of the defendants, and why they believe the defendants should be held liable for the injury. Plaintiffs should also bear in mind that matters of child custody are a traditional and important area of state concern and that the ability of federal courts to interfere in such matters is extremely limited. It is highly likely that the relief plaintiffs seem to be seeking is more readily available and more properly sought in the Oregon state courts.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Amended Complaint (doc. 8) is DISMISSED with prejudice as to plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims against CPS. The Amended Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend as to plaintiffs' other claims. Plaintiffs shall have thirty (30) days in which to file a second amended complaint. Plaintiffs are advised that failure to file a second amended complaint within the allotted time will result in the entry of a judgment of dismissal. The Court defers ruling on plaintiffs' IFP petition (doc. 3) and motion for pro bono counsel (doc. 9) until plaintiffs file a second amended complaint or the time for doing so has expired.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this 19th day of December 2018.
/s/_________
ANN AIKEN
United States District Judge