Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-0019-13T4
03-06-2015
JULIANNE BERNSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW and PARK RIDGE BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendants-Respondents.
Springstead & Maurice, attorneys for appellant (Harold N. Springstead and Lauren E. McGovern, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alan C. Stephens, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Park Ridge Board of Education has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fuentes and O'Connor. On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 402,423. Springstead & Maurice, attorneys for appellant (Harold N. Springstead and Lauren E. McGovern, on the brief). John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Alan C. Stephens, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Park Ridge Board of Education has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Julianne Bernstein appeals from the final decision of the Board of Review finding her ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits from June 24, 2012 through May 11, 2013. We affirm.
Appellant was employed by the Park Ridge Board of Education as an athletic trainer for the school district. She was injured in a work-related accident on October 1, 2011, and remained unable to return to work until December 2011. She returned to work thereafter but remained under medical care for post-concussion syndrome, headaches, nausea, and general dizziness. She was terminated from her employment when her job was eliminated and outsourced on May 26, 2012.
Appellant filed an application for unemployment compensation and collected benefits in the amount of $611 per week from July 7, 2012 through August 25, 2012, for a total of $4,888. She applied and began collecting disability benefits effective August 1, 2012. Appellant claimed that her work-related injury left her unable to perform heavy lifting and other physically demanding activities. Given these physical limitations, appellant claimed she was no longer able to perform the duties associated with the position of an athletic trainer.
She claimed she interviewed for the position of physical therapist at Spectrum Physical Therapy and Athletic Training in Old Tappan, and at Performance Physical Therapy in Wayne. She did not contact any other employer because she was still receiving cognitive rehabilitation treatment during this time period. After she began receiving disability payments in August 2012, her job search consisted of looking through the newspapers for employment advertising.
In a decision mailed to appellant on October 11, 2012, the Deputy Director of the Division of Unemployment and Disability Insurance determined appellant ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits based on being both unavailable for and unable to work, as provided for in N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(c)(1). The Director demanded that appellant pay back the $4,888 she previously received as unemployment compensation benefits. The Appeal Tribunal affirmed the Director's determination.
Appellant appealed to the Board of Review, which affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's determination and ordered her to repay the $4,888 in benefits. Appellant concedes she must refund benefit payments she received after August 1, 2012. However, she disputes the Board's finding that she merely "demonstrate[d] passive and minimal attempt[s] to obtain employment" during July 2012.
Our review of administrative agency decisions is limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). "'[I]n reviewing the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). We also give due regard to the agency's credibility findings. Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997). Unless the agency's action "was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable, the agency's ruling should not be disturbed." Brady, supra, 152 N.J. at 210.
Our appellate function is ordinarily limited to the following three areas of review:
(1) whether the agency's action violates express or implied legislative policies, that is, did the agency follow the law; (2) whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the findings on which the agency based its action; and (3) whether in applying the legislative policies to the facts, the agency clearly erred in reaching a conclusion that could not reasonably have
been made on a showing of the relevant factors.
[In Re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 28 (2007) (quoting Mazza v. Bd. of Trs., 143 N.J. 22, 25 (1995)).]
Mindful of this standard of review, we discern no legal basis to interfere with the Board's decision in this case. We thus affirm substantially based on the reasons expressed by the Board of Review. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D).
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(c)(1) provides, in pertinent part: "An unemployed individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to any week eligible only if: The individual is able to work, and is available for work, and has demonstrated to be actively seeking work . . . ."