" EPIC v. DOJ , 584 F.Supp.2d 65, 80 (D.D.C. 2008).Moreover, ACLJ's argument is "at odds with the established principle that Exemption 5 protects from disclosure documents that ‘fall within the ambit of a privilege’ such that they would not be ‘routinely or normally’ disclosed in civil discovery upon a showing of relevance," Berman v. CIA , 378 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1220 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (quoting Klamath Water , 532 U.S. at 7, 121 S.Ct. 1060 ), aff'd , 501 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007). This principle suggests that "courts interpreting Exemption 5 focus on the content or nature of the document, as opposed to the manner in which the exemption is raised in a particular situation."

See Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Dep't of Justice, 539 F.Supp.2d 363, 365-68 (D.D.C. 2008). Similarly, when a FOIA plaintiff sought documents from the Defense Department "regarding procedures for the forwarding of military death penalty cases to the President," the government successfully withheld those records based on Exemption 5. Loving v. Dep't of Defense, 496 F.Supp.2d 101, 104, 106-09 (D.D.C. 2007); see also, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Dep't of Defense, 499 F.Supp.2d 501, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding comments sent from a White House Counsel's Office attorney regarding the President's radio address protected from disclosure by Exemption 5); Berman v. CIA, 378 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1218-22 (E.D.Cal. 2005) (finding daily briefings from President Lyndon Johnson's term of office protected by Exemption 5). As these examples well demonstrate, invocation of the presidential communications privilege in FOIA cases is a routine occurrence, not a uniquely intrusive burden. Having found no jurisdictional basis under which we can proceed, we conclude with the language with which we closed in Green:

" The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the CIA, holding that the CIA had made an adequate showing that the documents were shielded from disclosure by exemptions 3 and 5. See Berman v. CIA 378 F.Supp.2d 1209 (E.D.Cal. 2005). This timely appeal followed.

See, e.g. , Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep't of Homeland Security , No. 06-cv-0173 (RJL), 2008 WL 2872183, at *2–3 (D.D.C. July 22, 2008) ; Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Office of Mgmt. & Budget , No. 07-cv-4997, 2009 WL 2940204, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 25 2009), as amended (Sept 9, 2009); Berman v. CIA , 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1218–22 (E.D. Cal. 2005) ; N.Y. Times Co. v. Dep't of Def. , 499 F. Supp. 2d 501, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). Cause of Action's argument is unpersuasive.

Amnesty Int'l , 728 F.Supp.2d at 522-23 (concluding that the presidential communications privilege applies to documents containing CIA's recommendations relating to detainee policies and decisions to be made by the President); Loving , 496 F.Supp.2d at 107 (holding the presidential communications privilege applied to transmittal memos from the Secretaries of Army and Defense containing court-martial death sentence recommendations requiring presidential approval); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , No. CIV. 06-0173 (RJL), 2008 WL 2872183, at *3 (D.D.C. July 22, 2008) (applying the presidential communications privilege to documents regarding FEMA's response to Hurricane Katrina); New York Times Co. , 499 F.Supp.2d at 516 (holding that an email from an attorney in the White House Counsel's Office seeking the Attorney General's comments on a draft presidential radio address was properly withheld under the presidential communications privilege); Berman v. CIA , 378 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1218-22 (E.D. Ca. 2005) (applying the presidential communications privilege to the CIA's Daily Presidential Briefs). Many of these cases do not discuss whether the power at issue is an Article II power or a statutory power.

Rather, a declarant in a FOIA case satisfies Rule 56(c)(4) if he attests to his personal knowledge of the procedures used in handling plaintiff's FOIA request and his familiarity with the documents in question. See, e.g., Spannaus v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d 1285, 1289 (4th Cir. 1987); Barnard v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 531 F.Supp.2d 131, 138 (D.D.C. 2008); Berman v. C.I.A., 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 n. 7 (E.D. Cal. 2005), aff'd, 501 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2007). These cases do not establish that a FOIA declarant does not need personal knowledge of or at least familiarity with the documents in question.

Rather, a declarant in a FOIA case satisfies Rule 56(c)(4) if she attests to her personal knowledge of the procedures used in handling plaintiff's FOIA request and her familiarity with the documents in question. See, e.g. , Spannaus v. U.S. Dep't of Justice , 813 F.2d 1285, 1289 (4th Cir.1987) ; Gahagan v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. , No. CIV.A. 14–1268, 2015 WL 5321749, at *5 (E.D.La. Sept. 11, 2015) ; Barnard v. Dep't of Homeland Sec. , 531 F.Supp.2d 131, 138 (D.D.C.2008) ; Berman v. C.I.A. , 378 F.Supp.2d 1209, 1216 n. 7 (E.D.Cal.2005), aff'd , 501 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir.2007). The Court finds this precedent persuasive.

For an action involving a FOIA request, an agency may submit a declaration from an agency official with "responsibility for coordinating the agency's decisions on FOIA requests where that official has personal knowledge of the procedures used in handling the FOIA request at issue and is familiar with the documents in question." Berman v. Cent. Intelligence Agency, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1216 n. 7 (E.D. Cal. 2005); see also SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, 926 F.2d 1197, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding declarant's second-hand knowledge sufficient because she interviewed the relevant employees). Hardy stated the following about how he acquired knowledge about the FBI's search: