R.C. 2945.06 sets forth no procedures authorizing the panel to request a visiting judge to rule on the admissibility of victim-impact evidence. Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 128-129, 3 OBR 141, 443 N.E.2d 1375; Rosenberg v. Gattarello (1976), 49 Ohio App.2d 87, 93-94, 3 O.O.3d 151, 359 N.E.2d 467; see, also, State ex rel. Chavis v. Griffin (2001), 91 Ohio St.3d 50, 51, 741 N.E.2d 130. The Ohio Rules of Superintendence provide that the judge assigned to a case under the individual assignment system "becomes primarily responsible for the determination of every issue and proceeding in the case until its termination."
{¶ 5} Rolfe's second claim is that under the Rules of Superintendence 3, 4, and 36 Judge Galvin was not a properly assigned judge, because it is not possible to trace the proper assignment of judges through the dockets and because the administrative judge did not properly issue an order re-assigning her to the case after she recused herself. In Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125; 443 N.E.2d 1375, the court held that under the Rules of Superintendence the reassignment of any case must be accompanied by a journal entry from the administrative judge which states a justifiable reason for transferring the case to another judge. "Absent such an entry, the judge assuming to act has no authority and his rulings are voidable on timely objection by any party." 3 Ohio App.3d at 130.
Nevertheless, we find that type of review to be unnecessary in this case because appellant waived his right to challenge the authority of Judge Moon by his failure to make a timely objection prior to sentencing. Such a waiver is supported in Brown v. Brown (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 45, 47, 15 OBR 73, 75, 472 N.E.2d 361, 362; McKinley, supra; Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 130-131, 3 OBR 141, 146-148, 443 N.E.2d 1375, 1381-1382; and; State ex rel. Dake, supra. As stated in Brown, supra, 15 Ohio App.3d at 47, 15 OBR at 75, 472 N.E.2d at 363:
First, appellant asserts that Judge White did not have the authority to rule on the issue of class certification. Appellant claims that Judge Huffman was assigned to this case and absent a journal entry or other order transferring the case to Judge White, the latter did not have the authority to make any rulings. Appellant argues that Brown v. Brown (1984), 15 Ohio App.3d 45, 15 OBR 73, 472 N.E.2d 361, and Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 3 OBR 141, 443 N.E.2d 1375, are controlling in this case. The Berger court, relying on C.P.Sup.R. 4, held that in a multi-judge general division of each court of common pleas, a transfer of a case between judges must be journalized or the judge assuming the case has no authority and his rulings are voidable on timely objection by any party.
{¶ 23} The purpose behind the rules permitting reassignment or temporary assignment of judges is to "eliminate whimsical transfers" and to "inhibit real or perceived `judge shopping' and judicial favoritism." Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 128. {¶ 24} Assignment from one judge to another must certainly be free from the appearance of impropriety, and the rules are also designed to prevent judge shopping.
In a case in which a party appealed the issue of the authority of the assigned judge, the Ninth Appellate District held that by failing to object to the assignment before the judge took any action in the case, the party waived its right to raise the issue on appeal. Boling v. Valecko (Feb. 6, 2002), Summit App. No. 20464, at 6, 2002 WL 185182, citing White v. Summit Cty. (2000), 138 Ohio App.3d 116, 118, 740 N.E.2d 688, quoting Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 131, 3 OBR 141, 443 N.E.2d 1375. "[A]ny procedural irregularities that may attend a transfer of a case [to a visiting judge] are waived unless asserted in a timely manner. `A party cannot await the decision with knowledge of the procedural irregularity before choosing to object to the defect if the decision is unfavorable.
Rather, transfers violate governing procedural rules if the record does not show that they have been made by the proper authority with a proper reason." Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 130. Kopniske and Uher made no fraud or bad faith arguments in their appeal. Their due process argument, therefore, fails. Nonetheless, they do state an error which requires this court's attention.
The journal entry reassigning a case must set out a justifiable reason for the transfer. Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 3 OBR 141, 443 N.E.2d 1375. Absent such a journal entry, the reassigned judge had no authority, and actions of the reassigned judge are voidable.
The law is thus clear that, barring an unforeseen circumstance, the judge assigned to a case retains jurisdiction over that case from its inception until its final disposition. This court dealt adequately with the legality of case reassignment in Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 3 OBR 141, 443 N.E.2d 1375, where we held that "reassignment of any case must be accompanied by a journal entry executed by the administrative judge which states a justifiable reason for transferring responsibility for the case to another judge. Absent such an entry, the judge assuming to act has no authority and his rulings are voidable on timely objection by any party." The record in the instant case reveals that the original judge assigned to the case stayed with the case until its conclusion.
As can be seen, the rule vests the originally assigned judge with "primary responsibility" for the determination of preliminary matters, but also expressly allows such matters to be submitted for disposition to the administrative judge if the assigned judge is unavailable. As observed by the court in Berger v. Berger (1981), 3 Ohio App.3d 125, 128, 3 OBR 141, 144, 443 N.E.2d 1375, 1379, the purpose of the rule is to "eliminate whimsical transfers," and to "inhibit real or perceived `judge shopping' and judicial favoritism." The rule does not, however, absolutely prohibit transfers from the assigned judge, nor, with regard to the particular facts of this case, does the rule prohibit an assigned judge who is the administrative judge from transferring a matter to a visiting judge.