Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. TC021851, Rose Hom, Judge.
Law Office of Spix & Martin, Richard L. Spix and D. Elizabeth Martin for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Veatch Carlson and Cyril Czajkowskyj for Defendants and Respondents.
ROTHSCHILD, J.
Plaintiff Kevin Banuelos appeals from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants Gerald Butler, Mary Butler, Sprkncdoych, LLC, Eastfield Properties, LLC, Diane Valine, Peter Starflinger and Marcelina Real Estate Services, Inc., doing business as LAI Properties, LLC (collectively, defendants) in this action arising out of Banuelos’s applications to become a tenant in the Park Granada mobilehome park in Carson. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The Complaint
On April 1, 2008, Banuelos filed this action against defendants. According to the complaint, Banuelos notified defendants in November 2007 that he would become the owner of a mobilehome in Park Granada and applied for approval to live in the park as transferee of the mobilehome. On December 10, 2007, Banuelos obtained certificate of title designating him the legal owner of the mobilehome. Nevertheless, defendants refused his tenant applications for reasons other than the limited grounds authorized by Civil Code section 798.74-lack of financial ability to pay the park’s rent and charges or a reasonable determination by management, based on prior tenancies, that he would not comply with the park’s rules and regulations. Banuelos claimed that defendants refused his tenant applications for the improper purpose of forcing him to abandon the mobilehome to them for little or no consideration so that they could rent out both the mobilehome and the space, which would allow them to avoid Carson’s rent control ordinance applicable only to space rental. Based on these facts, Banuelos alleged six causes of action: (1) statutory violations under section 798.74; (2) wrongful interference with contract; (3) wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (5) negligence; and (6) unfair business practices pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 17200. He sought compensatory, punitive and statutory damages, injunctive relief and attorney fees.
Defendants are Sprkncdoych, LLC and Eastfield Properties, LLC, which from 2007 to 2009 owned Park Granada; Marcelina Real Estate Service, Inc., doing business as LAI Properties, LLC, which managed the park through Peter Starflinger; Gerald and Mary Butler, who were members of Eastfield Properties, LLC from 2004 to 2009; and Diane Valine, who was a member of Sprkncdoych, LLC from 2007 to 2009. Banuelos also sued 218 Properties, LLC, which purchased Park Granada from Sprkncdoych, LLC and Eastfield Properties, LLC in 2009, but dismissed it without prejudice before the summary judgment proceedings. Banuelos also dismissed without prejudice 21 Roses, LLC, another defendant, shortly before entry of judgment. 218 Properties, LLC and 21 Roses, LLC thus are not parties to this appeal.
Statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise noted. Section 798.74 provides: “(a) The management may require the right of prior approval of a purchaser of a mobilehome that will remain in the park and that the selling homeowner or his or her agent give notice of the sale to the management before the close of the sale. Approval cannot be withheld if the purchaser has the financial ability to pay the rent and charges of the park unless the management reasonably determines that, based on the purchaser’s prior tenancies, he or she will not comply with the rules and regulations of the park. In determining whether the purchaser has the financial ability to pay the rent and charges of the park, the management shall not require the purchaser to submit copies of any personal income tax returns in order to obtain approval for residency in the park. However, management may require the purchaser to document the amount and source of his or her gross monthly income or means of financial support. [¶] Upon request of any prospective homeowner who proposes to purchase a mobilehome that will remain in the park, management shall inform that person of the information management will require in order to determine if the person will be acceptable as a homeowner in the park. [¶] Within 15 business days of receiving all of the information requested from the prospective homeowner, the management shall notify the seller and the prospective homeowner, in writing, of either acceptance or rejection of the application, and the reason if rejected. During this 15-day period the prospective homeowner shall comply with the management’s request, if any, for a personal interview. If the approval of a prospective homeowner is withheld for any reason other than those stated in this article, the management or owner may be held liable for all damages proximately resulting therefrom. [¶] (b) If the management collects a fee or charge from a prospective purchaser of a mobilehome in order to obtain a financial report or credit rating, the full amount of the fee or charge shall be credited toward payment of the first month’s rent for that mobilehome purchaser. If, for whatever reason, the prospective purchaser is rejected by the management, the management shall refund to the prospective purchaser the full amount of that fee or charge within 30 days from the date of rejection. If the prospective purchaser is approved by the management, but, for whatever reason, the prospective purchaser elects not to purchase the mobilehome, the management may retain the fee, or a portion thereof, to defray its administrative costs under this section.” (Italics added.)
2. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that Banuelos’s statutory and common law causes of action based on the processing of his applications to become a tenant in Park Granada lacked merit as a matter of law.
In support of the motion, defendants presented evidence that in June 2002 Banuelos, then a teenager, moved into the mobilehome park with his mother and lived there for several years before obtaining his own apartment. Banuelos’s mother regularly helped her elderly neighbor, George LeFaive, with taking care of his mobilehome and running errands for him, and Banuelos sometimes helped LeFaive as well with maintenance of the mobilehome. In 2007, when LeFaive decided to move from the mobilehome park to a convalescent home, he offered his mobilehome to Banuelos’s mother. Thinking that she did not need a second mobilehome, Banuelos’s mother declined, but suggested to LeFaive that he give the mobilehome to Banuelos. LeFaive said he would give the mobilehome to Banuelos, and Banuelos’s mother told Banuelos that LeFaive would give him the mobilehome and that she thought it was a good opportunity for him. Banuelos agreed.
Jim Bernal, LeFaive’s stepson, then gave Banuelos a form notice of transfer for the mobilehome, which indicated that Banuelos was paying nothing for the mobilehome and that it was a gift, and Banuelos testified in deposition that the mobilehome was “gifted” to him. Banuelos filed forms to obtain legal ownership of the mobilehome and applied to Park Granada on October 24, 2007, to become a tenant. Banuelos told Park Granada that certain documents requested by the park would not apply to him, such as a purchase agreement, escrow papers and a pre-sale inspection report, because “the mobilehome was given to [him] by its previous owner.” Park Granada considered Banuelos’s application incomplete because it lacked proof of ownership and LeFaive was paying rent on the space through December 2007. Not receiving additional information, Park Granada denied the tenant application on November 7, 2007. Banuelos submitted another tenant application later in November 2007.
Banuelos’s request for admissions to one of the defendants also referred twice to the transfer of the mobilehome as a gift.
On December 10, 2007, Banuelos obtained certificate of title and apparently notified Park Granada that he was now the legal owner. Banuelos then helped move LeFaive’s belongings out of the mobilehome and began to improve the mobilehome, such as by installing new plumbing, floors, electrical and drywall, building a storage shed and repairing the roof. Park Granada questioned whether Banuelos had obtained the proper permits for improvements to the mobilehome. Banuelos also spoke to Starflinger, as management of the park, who informed Banuelos that he needed to provide his Social Security card to complete his application. Banuelos told Starflinger he had lost his card. In early January 2008, Banuelos received another rejection of his tenancy.
Banuelos submitted a new tenant application on January 21, 2008. In February 2008, he requested a replacement Social Security card. Despite lacking approval of his tenant applications, Banuelos lived in the mobilehome and in January 2008 began paying rent to Park Granada of approximately $300 per month, which he believed to be about the correct amount of rent. His rental checks were returned. According to defendants, Banuelos never submitted his Social Security card, instead filing this action in April 2008. Banuelos said he missed work and school and suffered from stress, but did not visit a medical practitioner, as a result of defendants’ actions.
Based on this evidence, defendants argued that, because Banuelos had obtained the mobilehome as a gift, section 798.74, which governs only prospective purchasers of mobilehomes, did not afford Banuelos a statutory cause of action for damages and that the common law causes of action also were not legally viable. Defendants asserted that, because Park Granada had been sold in 2009, they could not be subject to an injunction regarding business practices at the park.
3. Banuelos’s Opposition
In opposition, Banuelos argued that section 798.74 should apply regardless whether the tenant applicant acquired the mobilehome by purchase or by gift. Although he had testified in deposition that the transfer of the mobilehome was a gift and the notice designated the transfer as a gift, Banuelos also attempted to demonstrate by declaration that a contract existed between him and either LeFaive or Bernal because Bernal had agreed to transfer the mobilehome to Banuelos for the consideration of Banuelos helping LeFaive move out of and clean the mobilehome. Banuelos claimed this purported contract qualified the transfer as a purchase under section 798.74 and, in any event, showed that his common law causes of action could not be summarily resolved.
As further support for his common law causes of action, Bernal asserted that defendants had selectively required a Social Security card from him, but not from others whom they wanted as tenants in the park, as an excuse to deny his tenancy so that they could seek and acquire ownership of his mobilehome and rent it along with the space and avoid Carson’s rent control ordinance, as opposed to simply renting the space to him in which case rent control would apply. Banuelos claimed the park’s adoption of a rule prohibiting the riding of motorcycles in the park purportedly after he had ridden a motorcycle in the park, and their refusal of his monthly rent payments on the basis that he was not a tenant of the park and institution of an unlawful detainer action against LeFaive and his deceased wife, demonstrated their improper motives toward him. Banuelos requested judicial notice of documents from another court action against some of the defendants based on their refusal of tenant applications, and of the purported fact that “the Social Security card in use today in this country contains no security features and is easily and routinely forged.”
Banuelos conceded his Business and Professions Code section 17200 cause of action was “moot[]” because Park Granada had new owners and defendants thus could not be subject to an injunction to remedy unlawful business practices.
4. Defendants’ Reply and Objections
In reply, defendants objected to the paragraphs in Banuelos’s declaration suggesting that the transfer of the mobilehome was not a gift but was made for consideration, arguing that his statements contradicted his deposition testimony that the mobilehome had been “gifted” to him, and asserted, in any event, that the statements did not show any assistance Banuelos had provided to LeFaive was consideration for transfer of the mobilehome. Defendants also objected to the judicial notice request, contending that evidence of another action was irrelevant to the issues on summary judgment and any purported fact about Social Security cards was not a proper subject for judicial notice. Defendants maintained that Banuelos’s opposition evidence was insufficient for any of his causes of action to survive summary judgment.
5. The Trial Court’s Order Granting the Motion and Entry of Judgment
After a two-day hearing on the motion, the trial court issued an order granting summary judgment. The court first sustained defendants’ objections to Banuelos’s declaration regarding his statements suggesting the transfer of the mobilehome to him was anything other than a gift. It also declined to take judicial notice of the documents submitted in opposition to summary judgment that related to the other court action involving some of the defendants and of the purported fact that Social Security cards “contain[] no security features and [are] easily and routinely forged.”
Addressing each cause of action, the court concluded that: (1) the undisputed evidence establishes the transfer of the mobilehome was a gift and thus section 798.74, which applies only to prospective purchasers, does not govern and cannot serve as a basis for Banuelos to recover statutory damages; (2) Banuelos cannot prove a cause of action for wrongful interference with contract because the mobilehome was a gift, not the subject of a contract, and, in any event, the gift was complete and defendants thus did not disrupt the transfer; (3) no valid cause of action exists for wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage because the evidence fails to show a plan to sell the mobilehome, defendants’ awareness of any such plan or a prospective purchaser; (4) the negligence cause of action legally fails because Banuelos did not establish defendants owed him a legal duty of care; (5) given Banuelos raised no statutory or common law basis to hold defendants liable, defendants did not exhibit extreme and outrageous conduct and Banuelos did not incur any medical treatment for stress to prove intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6) as Banuelos conceded, the unfair business practices cause of action seeking injunctive relief is moot based on the sale of the park to nondefendant owners. Judgment was entered for defendants. Banuelos timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
A trial court must grant a summary judgment motion when no triable issue exists as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) We independently review the trial court’s decision, “considering all of the evidence the parties offered in connection with the motion (except that which the court properly excluded) and the uncontradicted inferences the evidence reasonably supports. [Citation.] In the trial court, once a moving defendant has ‘shown that one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately pleaded, cannot be established, ’ the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show the existence of a triable issue; to meet that burden, the plaintiff ‘may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings... but, instead, shall set forth the specific facts showing that a triable issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action....’ [Citations.]” (Merrill v. Navegar, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 465, 476-477.)
2. The Trial Court Properly Resolved Banuelos’s Statutory Cause of Action Under Section 798.74 on Summary Judgment
The Mobilehome Residency Law (§ 798 et seq.) governs tenancies in mobilehome parks. The provision under which Banuelos has sued defendants, section 798.74, subdivison (a), provides in relevant part that “[t]he management may require the right of prior approval of a purchaser of a mobilehome that will remain in the park and that the selling homeowner or his or her agent give notice of the sale to the management before the close of the sale. Approval cannot be withheld if the purchaser has the financial ability to pay the rent and charges of the park unless the management reasonably determines that, based on the purchaser’s prior tenancies, he or she will not comply with the rules and regulations of the park.” (Italics added.) If management refuses a tenancy for reasons other than those specified in the statute, it may be liable for “all damages proximately resulting therefrom.” (Ibid.)
Banuelos’s theory of liability is that section 798.74 applies regardless whether a proposed tenant purchases a mobilehome in the park or acquires it by gift and that, because defendants refused his tenancy for reasons other than his ability to pay the rent and park charges or a reasonable determination that he will not obey the rules and regulations of the park, they are liable to him for damages. But section 798.74’s language and purpose, and case law describing the statute, refute his theory that it governs both the purchase and gift of a mobilehome.
Initially, the statute’s language signifies that it applies only to the purchase of a mobilehome in the park. The Legislature repeatedly uses the word “purchaser” and refers to the “selling homeowner” and to the “sale” of the mobilehome. The language, and thus the overall tone of the statute, indicates that the Legislature intended that it apply only in the context of a purchase of mobilehome. (Patarak v. Williams (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 826, 829 [goal in interpreting provision of Mobilehome Residency Law is to “‘ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature’”]; see Torrey Hills Community Coalition v. City of San Diego (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 429, 440 [“‘“If there is no ambiguity in the language of the statute, ‘then the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the language governs.’”’”].)
Although in several places the statute contains the term “prospective homeowner, ” it is used in the context of the sale of a mobilehome. (E.g., § 798.74, subd. (a) [“prospective homeowner who proposes to purchase a mobilehome that will remain in the park” (italics added); ibid. [discussing notification to seller and prospective homeowner of acceptance or rejection of tenant application and providing basis for statutory damages if rejection is based on reasons other than those specified].) Moreover, the Legislature used more broad language in other parts of the Mobilehome Residency Law, indicating that, when the Legislature wanted a provision to apply to circumstances other than a sale of a mobilehome, it selected different language. For example, the Legislature used the phrase “sale or transfer” in section 798.73.5 to specify the improvements or repairs to a mobilehome that the park management may require after a sale or transfer of a mobilehome. “‘Ordinarily, where the Legislature uses a different word or phrase in one part of a statute than it does in other sections or in a similar statute concerning a related subject, it must be presumed that the Legislature intended a different meaning.’” (Romano v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1343.) With section 798.74, the Legislature limited the provision to a “purchaser” of a mobilehome.
Indeed, the Supreme Court in describing the statute has recognized that it governs purchases of mobilehomes: “[T]he Mobilehome Residency Law limits park owners to two grounds for refusing to approve a buyer: lack of ability to pay park rent and charges, and a reasonable determination, ‘based on the purchaser’s prior tenancies, [that] he or she will not comply with the rules and regulations of the park.’” (Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1217, fn. 2, italics added.) A park owner’s withholding approval of a “‘purchase’” of a mobilehome could subject the owner to civil liability under section 798.74 if the reason given was not one of the approved bases under the statute. (Id. at p. 1218; see also Yee v. City of Escondido (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1349, 1352 [“park owner is compelled to accept as a new tenant a person who purchases a mobilehome from an existing tenant unless the new tenant does not have the financial ability to pay rent or, based on past tenancies, has demonstrated he or she will not comply with the park rules and regulations” (italics added)]; id. at p.1353 [“statutes generally compel a park owner to accept the purchaser of an existing tenant’s mobilehome as a new tenant” (italics added)]; Friedman et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Landlord-Tenant (The Rutter Group 2009) ¶¶ 11:242 to 11:246, pp. 11-71 to 11-73 [§ 798.74 subjects a mobilehome park owner to liability for damages for disapproving the tenancy of a prospective purchaser on grounds not specified by the statute]; see also id. at ¶ 11:279, p. 11-80.4.)
Applying section 798.74 only to purchasers of mobilehomes makes sense. Under the statute, management has 15 business days from receipt of all the information requested from the would-be purchaser to “notify the seller and the prospective homeowner, in writing, of either acceptance or rejection of the application, and the reason if rejected.” (§ 798.74, subd. (a).) In this way, the statute allows an individual interested in buying a mobilehome to learn whether he or she will be accepted as a tenant before the purchase is complete. As the Supreme Court has recognized, section 798.74 protects “a mobilehome owner, whose home could be rendered unmarketable if the park owner could arbitrarily refuse to rent the space on which it is installed to the home’s prospective buyer.” (Castaneda v. Olsher, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1217, fn. 2, italics added.) The Legislature reasonably could have determined that this protection was warranted only in the case of a purchase of a mobilehome.
Banuelos argues that section 798.74 must apply to both purchases and gifts because, if it does not, then defendants could attempt to acquire his mobilehome for little or no consideration and then rent the space and the mobilehome together, which would avoid Carson’s rent control ordinance applicable when the park owner rents only the space and not when it rents both the space and the mobilehome. This argument, however, does not render the statutory language ambiguous, nor impact our interpretation of it. Whether Banuelos is correct regarding defendants’ purported motive is immaterial. If in enacting section 798.74 the Legislature had been aware that certain rent control provisions apply only when the park owner rents the space, and not when it rents the space and the mobilehome together, the Legislature reasonably could have concluded that in the case of a purchase the park owner should have restrictions on its ability to decline a prospective tenant and attempt to avoid the rent control provisions, but the park owner should not be so restricted when a tenant or former tenant simply gives his or her mobilehome away. Thus, Banuelos’s attempt to assign an improper purpose to defendants’ actions does not change the import of section 798.74’s clear language limiting the statute’s application to purchasers of mobilehomes. (See Torrey Hills Community Coalition v. City of San Diego, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at p. 440 [“‘“‘Where the statute is clear, courts will not “interpret away clear language in favor of an ambiguity that does not exist.”’”’”].)
Banuelos next claims that, even if section 798.74 applies only to purchases, he nonetheless should be considered a purchaser for purposes of the statute. According to Banuelos, even though no money exchanged between LeFaive and him, the transfer of the mobilehome was based on an contract for consideration, that being, his agreement to move LeFaive to the nursing home and clean the mobilehome and his “years of good works” to the LeFaives, and that contract qualifies him as a “purchaser” under the statute. We need not decide whether a transfer based on a contract for consideration without the exchange of money would qualify Banuelos as a “purchaser” under the statute because the evidence as a matter of law does not show the formation of a contract.
Banuelos does not challenge the trial court’s ruling that the statements in his declaration in opposition to summary judgment suggesting that he had a contract with LeFaive or Bernal constituted “an improper attempt to create an issue of fact by contradicting his own deposition testimony.” Nor does he explain the contradiction between his deposition testimony in which he said the mobilehome was “gifted” to him and his later attempts to suggest he had a contract to receive the mobilehome. (See Shin v. Ahn (2007) 42 Cal.4th 482, 500, fn. 12 [in opposing summary judgment, “a party cannot create an issue of fact by a declaration which contradicts his prior discovery responses”].) Accordingly, we need not consider the statements in Banuelos’s declaration regarding a purported contract for transfer of the mobilehome in resolving this appeal. (TIG Ins. Co. of Michigan v. Homestore, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 749, 762 [failure to challenge trial court’s ruling on summary judgment to strike declaration forfeits the issue and appellate court will not consider evidence in the declaration].)
We note that in the factual section of his opening brief Banuelos states that in applying for tenancy he gave Park Granada “notice of the intended gift” of the mobilehome.
Even if we were to consider the statements, they do not afford Banuelos a cause of action under section 798.74. Although Banuelos is not precise on what constituted the supposed consideration for transfer of the mobilehome, neither of his suggestions establishes the formation of a contract between him and either LeFaive or Bernal. “‘“[C]onsideration for a promise must be an act or a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for the promise.”’” (Saks v. Charity Mission Baptist Church (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1135.) “The general rule is that a past consideration is not sufficient to support a contract.” (Blonder v. Gentile (1957) 149 Cal.App.2d 869, 874.) Banuelos’s suggestion that LeFaive agreed to give him the mobilehome because he had performed good deeds in the past for LeFaive cannot constitute consideration for transfer of the mobilehome because it would be past consideration and thus insufficient to support a contract. And his helping LeFaive move and clean the mobilehome is not consideration for the transfer of the mobilehome because the undisputed evidence shows that LeFaive offered the mobilehome to Banuelos’s mother, who declined and then suggested that LeFaive give the mobilehome to Banuelos, to which LeFaive agreed. Banuelos’s helping LeFaive move and clean the mobilehome was not “‘“an act or return promise [that was] bargained for and given in exchange for the promise”’” of LeFaive to transfer the mobilehome to Banuelos. (Saks, at p. 1135, italics omitted.) As a result, Banuelos cannot demonstrate a contract for consideration that might qualify him as a “purchaser” under the statute, and the undisputed evidence thus shows that Banuelos obtained the mobilehome as a gift. (Gonzales & Co. v. Department of Alcoholic Bev. Control (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 172, 175 [“gift” “commonly defined as ‘something that is voluntarily transferred by one person to another without compensation’”]; see also § 1146 [“gift is a transfer of personal property, made voluntarily, and without consideration”].)
In sum, because section 798.74 applies to the “purchaser” of a mobilehome, Banuelos, who received the mobilehome from LeFaive as a gift, has no basis for a cause of action for damages under the statute. (Vikco Ins. Services, Inc. v. Ohio Indemnity Co. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 55, 62 [“private right of action exists only if the language of the statute or its legislative history clearly indicates the Legislature intended to create such a right to sue for damages”].)
Banuelos also claims in passing that defendants’ conduct violated section 1942.5, which prohibits a lessor from retaliating against a lessee based on the lessee’s exercise of statutory rights. That statute, however, is not applicable because defendants were not Banuelos’s lessors, nor did Banuelos exercise statutory rights as a lessee of defendants. In addition, Banuelos did not make any allegations or present any evidence, such as LeFaive’s lease agreement, indicating that he acquired rights as a lessee or a leasehold interest as an assignee of LeFaive based on the gift of the mobilehome. As a result, nothing in the summary judgment record suggests Banuelos has any claim against defendants as their lessee.
3. The Trial Court Properly Resolved Banuelos’s Common Law Causes of Action on Summary Judgment
a. Wrongful interference with contract
“The elements of a cause of action for interference with contractual relations are: (1) the existence of a valid contract between the plaintiff and a third party; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of this contract; (3) the defendant’s intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage.” (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 212, 237-238.) “‘The actionable wrong lies in the inducement to break the contract or to sever the relationship....’” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1127.)
Banuelos contends that he has a viable cause of action for wrongful interference with contract because defendants interfered with a contract that he had with either LeFaive or Bernal whereby LeFaive or Bernal agreed to give him the mobilehome if he helped LeFaive move. Defendants maintain the evidence demonstrates as a matter of law that Banuelos acquired the mobilehome by gift and no contract existed between Banuelos and either LeFaive and Bernal with which they could have interfered. As noted, Banuelos’s evidence is insufficient as matter of law to establish a contract between him and either LeFaive or Bernal. And, even if he had such a contract, he cannot prove defendants induced the breaking of the contract or the severing of the contractual relationship. According to the summary judgment evidence, Banuelos acquired the mobilehome from LeFaive and obtained title in his name, completing the transfer. Any contract, therefore, was not breached and any contractual relationship was not severed.
b. Wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage
“[T]o prove a claim for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff has the burden of proving five elements: (1) an economic relationship between plaintiff and a third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) an intentional act by the defendant, designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and 5) economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant’s wrongful act....” (Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP (2008) 44 Cal.4th 937, 944.)
“The tort protects the expectation the relationship will produce the desired benefit, not ‘“the more speculative expectation that a potentially beneficial relationship will arise.”’ [Citation.] ‘Only plaintiffs that can demonstrate an economic relationship with a probable future economic benefit will be able to state a cause of action for this tort.’” (Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 243.) “The law precludes recovery for overly speculative expectancies by initially requiring proof the business relationship contained ‘“the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff.”’ [Citations.] ‘Although varying language has been used to express this threshold requirement, the cases generally agree it must be reasonably probable that the prospective economic advantage would have been realized but for defendant’s interference.’ [Citation.]” (Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 522.) Accordingly, a plaintiff cannot prove the required economic relationship simply by claiming a “‘lost opportunity’” or a “speculative expectation that a potentially beneficial relationship will eventually arise.” (Id. at pp. 523-524; see also Youst v. Longo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 64, 71, 75 [plaintiff cannot state a cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage when “the requisite relationship with third persons involved as yet unknown or nonexistent [persons]” and thus the “threshold causation requirement” is lacking (citing Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 331)]; Sole Energy Co. v. Petrominerals Corp., supra, 128 Cal.App.4th at p. 243 [directing judgment for defendant on cause of action for interference with prospective economic advantage cause of action because plaintiff had no existing economic relationship with a third party containing the probability of future economic benefit].)
Indeed, a would-be seller cannot prove a cause of action for wrongful interference with prospective business advantage without “an economic relationship, either actual or potential, with any buyer when the defendants’ allegedly tortious acts took place.” (Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 525, citing Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 832, 840-841 [no cause of action for wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage when plaintiff’s business relationship was with a class of as yet unknown purchasers of lots in the subdivision].) An “economic relationship with the entire market of all possible but as yet unidentified buyers for... property” is insufficient. (Westside Center Associates, at p. 527; id. at pp. 529-530 [“relationship with the general market is not enough by itself to demonstrate a reasonable probability of future economic advantage”].) “Without an existing relationship with an identifiable buyer, [the plaintiff’s] expectation of a future sale [i]s ‘at most a hope for an economic relationship and a desire for future benefit.’” (Id. at p. 527.)
Banuelos claims the evidence is sufficient to defeat summary resolution of his cause of action for wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage because defendants interfered with his ability to one day sell the mobilehome to an unidentified buyer. But this claim falls directly into the impermissible category of “‘lost opportunity’” or “speculative expectation that a potentially beneficial relationship will eventually arise.” (Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 523-524.) No evidence suggests Banuelos had “an economic relationship with a prospective buyer [that] was reasonably likely to produce a future beneficial sale of [his] property.” (Id. at p. 528.) As a result, he cannot prove the elements of the cause of action for wrongful interference with prospective economic advantage.
c. Negligence
The threshold element in a negligence cause of action is the existence of a duty by the defendant to use due care toward an interest of the plaintiff that is protected by law against unintentional injury or damage. (Bily v. Arthur Young & Co. (1992) 3 Cal.4th 370, 397.) Whether a duty exists in a particular case is a question of law. (Ibid.) If the defendant owes no duty, then the plaintiff has no negligence cause of action.
As discussed, defendants had no statutory duty to Banuelos under section 798.74. Banuelos fails to establish the basis for any other duty owed to him by defendants. Although he argues certain duties based on landlord-tenant law, he did not have a landlord-tenant relationship with defendants, and he does not allege or argue violation of anti-discrimination laws applicable to a tenant applicant. As a result, his negligence cause of action has no legal merit.
d. Intentional infliction of emotional distress
“‘The elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: “‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct....’ Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.” [Citation.] The defendant must have engaged in “conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001.)
According to Banuelos, defendants’ decision not to approve his tenant applications based on his failure to provide a Social Security card, and their improper motives, constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct that caused him severe or extreme emotional distress. Because defendants’ request that Banuelos provide his Social Security card before approval of his tenancy did not constitute a statutory or common law violation as argued by Banuelos, he cannot show extreme and outrageous conduct that would subject defendants to liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Nor did he show that defendants acted with intent to cause him emotional distress or that he suffered severe or extreme emotional distress. He thus has no grounds to pursue the cause of action.
Banuelos’s claim that defendants selectively required him to provide his Social Security card, while not applying the same requirement to other tenant applicants whom they wanted to reside in the park, does not add legal merit to any of his causes of action. Accordingly, we need not consider defendants’ evidence in response to Banuelos’s claim, submitted at pages 12.8 to 20 of their Respondents’ Appendix. Given, however, that defendants failed to demonstrate that the evidence they submitted regarding the Social Security card requirement was before the trial court, we strike pages 12.8 to 20 of the Respondents’ Appendix. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124(g) [“Filing an appendix constitutes a representation that the appendix consists of accurate copies of documents in the superior court file”].) We deny Banuelos’s request for sanctions based on defendants’ inclusion of the Social Security card evidence in the appendix. (Ibid. [sanctions for failure to comply with Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.124 are discretionary].) In addition, the trial court declined to take judicial notice of the documents Banuelos submitted from another action against some of the defendants, and those documents are not relevant to the summary judgment proceedings in this case. We also agree with the trial court that no basis exists for judicial notice of the purported fact that Social Security cards are easily and routinely forged. We, therefore, do not consider the documents or that purported fact on appeal.
As noted, during the summary judgment proceedings, Banuelos recognized that, because Park Granada had been sold, he no longer had grounds for an injunction against defendants and thus that the unfair business practices cause of action was moot. The trial court agreed and summarily resolved the cause of action for defendants. Banuelos makes no argument on appeal to revive his unfair business practices cause of action, and we, therefore, affirm summary resolution of that cause of action for defendants as well. In addition, because we conclude the trial court properly resolved each of the causes of action on summary judgment, we need not address Banuelos’s separate contentions that the individual defendants are liable to him and that the evidence supports his punitive damages claim.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J., JOHNSON, J.