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imposing restriction on named plaintiffs where the court dismissed without prejudice
Summary of this case from Jackson v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc.Opinion
Case No. C-3-00-350.
December 5, 2000.
Attorneys for Plaintiff: Paul L. Ruskin/Kevin Rames.
Attorneys for Defendants: Charles J. Faruki/Micheal T. Mervis, Jonathan Hollingsworth/James Rittinger.
Paul Ruskin ("Ruskin"), an attorney whose offices are located in New York City, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, on behalf of Karin Bentz ("Bentz") and Kevin Rames ("Rames"), two attorneys who reside in the Virgin Islands, alleging that the Defendants had violated federal antitrust and copyright statutes. This litigation was assigned to Judge Richard Berman. On March 31, 2000, counsel for Defendant Reed Elsevier, Inc. ("REI"), wrote to Judge Berman, in accordance with practices established by that judicial officer, requesting a pre-motion conference concerning a motion he desired to file, requesting that the court transfer this lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). See Doc. #24 at Ex. 1. On April 14, 2000, Judge Berman conducted the requested conference. During that conference, Ruskin indicated that he would not consent to such a transfer and that he would file a memorandum in opposition on behalf of his clients. Judge Berman permitted REI to file a motion to transfer and established a briefing schedule. Accordingly, REI filed such a motion (see Doc. #5), and Defendants Thomson Corporation and West Publishing Company (collectively "Thomson") filed an affidavit in support thereof.See Doc. #8. Notwithstanding Ruskin's previous statement that a motion to transfer would be opposed, no Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition was filed. On June 15, 2000, Judge Berman sustained REI's unopposed motion seeking the transfer of this litigation to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. See Doc. #12.
In his declaration, Michael Mervis, counsel for REI, states that when a memorandum on behalf of the Plaintiffs was not filed, he telephoned Ruskin, who indicated that he would not be filing any papers in opposition. According to Mervis, Ruskin explained that he had been conferring with a number of other attorneys who were interested in becoming co-counsel, that he and putative co-counsel intended to convert this litigation into a class action and that they did not care where it was litigated.
After this lawsuit had been transferred, this Court conducted a preliminary pretrial conference with counsel on August 16, 2000. During that conference, it became apparent that neither Plaintiffs nor their counsel had any interest in prosecuting this litigation before this Court. As a consequence, the Court directed Ruskin to enter an appearance, pro hac vice, or barring that, for the Plaintiffs to obtain local counsel. In addition, the Court directed Plaintiffs to file a motion, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), requesting dismissal without prejudice, and further directed the parties to attempt to negotiate the terms and conditions of a dismissal entry. At the conclusion of that telephone conference, this Court made certain that Ruskin understood what it expected him to do.
Neither Ruskin nor local counsel has entered an appearance on behalf of Plaintiffs. Rather, Rames filed a pro se motion, requesting that this Court dismiss this litigation without prejudice and without conditions.See Doc. #23. In response, REI has filed a motion with which it requests that this Court dismiss this litigation, without prejudice and subject to the conditions that, if either or both of the Plaintiffs or their counsel, on behalf of the Plaintiffs or anyone other party, initiate another action against the Defendants under the antitrust or copyright laws, such action be brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton. See Doc. #24. REI also requests the Court to enter an order directing Plaintiffs and their counsel to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt, for having failed to abide by the orders it issued during the August 16th pretrial conference; and that it order Ruskin to pay an unspecified amount of attorney's fees to it, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Id. Thomson has filed a motion with which it requests similar relief and, further, asks that the Court dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief with prejudice. See Doc. #25. In response to those motions, Ruskin has filed a memorandum in which he argues that this Court is without personal jurisdiction over him and that, therefore, it cannot impose any of the requested sanctions upon him. See Doc. #27.
REI has also requested that this Court permit it to serve interrogatories on Rames. The purpose of those interrogatories is to test certain statements contained in his pro se motion seeking dismissal of this litigation without prejudice. The Court will decline to permit REI to serve the proposed interrogatories. For reasons set forth below, the Court imposes the conditions for dismissal without prejudice requested by REI. Therefore, it overrules Rames pro se motion, with which he requested an unconditional dismissal without prejudice. As a consequence, the Court sees no purpose in permitting REI to serve interrogatories upon Rames.
On October 13, 2000, the Court conducted a telephone conference call with counsel and Rames. During that call, counsel for the Defendants represented that the Plaintiffs had agreed to the conditions of dismissal which Defendants had requested with their motions. Rames did not contradict that statement. At the conclusion of that telephone conference call, the Court indicated that it would rule upon the pending motions, which it does herein. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially address the motion filed by Rames and the Defendants' motions, as they relate to the Plaintiffs, following which it will turn to the Defendants' motions as they relate to Ruskin.
Ruskin, however, is most decidedly opposed to the imposition of any conditions of dismissal which would limit the venue in which he could file a similar lawsuit on behalf of plaintiffs other than Bentz and Rames.
I. Plaintiffs
The Defendants request the following as a condition of the dismissal of the Plaintiff's claims, without prejudice, to wit: an order of this Court that, if either or both of the Plaintiffs should file a similar suit against them, such a lawsuit must be commenced in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton. In addition, Thomson requests that this Court dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief with prejudice. As a means of analysis, the Court will address these two requests in the above order.
For reasons which follow, this Court will require, as a term of a dismissal without prejudice, that any future action brought by either or both of the Plaintiffs against either one or more or all of the Defendants, alleging a violation of federal antitrust laws predicated upon the same events giving rise to this litigation, be brought in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton. This condition applies regardless of whether one or both of the Plaintiffs seeks relief in his or her individual capacity or in a representative capacity as the named plaintiff in a putative class action.
As is explained below, the Court dismisses the Plaintiffs' claims based upon federal copyright statutes, with prejudice.
Given that this Court imposes conditions on the dismissal of this litigation, it overrules Rames Motion to Dismiss Complaint Without Prejudice (Doc. #23), since he requested that this litigation be dismissed without conditions.
Shortly after this litigation was initiated, Judge Berman, at REI's request, joined in by Thomson, transferred the captioned matter to this Court in accordance with § 1404(a). Having gone to the expense and effort to convince Judge Berman that the resolution of the Plaintiffs claims in the Southern District of Ohio would foster the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and the interests of justice, the Defendants should not have to fight that battle again. Other courts have conditioned a dismissal without prejudice upon the stipulation that the lawsuit be re-filed, if at all, in the court to which the litigation had been transferred under § 1404(a). See RMD Concessions, L.L.C. v. Westfield Corp., 194 F.R.D. 241 (E.D.Va. 2000) (imposing such a condition, because dismissal without prejudice should not be used to undo decisions made prior to dismissal). See also Pittsburgh Jaycees v. United States Jaycees, 89 F.R.D. 166, 168 (W.D.Pa. 1981) (plaintiffs were required as a condition of voluntary dismissal to re-file the suit, if at all, in the same United States District Court to which it had been removed from state court); Scholl v. Felmont Oil Corp., 327 F.2d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1964) (dismissing appeal from voluntary dismissal without prejudice, since condition that plaintiff re-file the case, if at all, in the same court was not "unreasonable").
Accordingly, the Court sustains the Defendants motions, to the extent that, with them, they request that the Court impose venue restrictions as a condition of dismissal without prejudice (i.e., any future action brought by either or both of the Plaintiffs against either one or more or all of the Defendants, alleging a violation of federal antitrust laws predicated upon the same events giving rise to this litigation, either in his or her individual capacity or in a representative capacity as the named plaintiff in a putative class action, must be filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton).
With their Second Claim, the Plaintiffs have alleged that the Defendants committed copyright misuse. During the October 13th conference call, Rames did not contradict the statement by Thomson's counsel that the Plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal of their Second Claim with prejudice. Therefore, the Court sustains this branch of Thomson's motion and will dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, alleging copyright misuse, with prejudice.
The other Plaintiff herein, Bentz, did not participate in that conference call; however, Rames agreed to report to her about the issues discussed and to tell her to provide her thoughts to the Court, by way of a letter with copies to counsel. The Court has not received such a letter. If Bentz objects to the dismissal of the Second Claim for Relief, with prejudice, she must file a motion for relief from judgment, within the time provided by Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e).
In addition, the Defendants request that this Court enter a order, directing the Plaintiffs to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt for their failure to abide by the orders which this Court orally made during the August 16th conference call. In Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Crowley, 74 F.3d 716, 720 (6th Cir. 1996), the Sixth Circuit indicated that to hold a party in civil contempt, a court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that the party "violated a definite and specific order of the court requiring [him] to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with knowledge of the court's order." Id. at 720 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Given that neither Plaintiff participated in the August 16th conference call and, further, since this Court did not journalize the results of that call, this Court could not find that the Plaintiffs violated definite and specific orders issued by this Court. Accordingly, the Court declines to issue the requested order, directing the Plaintiffs to show cause why they should not be held in civil contempt, and overrules this branch of the Defendants' motions.
Thomson also requests that this Court, as a condition of voluntary dismissal without prejudice, order the Plaintiffs to pay its costs and attorney's fees. Although a court may condition the dismissal of a lawsuit without prejudice upon the payment of attorney's fees and costs, this Court will decline to do so herein. The Sixth Circuit has stressed that, when making a party pay costs and attorney's fees as a condition of such a dismissal, the court should focus on wasted costs. Duffy v. Ford Motor Co., 218 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2000). Herein, Thomson has failed to identify what costs and attorney's fees were wasted in this litigation. It bears emphasis that there is no indication that Thomson had engaged in any discovery or that it had filed any motions, prior to the one which the Court addresses herein.
II. Ruskin
As an initial matter, Ruskin argues that this Court is without personal jurisdiction over him, since he has not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting affairs within the state of Ohio. For present purposes, this Court assumes that, if Ruskin were a defendant who had been sued in this Court, it would not be permissible to exercise personal jurisdiction over him. However, Ruskin is not a defendant who has been haled before a distant court by a plaintiff; rather, he is an attorney who filed suit on behalf of two clients in the Southern District of New York, only to have that litigation transferred to this Court, pursuant to § 1404(a). Any lawsuit which is filed in federal court can be transferred to any other judicial district in which "it might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The Sixth Circuit has interpreted that phrase as meaning that a case can be transferred to a judicial district where venue is proper and personal jurisdiction can be 898 F.2d 1200, 1208 (6th Cir. 1990). As Judge Berman noted in his transfer order, venue is proper in this district, and the Defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction in the Southern District of Ohio. Therefore, the possibility that this lawsuit would be transferred to this judicial district has existed since the Complaint was filed.Moreover, by signing the Plaintiffs' Complaint, Ruskin indicated that he was their attorney of record. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) (noting that every paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record). The transfer of this case did not, by operation of law, terminate Ruskin's status as counsel of record for the Plaintiffs. That point is amply demonstrated by examining Vanbeever v. DeWolf, 528 F.2d 932 (3rd Cir. 1976). Therein, the plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The defendant obtained counsel who represented him in that court. Subsequently, the lawsuit was transferred to the United States District Court for the District of the Virgin Islands. No attorney entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant in the transferee court. Thereafter, the transferee court informed the parties and counsel of the trial date solely through notice in a local legal publication. When neither the defendant nor counsel representing him appeared at the trial, the District Court conducted an ex parte proceeding and awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages in favor of the plaintiffs. After the defendant had unsuccessfully attempted to have that judgment vacated, he appealed to the Third Circuit, which concluded that the judgment against the defendant was void, since he had not been given notice of the trial date. Of particular relevance herein is the appellate court's discussion of the fact that, although he had not entered an appearance in the lawsuit after it had been transferred, the attorney who had represented the defendant in District of Connecticut remained counsel of record and that he should have been provided notice of the trial date. Similarly, although Ruskin has not entered appearance in this Court (despite being ordered by the Court to do so), he remains counsel of record in this litigation. It is axiomatic that a court has jurisdiction over counsel of record in litigation before it.
In sum, Ruskin voluntarily became counsel of record in this litigation, when he filed the Complaint on behalf of the Plaintiffs. Since this lawsuit might have been brought in this judicial district, the possibility of a transfer to the Southern District of Ohio has existed since the inception of this litigation. Ruskin's status as counsel of record was not terminated by the transfer. Therefore, this Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over him.
As an additional argument in support of his contention that this Court cannot exercise personal over him, Ruskin relies upon the Local Rules for the Southern District of Ohio. Under S.D. Ohio Civ.R. 83.5(a), all parties, other than those appearing pro se, must be represented by an attorney who is a member in good standing of both the bar of the Southern District of Ohio and the bar of the Supreme Court of Ohio. S.D. Ohio Civ.R. 83.5(d) authorizes an attorney, who is not eligible to become a member of the bar of the Southern District of Ohio, to appear pro hac vice. Ruskin points out that he is not a member in good standing of either the bar of the Southern District of Ohio or the Supreme Court of Ohio and, further, that he has not moved for admission pro hac vice in this litigation. As a consequence, Ruskin reasons that he could not have appeared as counsel for the Plaintiffs and that, therefore, this Court is without personal jurisdiction over him. This Court cannot agree. Although the Local Rules may have served as the basis for this Court preventing Ruskin from representing the Plaintiffs, the language of those Rules does not indicate that the Court is without personal jurisdiction over him.
The Defendants request that this Court condition the dismissal of this litigation without prejudice, upon the stipulation that any further litigation brought by Ruskin against either or both of them, whether on behalf of the Plaintiffs herein or anyone else, be filed in the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton. The Defendants point out that Ruskin previously indicated that he anticipated seeking to maintain this litigation as a class action. According to the Defendants, such a condition is necessary in order to protect the integrity of Judge Berman's transfer order, since, without it, Ruskin would be free to file a new class action in the Southern District of New York and, thus, could avoid that order. This Court will decline to impose that requested condition, at least insofar as same would bar suit against Defendants on behalf of anyone but either or both Plaintiffs. Judge Berman found, in the context of a lawsuit filed in the Southern District of New York by two Plaintiffs who practice law in the Virgin Islands, that the convenience of the parties and the witnesses and the interests of justice warranted a transfer to this Court. Since the Complaint herein does not allege that this lawsuit can be maintained as a class action, Judge Berman did not indicate that he was addressing the issue of whether an identical lawsuit, filed as a class action, would properly be transferred to this judicial district. Nor did that judicial officer purport to address the issue of whether a similar lawsuit filed on behalf of anyone, other than two lawyers who resided in the Virgin Islands and had minimal connections with the Southern District of New York, would properly be transferred pursuant to § 1404(a). Therefore, it is neither necessary nor proper to limit Ruskin to filing a future lawsuit, on behalf of plaintiffs other than the two named herein, to the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton, in order to protect the integrity of Judge Berman's order.
Of course, if such a new lawsuit is filed and one or both of the Plaintiffs herein is named as a plaintiff, that lawsuit must be filed in the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.
Accordingly, the Court overrules the branches of the Defendants' motions, with which they seek to limit the venue in which Ruskin could file a similar lawsuit on behalf of Plaintiffs other than either or both of Plaintiffs herein.
The Defendants also request that this Court enter an order requiring Ruskin to show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt for failing to abide by the orders issued by this Court during its August 16th conference call with counsel. For reasons which follow, this Court will decline to enter the requested order. The Court begins its analysis by reviewing the standards which are applicable to requests that a party be held in civil contempt.
In McMahan Co. v. Po Folks, Inc., 206 F.3d 627 (6th Cir. 2000), the Sixth Circuit noted that "[t]he primary purpose of a civil contempt order is to compel obedience to a court order and compensate for injuries caused by non-compliance," and that "an award of attorney's fees is appropriate for civil contempt in situations where court orders have been violated." Id. at 634 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As is indicated above, before a court may find one in civil contempt, that court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, that such person violated a definite and specific court order requiring him to perform or to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. Rolex Watch, 74 F.3d at 720. Willfulness, however, is not an element of civil contempt; therefore, the intent of a party to disobey a court order is irrelevant to the validity of a contempt finding. Id.
This Court ordered Ruskin to enter an appearance, pro hac vice, or barring that, for the Plaintiffs to obtain local counsel to represent them in this litigation. At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court made certain that Ruskin understood what was expected of him. Although Ruskin indicated that he understood the Court's directives, he has failed to comply. He has not entered an appearance, pro hac vice, nor has local counsel entered an appearance for his clients. Thus, this Court could find, by clear and convincing evidence, that Ruskin has violated a specific and definite order of this Court, directing him to perform an act. Nevertheless, keeping in mind that a primary purpose of civil contempt is to compensate the party which has been harmed by the non-compliance of the alleged contemnor, this will decline to enter an order, directing Ruskin to show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt. Filing the motions which the Court addresses herein is the only possible injury caused to the Defendants as a result of Ruskin's failure to comply with the order made during the August 16th telephone conference. With those motions, however, the Defendants have sought relief in addition to the dismissal of this litigation without prejudice. They have requested that the Court impose conditions on the dismissal, only some of which have been approved by the Court. In addition, Thomson has requested that the Court dismiss the Plaintiffs' Second Claim for Relief, with prejudice. There is no indication that Ruskin would have voluntarily agreed to these conditions, if he had entered an appearance as directed by the Court. On the contrary, Ruskin indicated in an e-mail to REI's counsel that he would not agree to limiting his right to practice law as a condition of dismissal. Consequently, this Court cannot conclude that Ruskin's failure to abide by this Court's order has caused the Defendants to suffer an injury. Moreover, as discussed below, the Defendants have also requested that the Court award them attorney's fees for actions which occurred before this litigation was transferred. There is no link between that request and Ruskin's failure to abide by this Court's order.
Another purpose of civil contempt is to compel compliance with a court order. Given that the Court dismisses this litigation herein, there is no need to compel Ruskin's further compliance at this point.
Accordingly, the Court overrules the branches of the Defendants' motions with which they request that the Court enter an order directing Ruskin to show cause why he should not be held in civil contempt.
Having declined to enter that requested order, the Court is, however, compelled to comment on what it deems to be entirely inappropriate behavior by an attorney. Quite simply, Ruskin's failure to comply with this Court's specific order is far below the type of professional conduct that is expected of any attorney. The Court assumes that Ruskin's blatant and unprofessional disregard of its order was based on the premise that the order was unenforceable, since the Court was without personal jurisdiction over him. If the Court's assumption is correct, Ruskin's remedy was to file a motion for reconsideration, raising that argument, rather than merely to ignore a definite and specific court order. Should Ruskin ever seek to appear pro hac vice before this Court, his unprofessional conduct in this litigation will weigh heavily upon the Court's consideration of such a request.
The Defendants argue that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, Ruskin should be required to compensate them for the attorney's fees they incurred to obtain the transfer of this litigation to this Court. According to the Defendants, Ruskin acted vexatiously, unreasonably and in bad faith by filing this litigation in the Southern District of New York, given the absence of a nexus between that venue and the parties and actions giving rise to this litigation. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially will review the standards which govern the award of attorney's fees under § 1927, following which it will turn to the Defendants' request.
Section 1927 provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
The Sixth Circuit has indicated that a District Court may impose sanctions upon an attorney, pursuant to § 1927, "where the attorney's conduct amounts to a serious and studied disregard for the orderly processes of justice" and that "sanctions are warranted when an attorney has engaged in some sort of conduct that, from an objective standpoint, falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the bar to the court and which, as a result, causes additional expense to the opposing party."Cook v. American S.S. Co., 134 F.3d 771, 774 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Sixth Circuit has stressed that the standard for awarding attorney's fees under § 1927 is an objective one. Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 298 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1046 (1998).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), venue for this litigation was proper in any judicial district in which the Defendants resided. The Defendants are corporations; therefore, for purposes of venue, they are deemed to be residents of any judicial district in which they were subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the litigation was initiated. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c). The Defendants did not raise the affirmative defense of lack of personal jurisdiction when they filed their Answers in the Southern District of New York. See Docs. ##9 and 11. The Defendants admitted in those pleadings that they did substantial business and maintained offices within that judicial district. Consequently, it is apparent that personal jurisdiction could have been exercised over the Defendants in the Southern District of New York and that, therefore, venue was proper in that judicial district. Indeed, REI implicitly conceded that such venue was proper, by requesting a transfer to this Court pursuant to § 1404(a). See Martin v. Stokes, 623 F.2d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 1980) (noting that a transfer pursuant to § 1404(a) is permissible only when venue is proper in the transferor court and that court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendants). Therefore, it is apparent that the Defendants are asking this Court to require Ruskin to pay the attorney's fees they incurred to secure the transfer of this litigation, even though, in accordance with § 1391, venue was proper in the Southern District of New York. In the absence of any indication that Ruskin filed this lawsuit in the Southern District of New York for the sole purpose of causing inconvenience and additional expense to the Defendants, this Court concludes that he did not act either unreasonably or vexatiously by initiating this litigation in a statutorily authorized judicial district. Congress has anticipated that civil cases will be filed in inconvenient venues, by enacting § 1404(a), which provides a venue transfer mechanism. Accordingly, the Court overrules the Defendants' motions to the extent that they request an award of attorney's fees pursuant to § 1927, because Ruskin filed this litigation in the Southern District of New York.
In support of this branch of their motions, the Defendants have relied upon Laine v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 124 F.R.D. 625 (N.D.Ill. 1989). Therein, plaintiff's counsel filed suit in the Northern District of Illinois, against Morton Thiokol and three of its employees. Although Morton Thiokol's corporate headquarters was located in that judicial district, the employees were residents of Utah. In addition, the events giving rise to that litigation had occurred in Utah. During a pretrial conference, the court raised the issue of whether personal jurisdiction could be exercised over the individual defendants and pointed out the absence of a link between the Northern District of Illinois and the events giving rise to the litigation. The court also cautioned plaintiff's counsel that he seemed to be engaging in "forum-shopping with a vengeance," which "ought to be discouraged with all the vigor at the court's disposal." Id. at 627-28. Thereafter, the plaintiff dismissed the three individual defendants from the lawsuit, and Morton Thiokol sought and was granted a transfer to Utah. After transferring the litigation, the transferor court awarded attorney's fees to Morton Thiokol, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 and § 1927. Herein, Ruskin did not name as defendants, individuals over whom in personam jurisdiction was lacking in the Southern District of New York. Moreover, there is no indication that Judge Berman cautioned Ruskin in a manner similar to the warnings given in Laine. Therefore, that decision is distinguishable from the present litigation.
Accordingly, judgment is to be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, dismissing their First Claim for Relief (alleging violations of federal antitrust laws) without prejudice and their Second Claim for Relief (alleging violations of federal copyright laws) with prejudice. The dismissal without prejudice of the Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief is subject to the following condition, to wit: any future action, brought by either or both of the Plaintiffs (whether in an individual capacity or as the named plaintiff in a putative class action) against either one or more or all of the Defendants, alleging a violation of federal antitrust laws, predicated upon the same events giving rise to this litigation, must be filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.
The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.