Opinion
C. A. 3:24-3710-MGL-PJG 24-3726-MGL-PJG 24-3721-MGL-PJG
07-18-2024
James E. Benton, Plaintiff, v. Founders Federal Credit Union, Defendant. Founders Federal Credit Union, Plaintiff, v. James E. Benton, Defendant. Founders Federal Credit Union, Plaintiff, v. James E. Benton, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
James Benton, proceeding pro se, filed the above-captioned actions in this court on June 27, 2024, the first by way of a complaint against Founders Federal Credit Union (“Founders”), and the other two by purporting to remove a civil action initially filed by Founders in the York County Court of Common Pleas. These cases are before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the pleadings in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes the originally filed action should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and issuance and service of process and that the removed cases should be remanded to the York County Court of Common Pleas.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On March, 28, 2024, Founders filed a lawsuit against Benton in the York County Court of Common Pleas to collect debt on a defaulted car loan worth approximately $12,000. Founders also sought to foreclose on the car that secured the loan and take possession of it. Prior to filing the three cases at issue here, Benton filed a pro se Complaint against Founders pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act, but the case was summarily dismissed on June 10, 2024 for Benton's failure to prosecute. C/A No. 0:24-1463-MGL.
On June 27, 2024, Benton filed these three actions. In Civil Action No. 3:24-3710, on a standard complaint form utilized by the court, Benton claims that Founders “refuse to fix my car, under their warranty” and “they have breach the contract [sic] with devices that were put in the vehicle without my knowledge.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5.) For relief, he seeks for Founders to “drop all cases against [Benton] and bring my account to good standing” and to “release my van to [Benton] and 12,000 for the lost car.” (Id.) He lists “12 U.S.C. [§] 1311” as the federal statute at issue, but that is not a valid citation for an enacted statute. (Id. at 3.) Benton also alleges “all securities are federal jurisdiction.” (Id.)
In Civil Action No. 0:24-3726, which Benton labels as a notice of removal, Benton alleges that Founders “breach their contract on more then [sic] one situation . . . refuse to pay for repairs from my car under their car plan.” (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 5.) Benton again seeks “12,000 for car to have my account in good standing [and] to drop all case against James E. Benton.” (Id.) He again lists the non-existent federal statute and provides a case number for Founders's state court debt collection action against him.
In Civil Action No. 0:24-3721, Benton again labels the action as a notice of removal, but this time he also attaches copies of the summons and complaint from Founders's state court case against him. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1-1 at 1-6.) Otherwise, Benton generally provides the same allegations as Civil Action No. 0:24-3726, but he does not cite the non-existent federal statute, and he adds that the state court case is “outside their jurisdiction” and he seeks a “credit line of 3,000.” (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1 at 5.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The instant cases are subject to summary dismissal and summary remand because Benton fails to demonstrate that the court has subject matter jurisdiction in these cases. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id. at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).
There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]”
The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) “federal question” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As discussed below, the allegations contained in Benton's Complaint and Notices of Removal do not fall within the scope of either of these forms of this court's limited jurisdiction. And no other basis for federal jurisdiction is apparent from the pleadings.
First, federal question jurisdiction requires the plaintiff to show that the case is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Benton's allegations do not assert that Founders has violated a federal statute or constitutional provision, nor is any source of federal question jurisdiction otherwise evident from the face of the pleading. Benton provides what appears to be a citation to a federal statute and adds that “all securities are federal jurisdiction.” (Compl., C/A No. 3:24-3710, ECF No. 1 at 4.) However, the citation he provided does not correspond to an enacted statute, and the federal statutes conferring jurisdiction on the federal district courts do not include a provision for cases involving “all securities,” or more pertinent here, actions to collect a secured debt. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1331 et seq. Therefore, Benton fails to meet his burden of showing that federal question jurisdiction exists in these cases. See Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that where the alleged federal claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the United States Supreme Court], or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy,” subject matter jurisdiction does not exist over that claim) (citing Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)); Burgess v. Charlottesville Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 477 F.2d 40, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he mere assertion in a pleading that the case is one involving the construction or application of the federal laws does not authorize the District Court to entertain the suit[,] nor does federal jurisdiction attach on the bare assertion that a federal right or law has been infringed or violated or that the suit takes its origin in the laws of the United States.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Second, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 nn. 13-16 (1978). The Complaint, Notices of Removal, and state court pleadings all show that both parties are citizens of South Carolina. Also, the Complaints and state court documents all show that the amount in controversy is below the jurisdictional threshold because the secured debt is only $12,000 and there is no allegation that the car securing the debt is valuable enough to reach the jurisdictional threshold. Therefore, Benton fails to meet his burden of showing that diversity jurisdiction exists in these cases.
III. Conclusion
There being no apparent basis of federal jurisdiction over these cases, the court recommends that Civil Action No. 3:24-3710 be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court also recommends that Civil Action No. 0:24-3726 and Civil Action No. 0:24-3721 be remanded to the York County Court of Common Pleas for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).