Opinion
Civil No. A3-97-161.
Filed June 15, 1999.
Summary: Civil rights action against two City of Fargo, North Dakota, police officers. Motion for judgment as a matter of law, or, in the alternative, a new trial, by plaintiff following a jury verdict finding no liability on behalf of defendants. Motion denied.
ORDER
I INTRODUCTION
Before the court is plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law (JAML), or in the alternative, new trial (doc. #61), pursuant to Rules 50 and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As an initial matter, plaintiff's motion for leave to file a reply brief (doc. #65) is GRANTED. Since the court finds a hearing on this motion unnecessary, however, plaintiff's request for oral argument (doc. #66) is DENIED.
II ANALYSIS
Briefly stated, this Section 1983 action arose out of two separate warrantless entries into plaintiff's apartment by defendants, both members of the City of Fargo, North Dakota, Police Department. Plaintiff brings her motion in response to a jury verdict finding no liability on behalf of defendants for violating plaintiff's constitutional rights (doc. #51). Plaintiff raises several objections to the verdict, the jury instructions, and the court's conduct of the trial. These objections will be taken in turn.
A. LEGAL STANDARDS
Eighth Circuit courts advise extreme caution in granting JAML after a jury verdict. Ryther v. Kare 11, 108 F.3d 832, 844 (8th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, when faced with such a motion, this court must (1) consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, (2) assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in the prevailing party's favor, (3) assume as proved all facts that the prevailing party's evidence tended to prove, and (4) give the prevailing party the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the facts proved. Id. "That done, [this] court must . . . deny the motion if reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from the evidence." Id.
Simply put, JAML is proper only in the complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached, so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party. Bailey v. Runyon, 167 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1999). Where conflicting inferences reasonably can be drawn from the evidence, it is the function of the jury to determine what inferences should be drawn.Ryther, 108 F.3d at 845.
Though the authority to grant a new trial is confided almost entirely to the trial court's discretion, see Sanford v. Crittenden Mem'l Hosp., 141 F.3d 882, 884 (8th Cir. 1998), this does not afford a court license to usurp the functions of a jury. Rather, a new trial is in order only if the first trial results in a miscarriage of justice, and inaccuracies or errors at the trial stage will not form the basis for setting aside a jury verdict absent a showing of prejudice. Greaser v. Missouri Dep't of Corrections, 145 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 1998).
B. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
As an initial matter, plaintiff contends that she is entitled to JAML or, alternatively, a new trial, because the jury verdict is contrary to law and against the manifest weight of the evidence. However, the court finds the evidence adduced at trial sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find that defendants were not liable to the plaintiff. Specifically, the jury heard evidence as to the objective reasonableness of defendants' conduct during both disputed entries into plaintiff's apartment, as well as the presence or absence of exigent circumstances justifying the February 23, 1997 entry. In light of this evidence, along with all the evidence adduced at trial, the court concludes that the verdict in this case was not against the weight of the evidence.See Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 612 (8th Cir. 1997).
Plaintiff urges the court to direct a verdict against defendants in their official capacities. In its April 1, 1999 Order (doc. #30), however, the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against the City of Fargo and dismissed those claims. As plaintiff was no doubt well-aware, this operated to dismiss her "official capacity" claims, since a suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer. See Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir. 1999).
The court may have inadvertently caused plaintiff's confusion on this issue. In the same Order, the court mistakenly stated that Section 1983 claims remained against defendants in their individual and official capacities. During the trial, however, the court made it abundantly clear to both sides, as well as the jury, that the City of Fargo was no longer a party to this action.
Plaintiff next argues that she is entitled to a new trial because the court issued several erroneous jury instructions. Along these lines, trial courts retain broad discretion in instructing a jury.Ryther, 108 F.3d at 846 (citing Hastings v. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co., 975 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1992)). See Greaser, 145 F.3d at 983-84. Consequently, instructions need not be exactly as the parties would have them, technically perfect, nor even a model of clarity to pass muster. Greaser, 145 F.3d at 984. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 847. Furthermore, the mere fact that a trial court erred by giving or refusing to give a particular instruction to the jury does not automatically entitle a party to relief; the error must have been prejudicial. Greaser, 145 F.3d at 984. No prejudice can be shown as long as the instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and adequately submit the issues to the jury. Dupre v. Fru-Con Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 329, 335 (8th Cir. 1997). Plaintiff contends that the court erred by instructing the jury on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff maintains that this instruction violated the generic principle that "[q]ualified immunity is an issue of law which is the province of the court to determine." See Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for New Trial.
Unfortunately, plaintiff's argument reflects an all-too prevalent misunderstanding of the roles of judge and jury when fact questions preclude judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the qualified immunity defense. In order to properly address plaintiff's argument, the court finds it necessary to review the events which led to the qualified immunity instruction.
In its April 1, 1999 Order (doc. #30), the court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, finding the evidence sufficient to create a material dispute as to the reasonableness of defendants' conduct during both disputed entries into plaintiff's apartment. Immediately prior to trial, the court alerted the parties to the confusion within and without the Eighth Circuit when material factual disputes preclude judgment as a matter of law on the qualified immunity issue, and solicited suggestions as to the proper course of action. None were forthcoming. The court subsequently informed the parties during the course of trial that it would indeed instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, and requested proposals. The parties complied without objection.
Before the close of evidence, the court ruled as a matter of law that defendants' December 18, 1996 entry into plaintiff's apartment violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. The court further ruled that the February 23, 1997 entry violated plaintiff's rights, absent a finding of exigent circumstances. In light of these rulings, the court instructed the jury as follows at the close of evidence:
Jury Instruction No. 17 ILLEGAL ENTRY AND SEARCH
As you know, the plaintiff claims that defendants violated her Fourth Amendment rights by entering and searching her apartment on two separate occasions: December 18, 1996 and February 23, 1997.
I have ruled and instruct you as a matter of law that the defendants' entry and search of the plaintiff's apartment on December 18, 1996 was unreasonable and improper, and therefore violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.
I have also ruled and instruct you as a matter of law that the defendants' entry and search of the plaintiff's apartment on February 23, 1997, was unreasonable and improper and therefore violative of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights, unless you find that exigent circumstances were present which justified that entry and search.
Jury Instruction No. 18 UNLAWFUL ARREST
As you have heard, the plaintiff also claims that defendants deprived her of liberty without due process of law when they arrested and charged her with hindering law enforcement on December 18, 1996. As previously mentioned, I have ruled as a matter of law that the defendants violated the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights by entering and searching her apartment on that date. Therefore, you are instructed that the December 18, 1996 arrest which flowed from the defendants' illegal entry and search is unreasonable and improper and therefore violative of the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 20 AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE-QUALIFIED IMMUNITY/REASONABLE OFFICER
If you find that the plaintiff has proven her claim, you must then consider the defendants' affirmative defense that their actions were objectively reasonable in light of the legal rules clearly established at the time of the events in question.
Law enforcement officers are presumed to know about the basic, unquestioned constitutional rights of citizens. Thus the plaintiff need not prove that the defendants acted with the specific knowledge of the plaintiff's particular constitutional right(s) they violated.
In this case, I have ruled that the clearly established law at the time of the events in question required a law enforcement officer to obtain a search warrant before entering a third person's home to search for a suspect, absent consent or exigent circumstances. I have also ruled that an arrest warrant did not justify entry into a third person's home to arrest the subject of the warrant. Rather, law enforcement officers were required to obtain a search warrant to enter the third party's home to effectuate the arrest. At the same time, the clearly established law allowed law enforcement officers implicit but limited authority to enter the premises of the person named in an arrest warrant in order to execute the warrant. In other words, an officer was entitled to enter the residence of the person named in an arrest warrant if the officer reasonably believed that the suspect resided at the place to be entered and that the suspect was present.
If, after considering the scope of discretion and responsibility generally given to police officers in the performance of their duties, and after considering all of the surrounding circumstances of the case as they would have reasonably appeared to the defendants during the events in question, you find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants reasonably but mistakenly concluded that their actions did not violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff, then you cannot find them liable — even if the plaintiff's rights were in fact violated as a result of the defendants' actions. This is an objective determination which focuses upon whether a reasonable officer would have determined that his or her actions comported with the clearly established law at the time. The defendants' subjective beliefs as to the reasonableness of their actions are irrelevant.
With that background, the court turns to plaintiff's legal arguments on the propriety of so instructing the jury.
The court is keenly aware of the Supreme Court's admonitions directing resolution of qualified immunity at the earliest possible stage of litigation. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6 (1987). Early resolution of this issue is, of course, optimal, because the qualified immunity defense protects public officials "not simply from liability, but also from standing trial." Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 312 (1995) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985)). To the latter end, the Supreme Court has effectuated the early resolution of qualified immunity by, for example, focusing the immunity determination upon the objective reasonableness of an official's conduct as opposed to fact-based subjective intent, See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), and by allowing immediate appeal from a denial of qualified immunity to the extent such a decision turns on an issue of law, See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 529. By so narrowing the range of qualified immunity issues which might survive judgment as a matter of law during the early stages of litigation, the Supreme Court has ensured that the availability of the defense will "ordinarily . . . be decided . . . long before trial." Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228 (1991).
However, by providing for early resolution of qualified immunity in many, perhaps even most, cases, the Supreme Court has not deprived parties of the defense at trial in cases such as this, wherein disputed material facts preclude judgment as a matter of law on the issue. Quite the contrary, the Court has recently reaffirmed the principle that the qualified immunity defense remains for trial where issues of fact prevent its resolution at the summary judgment stage. See Jones, 515 U.S. at 319-20 (holding that a denial of qualified immunity based upon the existence of triable material facts is not immediately appealable).
Nor have the roles of judge and jury been altered in this narrow category of cases. Notwithstanding plaintiff's arguments to the contrary, the Eighth Circuit, like the vast majority of its brethren, has clearly approved submitting the qualified immunity determination to the jury where material factual disputes preclude resolution of the issue as a matter of law. See Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 474 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted),reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied (June 15, 1995), ("Although it is a question of law whether particular facts entitle police officers to summary judgment based on qualified immunity, where, as here, `there is a genuine dispute concerning predicate facts material to the qualified immunity issue, there can be no summary judgment.' The evidence in this case presents material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified immunity turns and `presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.'"); Engle v. Townsley, 49 F.3d 1321, 1323 (8th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted) ("Not every immunity question can be decided on summary judgment, however, for there may be disputed issues of material fact which prevent it. Whether a[n] [objectively] reasonable [police officer] would know that particular conduct violates a clearly established right may, for example, depend on the resolution of conflicting evidence about what the surrounding circumstances were at the time the official took the challenged action. If the factual circumstances are material to the qualified immunity analysis and remain disputed after initial discovery, . . . the issue cannot be resolved as a matter of law."); Arnott v. Mataya, 995 F.2d 121, 123-24 (8th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted) ("As a general rule, the question of qualified immunity is ordinarily one of law for the court. . . . This does not mean, however, that courts may always decide questions of qualified immunity on summary judgment. If the arrestee challenges the officer's description of the facts and presents a factual account where a reasonable officer would not be justified in making an arrest, then a material dispute of facts exists. Where there is a genuine issue of material fact surrounding the question of plaintiff's conduct, we cannot determine, as a matter of law, what predicate facts exist to decide whether or not the officer's conduct clearly violated established law."); see also Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 799-800 (5th Cir. 1998) reh'g and suggestion for reh'g en banc denied, 149 F.3d 1181 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. granted in part, 119 S.Ct. 863 (1999), and cert. dismissed, 119 S.Ct. 1493 (1999); Thompson v. Mahre, 110 F.3d 716, 720 (9th Cir. 1997) cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 414 (1997); Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 491-92 (3rd Cir. 1995); Olveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 649-650 (2nd Cir. 1994) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1076 (1995); Guffey v. Wyatt, 18 F.3d 869, 873 (10th Cir. 1994); Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307, 313 (4th Cir. 1992); Prokey v. Watkins, 942 F.2d 67, 71-74 (1st Cir. 1991).
The court notes that questions involving "clearly established law" at the time of the challenged conduct will always be capable of resolution as a matter of law. Thus, fact issues appropriate for submission to the jury will only arise where, as here, material disputes exist as to whether the official's conduct was reasonable in light of the clearly established law at the time.
The court is, of course, aware that the Eighth Circuit, has occasionally "spoken out of both sides of its mouth" on this issue. Peterson v. City of Plymouth, the case upon which plaintiff primarily relies, is an excellent example of this double-speak. In that case, the Eighth Circuit criticized an instruction which arguably incorporated the qualified immunity defense, stating that qualified immunity is ultimately a question of law ". . . [and] . . . [t]he jury's role is limited to settling disputes as to predicate facts."Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Engle, 49 F.3d at 1323 and Arnott, 995 F.2d at 123-24. In support of this conclusion, however, the court inCity of Plymouth cites Engle and Arnott, which, as previously indicated, appear to approve submitting qualified immunity to the jury where material facts preclude judgment as a matter of law on the issue. See Engle, 49 F.3d at 1323; Arnott, 995 F.2d at 124.
In this case, the factual disputes surrounding defendants' conduct bore directly upon whether it was objectively reasonable for them to believe they comported themselves with clearly established law.See Order Den. Def.'s Mot. For Summ. J. (doc. #30). These factual disputes placed this case squarely within the narrow category of cases in which the Eighth Circuit has approved submission of the qualified immunity determination to the jury. See Ludwig, 54 F.3d at 474. The court's instructions left to the jury the narrowest of factual issues regarding the qualified immunity determination: whether defendants' conduct fit within the parameters of the reasonable officer standard in light of clearly established law as announced by the court. The court consequently finds no error in its instructions, nor its decision to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity.
Plaintiff next argues that the court erroneously required the jury to find that defendants specifically intended to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights in order to find them liable for doing so. Plaintiff misreads the court's instructions, which merely required plaintiff to establish that defendants " intentionally or recklessly committed acts that violated one or more of the plaintiff's Federal constitutional rights." See Final Instruction No. 8-11 (doc. 54). It is axiomatic that Section 1983 requires an intentional or reckless action which causes the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights. See Boldthen v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 2397, 865 F. Supp. 1330, 1335 (D.Minn. 1994) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-92 (1978) and Chapman v. Musich, 726 F.2d 405, 407 (8th Cir. 1984)). Of course, as reflected in Final Instruction No. 20, in cases featuring an alleged violation of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant will escape liability where his intentional or reckless actions are objectively reasonable under the circumstances; and a defendant may be entitled to the qualified immunity defense if he can affirmatively establish that he comported himself as a reasonable officer in light of the clearly established law at the time. The court is confident that the jury had no trouble discerning between these distinct concepts. See Ryther, 108 F.3d at 846 (quoting Forbes v. Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 501 (8th Cir. 1996)).
Furthermore, all of plaintiff's foregoing arguments are fatally undermined by her counsel's admitted failure to object to any of the instructions of which plaintiff now complains. As defendants point out, Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict,. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 51. Rule 51 requires a litigant to state distinctly the specific objections to a jury instruction before the jury retires; otherwise, a litigant waives the right to object on those grounds.Dupre, 112 F.3d at 333. The purpose of the rule is to compel litigants to afford the trial court an opportunity to cure a defective instruction and to prevent litigants from ensuring a new trial in the event of an adverse verdict by covertly relying upon the error. Greaser, 145 F.3d at 984. Where no objection is made, an instruction is reviewed for "plain error." Id. Plain error is "narrowly confined to those exceptional cases where error has seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings." Id. Under this standard, an instruction will be upheld unless it prejudices the substantial rights of a party so that a miscarriage of justice would result if the erroneous instruction is left uncorrected. Dupre, 112 F.3d at 335. The court finds no such error in its instructions to the jury in this case. See Bendiburg v. Dempsey, 19 F.3d 557, 562 (11th Cir. 1994); see also Turner v. White, 980 F.2d 1180, 1182 (8th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of erroneous jury instructions.
Finally, plaintiff argues that she was denied a fair trial when defense counsel questioned her about a prior arrest. Plaintiff maintains that this line of questioning ran afoul of the court's Order in Limine restricting any reference at trial to juvenile arrests or adjudications, or adult arrests which did not result in conviction (doc. #45).
Along these lines, the admission of evidence is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d at 612. A new trial is not warranted on the basis of an evidentiary ruling unless the evidence was so prejudicial that a new trial would likely produce a different result. Id.
The court's recollection and a review of the court's real-time court reporting notes reveal that defense counsel's questions regarding plaintiff's prior arrest were directed to her alleged failure to mitigate damages, as opposed to her credibility. Furthermore, plaintiff volunteered the nature of the charges which resulted in her arrest over defense counsel's admonitions. Finally and most importantly, "[plaintiff's] position is [once again] fatally undermined because [her] counsel failed to object to [these questions] at trial. A party is entitled to a new trial on the basis of misconduct not objected to at trial only if that misconduct rises to the level of plain error." Dole v. USA Waste Serv., Inc., 100 F.3d 1384, 1388 (8th Cir. 1996). Based upon these factors, the court finds that the admission of the foregoing testimony does not warrant a new trial.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's motion for JAML, or, in the alternative, a new trial (doc. #61), is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.