Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CV020026
Mihara, Acting P.J.
Appellants David Bennion and Constance Bennion brought an action for a property tax refund. Following a motion for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of respondent County of Santa Clara. We conclude that Revenue and Taxation Code section 69.5 does not authorize appellants to transfer the base year value of their original property to a partial interest in their replacement dwelling. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
All further statutory references are to the Revenue and Taxation Code.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Appellants owned a residence located at 441 Maple Street in Palo Alto (original property) for approximately 31 years. Margaret Bennion, David Bennion’s mother, owned a residence with her children and their spouses. This property was located at 650 Center Drive in Palo Alto (replacement dwelling). In February 1999, appellants sold the original property. In June 2000, appellants purchased a 31 percent interest in the replacement dwelling from three of David Bennion’s siblings and their spouses, and moved into this property.
Relying on section 69.5, appellants, who are both over the age of 55, sought to transfer the base year value of the original property to the 31 percent interest in the replacement dwelling. The Assessor denied relief. Appellants filed applications for changed assessment, which the Assessment Appeals Board denied in September 2002. On May 19, 2004, appellants filed a complaint for a property tax refund. Respondent brought a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.
II. Discussion
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in granting respondent’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that section 69.5 did not apply where the proceeds from the sale of the original property were used to purchase a partial interest in a replacement dwelling.
A. Standard of Review
Since the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, this court’s review is de novo. (People ex rel. Lockyer v. Shamrock Foods Co. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 415, 432.) For the same reason, this court also reviews a ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. (Brassinga v. City of Mountain View (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 195, 210.)
B. Legal Analysis
Real property is reassessed at its “full cash value” upon a change of ownership. (Cal. Const., art. XIII A, § 2, subd. (a); § 60 et seq.) This reassessment establishes the new base year value of the property. (§110.1, subd. (b).) However, there are certain exceptions to this general rule. In 1986, the electorate passed Proposition 60, which amended article XIII A, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution. Proposition 60 authorized the Legislature to provide definitions and procedures whereby homeowners over the age of 55 would be allowed to transfer the base year value of their former residences to their newly purchased residences. The Legislature then enacted section 69.5, which tracks the language in the Constitution. Section 69.5, subdivision (a)(1) states, in relevant part, that “. . . any person over the age of 55 years, . . . who resides in property that is eligible for the homeowner’s exemption . . . may transfer, subject to the conditions and limitations provided in this section, the base year value of that property to any replacement dwelling of equal or lesser value that is located within the same county and is purchased . . . by that person as his or her principal residence within two years of the sale by that person of the original property . . . .”
In order to determine legislative intent, we begin our analysis by examining the language of the statute. (Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 872.) When this language is “clear and unambiguous[, ]” our inquiry ends. (In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream System (1979) 25 Cal.3d 339, 348.) “[W]e presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the statute governs.” (People v. Snook (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1210, 1215.) This court also interprets a statute as a whole, and does not view statutory language out of context. (People v. McCart (1982) 32 Cal.3d 338, 342-343.)
Section 69.5, subdivision (a)(1) allows certain claimants to transfer the base year value of their original property to “any replacement dwelling.” “Any” is defined as “one indifferently out of more than two; one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 97.) “Any” is not defined as a portion of one. We next note that the Legislature did not refer to a partial interest in “any replacement dwelling.” However, in other portions of the Revenue and Tax Code, the Legislature has expressly stated when it was referring to a fractional interest in real property. For example, section 65.1 states in relevant part that “when an interest in a portion of real property is purchased or changes ownership, only the interest or portion transferred shall be reappraised.” (See also § 70 [which pertains to the assessment of new construction] and its use of the phrase “or portion thereof.”) “[I]t is our role to ascertain the meaning of the words used, not to insert what has been omitted or otherwise rewrite the law to conform to an intention that has not been expressed.” (Gray Cary Ware & Freidenrich v. Vigilant Insurance Co. (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1190.) Here the Legislature could have inserted “or any interest in a portion thereof” after “replacement dwelling.” Since Legislature did not employ this language, we will not rewrite the statute.
Appellants, however, focus on subdivision (d)(1) of section 69.5. Thus, they argue that the statute contemplates situations in which the claimant has purchased a partial interest in the replacement.
Subdivision (d)(1) states: “The property tax relief provided by this section shall be available to a claimant who is the coowner of the original property, as a joint tenant, a tenant in common, or a community property owner, subject to the following limitations: [¶] (1) If a single replacement dwelling is purchased or newly constructed by all of the coowners and each coowner retains an interest in the replacement dwelling, the claimant shall be eligible under this section whether or not any or all of the remaining coowners would otherwise be eligible claimants.”
However, this subdivision applies only when all of the coowners of the original property purchase a single replacement dwelling within the two-year period. Here, Bennion’s mother, siblings, and his siblings’ spouses were not coowners of the original property, who then acquired a single replacement dwelling with appellants. Thus, subdivision (d)(1) does not apply to the present case.
Moreover, section 69.5, subdivision (c) expressly addresses specific situations in which a claimant has not purchased 100 percent of the replacement property, but not the situation presented by the case before us. This indicates that the Legislature did not intend to provide tax relief in every situation in which a claimant purchased a partial interest in a replacement property. Subdivision (c) provides that property tax relief is available to “[a] unit or lot within a cooperative housing corporation, a community apartment project, a condominium project, or a planned unit development.” (§ 69.5, subd. (c)(1).) In these circumstances, “the assessor shall transfer to the claimant’s replacement dwelling only the base year value of the claimant’s unit or lot and his or her share in any common area . . . [or] the assessor shall transfer the base year value of the claimant’s original property only to the unit or lot of the claimant and any share . . . in any common area . . . .” (Ibid., italics added.) Similar procedures govern when either the original property or the replacement dwelling is a manufactured home. (§ 69.5, subd. (c)(2)(A), (B).) “‘[L]and owned by the claimant’ includes a pro rata interest in a resident-owned mobilehome park . . . .” (§ 69.5, subd. (c)(2), italics added.) Thus, the base year value includes the claimant’s “pro rata portion” of the park. (§ 69.5, subd. (c)(2)(A), (B).)
Unlike these previous examples, there is nothing in section 69.5 indicating the manner in which the base year value of the original property would be applied to a claimant’s purchase of a fractional interest in the replacement dwelling. Respondent notes that section 69.5 does not specify whether 100 percent of the base year value transfers to 100 percent of the replacement property, whether 100 percent of the base year value transfers to a fractional portion of the replacement property, or whether a portion of the base year value transfers to the replacement property. The fact that the statute provides no guidance to the Assessor regarding the procedures for apportioning the base year value transfer supports our interpretation that the Legislature did not intend that section 69.5 would apply when claimants purchased only a partial interest in the replacement property.
Appellants themselves have taken different positions on this issue. In May 2004, appellants filed their complaint in which they sought the transfer of 100 percent of the base year value from the original property to the 31 percent interest that they acquired in the replacement dwelling. Appellants had previously argued before the Assessment Appeals Board that 31 percent of the base year value from the original property should be transferred to their 31 percent interest in the replacement property.
Relying on other language in this statute, appellants point out that property tax relief is available if “the claimant is an owner of a replacement dwelling and occupies it as his or her principle place of residence . . . .” (§ 69.5, subd. (b)(4), italics added.) They argue that the reference to “an owner” indicates that section 69.5 authorizes the purchase of a replacement dwelling that was already occupied by coowners. We are not persuaded that this language supports appellants’ position. Section 69.5, subdivision (g)(9) defines a claimant as “any person claiming the property tax relief provided by this section. If a spouse of that person is a record owner of the replacement dwelling, the spouse is also a claimant . . . .” Thus, subdivision (b)(4) refers to “an owner” of a replacement dwelling, because a claimant and his or her spouse could be coowners, who would be entitled to tax relief under certain circumstances.
Considering section 69.5 as a whole, as we must, we conclude that the statute does not authorized appellants to transfer the base year value of their original property to a partial interest in their replacement dwelling. Thus, the trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McAdams, J., Duffy, J.