Summary
affirming summary judgment on claims against insurance broker because there were not "any triable issue presented as to whether plaintiff had enforceable rights as a third-party beneficiary of a contract" between the insured and broker
Summary of this case from Goldsmith v. Marsh U.S. (In re GlassHouse Techs.)Opinion
502
March 18, 2003.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Karla Moskowitz, J.), entered on or about January 25, 2002, which, inter alia, granted the motion of defendant Tanenbaum-Harber Co. for summary judgment dismissing the complaint as against it, and denied plaintiff's cross motion for leave to serve a second amended complaint alleging additional causes of action against Tanenbaum-Harber Co., unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Louis M. Atlas, for plaintiff-appellant.
Kenneth R. Feit, for defendants-respondents.
Before: Mazzarelli, J.P., Andrias, Saxe, Ellerin, Williams, JJ.
The motion court properly held that defendant Tanenbaum-Harber Co., the insurance broker of plaintiff landlord's tenant, was under no duty to plaintiff and, accordingly, was not liable to plaintiff for negligent misrepresentation or negligence by reason of Tanenbaum's issuance of certificates of insurance representing that the tenant's insurance policy, naming plaintiff as an additional insured, contained rental coverage insurance for plaintiff's benefit, even though such coverage was not included in the policy. Plaintiff and Tanenbaum had no contractual relationship and the fact that plaintiff had contact with Tanenbaum in the course of obtaining the certificates of insurance did not give rise to the sort of relationship, i.e., one approaching that of privity, requisite to the imposition of liability for negligent misrepresentation (see Credit Alliance v. Arthur Anderson Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536). Moreover, where, as here, certificates of insurance contain disclaimers that they are for information only, they may not be used as predicates for a claim of negligent misrepresentation (see St. George v. W.J. Barney Corp., 270 A.D.2d 171; see also Am. Ref-Fuel Co. of Hempstead v. Resource Recycling, Inc., 248 A.D.2d 420, 423). Nor was any triable issue presented as to whether plaintiff had enforceable rights as a third-party beneficiary of a contract between the tenant and Tanenbaum.
Since the causes that plaintiff sought to add against Tanenbaum were plainly without merit, the motion court properly denied plaintiff's cross motion for leave to serve a second amended complaint (see Koss v. Bd. of Trustees of the Fashion Inst., 281 A.D.2d 200).
THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.