Opinion
No. C 03-00392 JSW.
October 20, 2004
ORDER DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS
Now before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) filed by Defendants City of Fremont, Officer William Carratini, and Officer Russell Schatzinger (collectively the "Fremont Defendants"). Having carefully reviewed the parties' papers, considered their arguments and the relevant legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court denies the Fremont Defendants' motion on the first, third, and eleventh claims for relief. The Court shall, however, convert the motion to dismiss the fourth through tenth claims for relief to a motion for summary judgment and shall provide the parties an opportunity to file supplemental briefing on the following issues: 1) whether Plaintiffs timely filed their claims pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act; and 2) whether monetary damages are recoverable for the state constitutional claims.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 19, 2004, Plaintiffs filed their Third Amended Complaint ("TAC"), which added as defendants the City of Fremont, Officer William Carratini, and Officer Russell Schatzinger. Plaintiffs, who seek to certify this matter as a class action, include students Brian Benitez, Victor Munoz, and Jessica Prentice. According to Plaintiffs' allegations, around lunchtime on February 22, 2002 at James Logan High School in Union City, California, school officials and Union City police officers "rounded up" approximately sixty students and ordered them into empty classrooms. (TAC at ¶¶ 39-40.) Over the next two hours, the school officials, Union City police officers, and Fremont police officers searched the detained students and their personal belongings. (TAC at ¶ 41.) The students were told that if they did not cooperate with the searches, they would be suspended from school. (TAC at ¶ 42.) The school officials, the Union City officers, and/or the Fremont officers also made other intimidating statements or gestures to the students. (TAC at ¶ 42.) The Union City and Fremont officers interrogated each student, asking them for the following information: name, address, telephone number, date of birth, height, weight, and whether the student was a member of any gang. (TAC at ¶ 43.) In addition, the Union City and Fremont officers noted and recorded any distinctive characteristics of each student. (TAC at ¶ 43.) The Fremont officers are not alleged to have searched Plaintiffs' backpacks or other personal belongings but are alleged to have patted down the Plaintiffs and ordered Plaintiffs to empty their pockets and backpacks, placing the contents on a desk or chair. (TAC at ¶ 52.) The Fremont officers searched the backpacks and personal belongings of other students. (TAC at ¶ 41.) The Union City and Fremont officers also photographed each student. (TAC at ¶ 44.)
The facts set forth herein are taken from Plaintiffs' Third Amended Complaint and the reasonable inferences are accepted as true for purposes of this motion.
As to the Fremont Defendants, Plaintiffs assert the following causes of action under federal and state law: Unlawful Search and Seizure (first and sixth claims); Discrimination on Account of Race, Ancestry, and National Origin (third and fourth claims); Right to Informational Privacy (fifth claim); Violation of California Civil Code Section 52.1(b) (seventh claim); False Imprisonment (eighth claim); Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (ninth claim); Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (tenth claim); and Declaratory Relief (eleventh claim).
II. ANALYSIS
The Fremont Defendants move to dismiss the TAC on the ground that it fails to state viable causes of action against them. The Fremont Defendants assert that: 1) based on the facts alleged in the TAC, they are entitled to qualified immunity; 2) Plaintiffs have failed to show that the City of Fremont maintains any policy or practice to subject it to liability; 3) Plaintiffs' state tort claims must be barred because they were untimely filed; and 4) monetary damages are not a valid remedy for Plaintiffs' state constitutional claims.
A. Legal Standard Applicable to Motion to Dismiss.
A motion to dismiss is proper under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where the pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss should not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that a plaintiff can show no set of facts supporting his or her claim. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Thus, dismissal is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and all material allegations in the complaint are taken to be true. Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 1986). The court, however, is not required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations, if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn from the facts alleged. Cleggy v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). If the court considers matters outside of the pleadings, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment, and all parties shall be given notice and an opportunity to supplement the record. Garaux v. Pulley, 739 F.2d 437, 438 (9th Cir. 1984).
B. Plaintiffs Have Alleged Facts Sufficient to Withstand the Fremont Defendants' Motion to Dismiss on the Issue of Qualified Immunity.
Qualified immunity is "an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). The privilege "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." Id. As a result, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly "stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). As a threshold question in resolving this issue on a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, demonstrate that the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right. Id. If the Court finds that the facts alleged demonstrate that there is a constitutional violation, the next inquiry is whether that right is clearly established. Id. "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. at 202. In other words, an officer is immune if he could have reasonably but mistakenly believed that his conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Id.
1. Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief Survives the Officer Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs' first claim for relief arises under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs assert that the Fremont officers infringed the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when the Fremont officers searched and interrogated Plaintiffs during the round up. The Fremont officers move to dismiss this claim on the basis they are entitled to qualified immunity.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil cause of action for "every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
The first inquiry under a qualified immunity analysis is whether the facts alleged in this case demonstrate that the Fremont officers violated Plaintiffs' constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure. As noted, the alleged round up took place on school grounds. School officials do not need probable cause to conduct searches of students on school grounds. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985). "[T]he legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." Id. at 341. The Fremont officers argue that they should be treated as school resource officers, and, thus, would be subject to the same standard as school officials in evaluating their conduct. See In re William V., 111 Cal. App. 4th 1464, 1471 (1st Dist. 2003) (a resource police officer assigned to a school will be held to the same standard as a school official). Although the standard for searches of students at schools is less stringent, students are still entitled to be free from unreasonable searches.
In general, under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer must demonstrate that he or she has reasonable and articulable suspicion for suspecting a particular person of criminal activity. United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2000). There must be specific, articulable facts which, together with objective and reasonable inferences, form a basis for suspecting that a particular person is engaged in criminal conduct. Id. As is pertinent to this case, mere membership in a gang is not a sufficient basis on which to suspect that an individual has committed or is about to commit a crime. See People v. Rodriguez, 21 Cal. App. 4th 232, 239 (1993).
The parties offer the Court no authority on what standard should be applied to a police officer conducting searches of students on school grounds; nor has the Court found any authority on point. In re William V., on which Defendants rely, is not dispositive because there are no allegations that the Fremont officers were acting as school resource officers. However, this does not affect the Court's consideration of whether the facts alleged would show that the Fremont officers violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Plaintiffs allege in the TAC that the Fremont officers searched, interrogated, and photographed Plaintiffs with no lawful justification for their actions. Viewing this version of the events in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, regardless of what standard is applied, the facts as currently alleged plead a violation of Plaintiffs' right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Having concluded that the facts in the TAC are sufficient to allege a constitutional violation, the next inquiry is whether that right was clearly established. That is, the Court must consider whether under the facts alleged, the Fremont officers could have reasonably but mistakenly believed that their conduct was lawful.
The Fremont officers claim that they were simply relying on the school officials' designations of which students were to be searched, questioned, and photographed, and, thus, they did not need their own, independent reasonable suspicion to engage in these activities. This contention is outside of the pleadings and, therefore, not properly considered on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Looking at the allegations of the TAC, Plaintiffs allege that neither school officials nor Union City or Fremont police officers informed Plaintiffs of the basis for the searches, nor did they obtain consent for the searches. (TAC at ¶ 55.) Notwithstanding which standard should be applied to the Fremont officers' conduct, the Court concludes that the facts alleged are sufficient to show a clearly established right and that the Fremont officers could not have concluded that their conduct was lawful.
Accordingly, as to the individual officers, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the first claim for relief. This ruling is without prejudice to the Fremont officers revisiting the issue of qualified immunity on a motion for summary judgment.
2. Plaintiffs' Third Claim for Relief Survives the Officer Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
Plaintiffs' third claim asserts discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fremont officers again assert a qualified immunity defense. To succeed on an equal protection claim, Plaintiffs must show that they were treated differently from other similarly situated persons. Dillingham v. Immigration Naturalization Serv., 267 F.3d 996, 1007 (9th Cir. 2001). In addition, Plaintiffs must show that Defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against Plaintiffs, based upon membership in a protected class. Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
Again, the Court's first inquiry under a qualified immunity analysis is whether the facts in the TAC allege that the Fremont officers violated a constitutional right. Plaintiffs allege that the Fremont officers participated in what the facts alleged in the TAC characterize as a discriminatory event by searching, interrogating, and photographing them based on their Latino or Hispanic ancestry or national origin, or their associations with persons of that ancestry. Plaintiffs allege that only Asian American and Latino students, and others who associate with those students, were detained during the alleged round up. These allegations are sufficient to show that Plaintiffs were treated differently from the other high school students.
In addition, Plaintiffs must show that the Fremont officers acted with discriminatory intent. Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1980) ("the essence of an equal protection violation on racial grounds lies in the intent or motive to discriminate"). As noted, Plaintiffs allege that the entire round up was a discriminatory event in which the Fremont officers participated. Although Plaintiffs' case of discrimination against the Fremont officers may rest on a slender thread, the Court concludes the facts alleged are sufficient to show that the Fremont officers participated in a discriminatory event and treated Plaintiffs differently from the other students. The Court concludes the facts alleged are also sufficient to show that the Fremont officers could not have reasonably but mistakenly believed that their conduct was lawful.
Accordingly, as to the Fremont officers, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the third claim for relief.
C. Plaintiffs' Claims Against the City of Fremont Survive the Motion to Dismiss.
The City of Fremont moves to dismiss the first and third claims on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to show that the City maintained any policy or custom that deprived Plaintiffs of a constitutional right. To establish liability against the City of Fremont under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that their injury was caused by an official policy or custom of the City. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). "[A] claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss `even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice.'" Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1127 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1998), quoting Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986)).
Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that the Fremont officers acted pursuant to policies and customs of the City of Fremont. (TAC at ¶ 36, 87.) Although the Court is not required to accept legal conclusions cast as factual allegations as true, Plaintiffs have alleged that the City of Fremont promulgated "policies and procedures pursuant to which the unlawful conduct occurred" and thus that the parties "acted jointly and in concert with others." (TAC at ¶ 36.) Further, Plaintiffs have alleged participation of the Southern Alameda County Gang Task Force, with which the City of Fremont was involved. (TAC at ¶ 35.) Looking at the allegations as a whole, and under the liberal pleading standards of Rule 8(a), the Court finds that these allegations are sufficient to withstand the City of Fremont's motion to dismiss.
The Court therefore DENIES the motion to dismiss on the first and third claims for relief as to the City of Fremont. Again, the Court's ruling is without prejudice to the Defendants revisiting this issue on a motion for summary judgment.
D. Plaintiffs Eleventh Claim for Declaratory Relief Against the Fremont Defendants Survives the Motion to Dismiss.
In their eleventh claim, Plaintiffs request declaratory relief for their state and federal causes of action. A finding of qualified immunity does not bar actions for declaratory relief. Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, even if the Court ultimately finds that the Fremont officers are immune from damages based on qualified immunity, Plaintiff's could proceed on their eleventh claim for declaratory relief.
Similarly, because the Court finds that the facts alleged are sufficient to establish liability against the City of Fremont, this claim also survives the City of Fremont's motion to dismiss. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (when alleged injury is caused by policy or custom, the governing body can be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief).
Finally, under California law, actions seeking specific relief other than money or damages, such as injunctive or declaratory relief, are exempt from the Tort Claims Act. Cal. Govt. Code § 814; see also Eureka Teacher's Ass'n v. Bd. of Educ., 202 Cal. App. 3d 469, 475 (1988). As will be discussed infra in Section II.E, there is a question as to whether Plaintiffs have complied with the requirements of the Claims Act. However, even if Plaintiffs are ultimately precluded from collecting monetary damages for their state claims, they would still be entitled to seek declaratory relief, as well as injunctive relief, on these claims.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES the motion to dismiss the eleventh claim for relief as to all defendants.
E. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Plead Facts Sufficient to Show Compliance With the California Tort Claims Act.
As set forth above, Plaintiffs bring their fifth through tenth claims for relief under California law. The Fremont Defendants assert that Plaintiffs' state tort claims should be dismissed because they were not timely filed. The Court finds that in light of the deposition testimony submitted by Defendants, it will convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages for these claims. See Cal. Govt. Code § 814; see also Eureka Teacher's Ass'n, 202 Cal. App. 3d at 475.
California Government Code § 950.2 requires filing of tort claims against public entities within six months of the date of the injury. See Cal. Govt. Code § 911.2. Government Code § 950.4 excuses this time requirement if a plaintiff did not know or have reason to know that a defendant was involved in the injury. This exception, however, still requires the exercise of due diligence within that time period by plaintiffs and their attorneys. Leake v. Wu, 64 Cal. App. 3d 668, 673 (1976). Due diligence requires a reasonably prudent investigation of the circumstances surrounding the event. Id. If a plaintiff seeks to excuse compliance with the time requirements, he or she must state in the complaint when the plaintiff made the discovery of the defendant's participation, the circumstances surrounding the discovery, and facts which show that the failure to make an earlier discovery was reasonable, justifiable and not a result of plaintiff's failure to investigate or to act. Dujardin v. Ventura County Gen. Hosp., 69 Cal. App. 3d 350, 356 (1977).
Plaintiffs generally allege that they have exhausted all administrative remedies under the California Tort Claims Act. (TAC at ¶ 7.) In support of their motion, the Fremont Defendants, submit Plaintiffs administrative claims against the City of Fremont, pursuant to the California Tort Claims Act, which were submitted on February 2, 2004. (Helfrich Decl. Exs. 1-3.) In these claim forms, Plaintiffs asserted that they discovered the Fremont Defendants' involvement on August 19, 2003. The Fremont Defendants submit testimony, however, which suggests that Plaintiff Prentice knew of Fremont's involvement within a few weeks after the alleged round up, making a claim filed in 2004 untimely.
This Court can properly consider Plaintiffs' claims forms in this motion to dismiss without converting the motion to one for summary judgment because the forms are incorporated by reference in the TAC and no party has objected to the authenticity of the form. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003) (on a motion to dismiss the court may consider documents attached to complaint, documents incorporated by reference into complaint, or matters of judicial notice, without converting the motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment).
Even if the Court were only to consider the claim forms, the allegations therein are insufficient to plead the circumstances surrounding the discovery of a claim against the Fremont Defendants. In light of the deposition testimony presented by the Fremont Defendants, however, which in the Court's view raises serious questions as to whether these claims can proceed, the Court hereby CONVERTS the motion to dismiss as to the fifth through tenth claims for relief into a motion for summary judgment, to the extent Plaintiffs are seeking monetary damages for these claims.
The Court orders further briefing on Plaintiffs' compliance with the California Tort Claims Act, as set forth below.
F. The Court Orders Supplemental Briefing on the Issue of Whether Plaintiffs May Recover Monetary Damages for State Constitutional Claims.
The Fremont Defendants assert that Plaintiffs are unable to maintain actions for damages for their state constitutional claims. Plaintiffs rely on Katzberg v. Regents of the University of California, 29 Cal. 4th 300 (2002), for the proposition that there is a right to monetary damages for violations of the California Constitution. Defendants rely on Bonner v. City of Santa Ana, 45 Cal. App. 4th 1465 (1996), to support their argument that monetary damages are not recoverable for state constitutional claims.
Neither party has fully briefed this question. Accordingly, the Court hereby ORDERS supplemental briefing on the issues of whether monetary damages are recoverable for state constitutional claims and whether this issue would be rendered moot if Plaintiffs are time barred from maintaining claims for damages on their state law claims.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have plead facts sufficient to withstand the Fremont officers' motion to dismiss the first, third and eleventh claims based on qualified immunity. Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss the first, third and eleventh claims for relief as to the City of Fremont. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion to dismiss on these claims for relief.
The Court also DENIES the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Fourth through Fifth Claims for Relief to the extent Plaintiffs seeks injunctive or declaratory relief as remedies for these causes of action.
The Court concludes, however, Plaintiffs have not met their burden to plead facts sufficient to show compliance with the California Tort Claims Act such that monetary damages would be recoverable for these claims. Accordingly, the Court HEREBY CONVERTS the motion to dismiss the fifth through tenth claims for relief into a motion for summary judgment and ORDERS further briefing from the parties.
The Court FURTHER ORDERS supplemental briefing on the issue of whether Plaintiffs may recover monetary damages for their state constitutional claims.
The briefing schedule for the supplemental briefing shall be as follows:
The Fremont Defendants will have thirty (30) days from the date of this order in which to file their supplemental briefing.
Plaintiffs will have thirty (30) days thereafter to file an opposition brief.
The Court will set a further hearing if needed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.