Opinion
No. 03-0931.
March 16, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, David S. Good, Judge.
Francis Pruss appeals the district court's denial of his motion seeking to collaterally attack a prior judgment. DISTRICT COURT DECISION VACATED.
Francis J. Pruss, Cedar Rapids, pro se.
Susan L. Hense and Jason M. Craig of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Francis Pruss entered into a contract to sell certain real property in Linn County to Michael Parnell and Mary Benge. A dispute arose concerning whether there were defects in the title to the property. Parnell and Benge filed an action for specific performance, asking that Pruss provide them with marketable title to the property. The district court ordered Pruss to provide a quit claim deed and pay attorney fees of $4000.
Both parties filed motions pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) and motions for new trial. In June 2001 the district court denied the motions, but determined that under the purchase agreement, Pruss should be responsible to pay attorney fees of $15,000, instead of $4000. Pruss appealed on several issues, including the increase in attorney fees. We determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in the award of attorney fees. Benge v. Pruss, No. 01-1044 (Iowa Ct.App. Nov. 25, 2002).
Pruss filed an application for further review, claiming the plaintiffs' post-trial motions were untimely, and therefore the district court did not have jurisdiction to increase the award of attorney fees. The Iowa Supreme Court denied Pruss's request for further review. Procedendo issued in the case on February 12, 2003.
On March 11, 2003, Pruss filed a "motion in arrest of judgment" in district court, again claiming that the court did not have jurisdiction to increase the award of attorney fees because plaintiffs' post-trial motions were untimely. Plaintiffs resisted on the ground that this issue had already been decided adversely to Pruss in the prior appellate proceedings. The district court entered an order which simply stated, "Mr. Pruss has filed a motion objecting to the additional assessment of $11,000 in attorney fees. The total attorney's fees awarded, therefore, is the $15,000 set forth in the Court's ruling on June 1, 2001." Pruss appeals this ruling of the district court.
II. Analysis
We determine the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider Pruss's "motion in arrest of judgment," filed in March 2003. Our supreme court has stated:
Ordinarily the authority of the district court to decide substantive issues in a particular case terminates when a final judgment is entered and post-judgment motions have been resolved. A final judgment, one that conclusively determines the rights of the parties and finally decides the controversy, creates a right of appeal and also removes from the district court the power or authority to return the parties to their original positions. In the absence of a remand or procedendo directing further proceedings in the trial court, the jurisdiction of the district court terminates both as to the parties and the subject matter when a district court judgment has been affirmed.
Franzen v. Deere Co., 409 N.W.2d 672, 674 (Iowa 1987) (citations omitted). While a district court retains jurisdiction during and after appeal from its final judgment to enforce the judgment itself, the district court does not have the authority to revisit and decide differently issues already concluded by that judgment. Waterhouse v. Iowa Dist. Court, 593 N.W.2d 141, 142 (Iowa 1999).
The matter of the attorney fees in this case had already been decided on appeal, and the district court did not have jurisdiction to revisit that issue. See id. We conclude the decision of the district court must be vacated.
In an aside, we note that there is no requirement that an application for attorney fees be filed within ten days after a district court's judgment. City of Hampton v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 554 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 1996). Also, a court has the power to correct its rulings up until the time a final judgment is entered. State v. Kirschbaum, 491 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). Therefore, if we were to address the issue, we would conclude the district court had jurisdiction to increase the award of attorney fees in its ruling of June 2001.
III. Sanctions
In a cross-appeal, plaintiffs seek sanctions against Pruss under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.413 on the grounds that the "motion in arrest of judgment" and present appeal were frivolous and unwarranted.
The issue of sanctions was not raised before the district court, and regarding Pruss's motion, we determine the issue has not been preserved for our review. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002) (noting we do not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal). As to the present appeal, we determine sanctions are not appropriate. See Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1510 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1987) (noting that under a similar federal rule sanctions may be imposed at the trial court level, not on appeal).
We vacate the decision of the district court, and dismiss this appeal. Costs of this action are assessed to Francis Pruss.