Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:99-CV-0771-P
June 13, 2003
ORDER
Now before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment Order and/or Motion for New Trial; Plaintiff's Motion Requesting to Place Live Charge of Compensation (Pay) Discrimination on Court's Docket and Set Case for Trial by Jury; Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment Order and/or Motion for New Trial and Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion Requesting to Place Live Charge of Compensation (Pay) Discrimination on Court's Docket and Set Case for Trial by Jury; and Plaintiff's/Appellant's Motion to Continue Frantisek Benes as Attorney Pro Se in District Court.
Plaintiff filed his motion for relief from summary judgment and/or motion for new trial, his motion requesting to place live charge of compensation discrimination on the Court's docket, and his motion to continue Frantisek Benes as attorney pro se in district court on February 3, 2003. Defendant responded to each of these motions on March 20, 2003. Plaintiff replied to Defendant's response to Plaintiff's motion for relief from summary judgment and Plaintiff's motion requesting to place live charge of compensation discrimination on the Court's docket on March 24, 2003. Plaintiff then replied to Defendant's response to Plaintiff's motion to continue Frantisek Benes as attorney pro se in district court on April 1, 2003. Plaintiff filed his supplemental motion on March 10, 2003. Defendant responded to this supplemental motion on March 25, 2003.
After considering the parties' briefing and the applicable law, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion for relief from summary judgment order and/or motion for new trial, DENIES Plaintiff's motion requesting to place live charge of compensation (pay) discrimination on Court's docket and set case for trial by jury, and DENIES Plaintiff's motion to continue Frantisek Benes as attorney pro se in district court as moot.
I. Background
Plaintiff Frantisek Braes ("Plaintiff' or "Braes") brought this action against the City of Dallas ("Defendant" or "City") on April 7, 1999, and filed a First Amended Original Complaint on October 19, 2000, asserting a right to recover under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), Sections 1981, 1983, and 1985, and the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. See generally Pl.'s Orig. Compl. Specifically, Plaintiff asserted that he had been treated disparately and had suffered retaliation throughout his career with Defendant because of his national origin (Czechoslovakian), his race (White), and his age (47) as compared to similarly situated co-workers. In a Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated February 26, 2002, the Court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment on each of Plaintiff's claims by finding that (1) most of Plaintiff's claims were time-barred; (2) Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case on his additional claims; (3) Plaintiff could not adduce evidence sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to find that Defendant's articulated reasons for its employment decisions were pretextual, or that "but for" his protected activity Defendant would not have taken the actions in question; and (4) Plaintiff could not establish statutory or constitutional violations to permit recovery under sections 1981, 1983, and/or 1985. See Mem. Op. Order, dated February 26, 2002, at 11-29.
Then, on May 15, 2002, the Court denied Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Final Judgment Order and Final Judgment and/or Motion for New Trial and Motion to Extend the Ten Day Deadline for Filing such Motion. On October 28, 2002, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Final Judgment issued by the Court. On February 3, 2003, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting relief from the summary judgment order and/or moves for a new trial. Plaintiff also claims that his charge of compensation discrimination for the period of 1989 to the present was not challenged by Defendant and was not otherwise dealt with by the Court. Plaintiff further asks the Court to allow him to proceed as attorney pro se in district court to address the charge of compensation discrimination.
II. Discussion
A. Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment Order and/or Motion for New Trial
A party has ten days from the entry of judgment in which to file post-trial motions, including a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, a motion for a new trial, and a motion to amend or alter judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b), 59(b) (e). The requirement that post-trial motions must be filed within the relevant ten-day period after the entry of judgment is jurisdictional and may not be extended by a waiver of the parties or by a rule of the district court. U.S. Leather, Inc. v. H W P'ship, 60 F.3d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing Vincent v. Consol. Operating Co., 17 F.3d 782, 785 (5th Cir. 1994)). Failure to serve the motion within the ten day limit deprives the district court of jurisdiction to alter or reconsider its earlier judgment Id. (citing Flores v. Procunier, 745 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir. 1984). As Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Summary Judgment Order Entered February 27, 2002 [sic] and/or Motion for New Trial in this case were not filed until nearly one year after the entry of the Court's Order granting summary judgment for Defendant, the Court lacks jurisdiction to alter or reconsider its earlier judgment pursuant to Rule 59.
However, if a motion is filed more than ten days after the entry of judgment and includes the allegations necessary for relief, the court does have the discretion to treat it as a motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b). Pryor v. U.S. Postal Serv., 769 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir. 1985); see FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); see also Tran v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Texas, No. Civ. A. 3:00-CV-1559-P, 2001 WL 1082418 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Sep. 7, 2001) (Solis, J.). Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from final judgment under the following circumstances:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which, by due diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under rule 59(b);
(3) fraud, misconduct, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Plaintiff has not met the standards set forth by rule 60(b) allowing the Court to reconsider its earlier judgment. In his motion for relief from summary judgment, Plaintiff charges only legal error and takes issue solely with the interpretation and application of the law to his case by this Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Rule 60(b) was "designed to address mistakes attributable to special circumstances and not merely erroneous applications of law." McMillan v. MBank, Fort Worth, N.A., 4 F.3d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1993); see Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 699 F.2d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1983). As the Court stated in its May 15, 2002 Order on Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of final judgment, "Plaintiff has not offered any new law or new facts uncovered since the Court's Order bearing on its previous determination. Rather, he merely repeats the arguments that he made in his first motion for reconsideration." Order, dated May 15, 2002, at 4. Therefore, as Plaintiff has not raised any of the grounds for relief cognizable under rule 60(b), the Court DENIES his Motion Requesting Relief from Summary Judgment Order and/or Motion for New Trial. See In re Stangel, 68 F.3d 857, 859 (5th Or. 1995)
B. Plaintiff's Motion Requesting to Place Live Charge of Compensation (Pay) Discrimination on Court's Docket and Set Case for Trial by Jury
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the summary judgment granted in this matter and the Final Judgment entered on February 26, 2002 did not dispose of his claims of compensation discrimination. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the compensation discrimination charges were not actually adjudicated and also that it was erroneously held that the compensation discrimination charges were time-barred. This Court has explicitly ruled twice concerning Plaintiff's claims of compensation discrimination: the initial grant of Defendant's motion for summary judgment and entry of Final Judgment, which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, and the subsequent denial of Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of this Court's Final Judgment. See generally Mem. Op. Order, Fifth Cir. Op., dated January 27, 2003; Order. It is clear that all matters concerning this dispute have been adjudicated.
In its Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court specifically discussed Plaintiff's charge of compensation discrimination, holding that a number of Plaintiff's claims were time-barred and Plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case concerning the others. Although various portions of the opinion speak of Plaintiff's compensation discrimination charge in terms of "non-promotion claims," it is clear that the Court intended this term to include all matters that dealt with the non-promotion claim that Plaintiff brought against Defendant. When the Court discussed generally the discrimination charges that Plaintiff alleged, the Court included the compensation discrimination charges as well. Specifically, when the Court explained that Plaintiff "contends that since Defendant City used a discriminatory salary as the basis for determining annual, promotional and cost of living salary increases" it is evident that the Court is addressing the compensation discrimination charge brought by Plaintiff. Mem. Op. Order at 12. Thus, it is clear that the Court incorporated Plaintiff's claim of compensation discrimination throughout its May 2002 Order when discussing discrimination generally.
This Court entered Final Judgment conclusively concerning all of Plaintiff's claims, including the compensation discrimination claims. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court, thereby agreeing with the Court's adjudication of all claims in the dispute including the charges of compensation discrimination. Upon appellate review, Plaintiff's point of appeal stated as follows:
Whether the District Court erred in granting the City's Motion for Summary Judgment in its entirety when the City failed to move for summary judgment on Frantisek Benes' statutory claims of continuing discriminatory pay over multiple years?
App. at 39. In answer, the Fifth Circuit recognized that the Court had granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment "in toto" and affirmed the Final Judgment of the Court. Fifth Cir. Op. at 2. Plaintiff then filed a motion asking the Court to reconsider the final judgment order and Final Judgment entered, arguing that the compensation discrimination claims were not discussed by the Court when it issued its summary judgment opinion. The Court summarily denied this motion stating "in its previous order the Court specifically found that Benes could not employ the continuing violation theory to resurrect claims about pay discrimination concluded in the past, even though its effects persisted." Order at 4 (referencing the Court's 2002 Mem. Op. Order).
It has been firmly established that none of Plaintiff's claims against Defendant can survive, either because they are time-barred or because Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case. When a particular claim cannot stand or has been abandoned, and judgment has been entered concerning the dispute in total, the judgment is considered final as to that claim even if it appears that the court has failed to adjudicate that claim. See National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Public Serv. Bd. of San Antonio, Tx., 40 F.3d 698, 705 (5th Cir. 1994). Furthermore, as in the instant case, if a judgment reflects an intent to dispose of all issues before the district court, then the judgment will be characterized as final. Id. (citing Vuaghn v. Mobil Oil Exploration Producing SE, Inc., 891 F.2d 1195, 1197 (5th Cir. 1990)). Therefore, Plaintiff's Motion Requesting to Place Live Charge of Compensation Discrimination on Court's Docket and Set Case for Trial by Jury is DENIED. As no claims remain to be adjudicated, Plaintiff's Motion to Continue Frantisek Benes as Attorney Pro Se in District Court is DENIED as moot.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiff's motion for relief from summary judgment order and/or motion for new trial, DENIES Plaintiff's motion requesting to place live charge of compensation (pay) discrimination on Court's docket and set case for trial by jury, and DENIES Plaintiff's motion to continue Frantisek Benes as attorney pro se in district court as moot.
Furthermore, Plaintiff Frantisek Benes must first obtain leave of this Court before he may file additional motions or seek further relief in this matter.