Opinion
21-CV-8077(CS)
10-01-2021
PETER C. BENEDITH, Plaintiff, v. WHITE PLAINS HOSPITAL, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEND
CATHY SEIBEL, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff, appearing pro se, paid the filing fee to bring this action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). He also brings state-law discrimination claims under the New York State Human Rights Law (NYSHRL). Plaintiff, who identifies himself as "African," alleges that Defendant White Plains Hospital declined to hire him as a physician because of his race, color, and national origin. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has the authority to dismiss a complaint, even when the plaintiff has paid the filing fee, if it determines that the action is frivolous, Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 363-64 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (citing Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 16-17 (2d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that Court of Appeals has inherent authority to dismiss frivolous appeal)), that it fails to state a claim, Wachtler v. County of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994), or that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). The Court is obliged, however, to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The exact degree of solicitude that should be afforded to a pro se litigant in any given case depends upon a variety of factors, however, including the procedural context and relevant characteristics of the particular litigant. Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2010). A frequent pro se litigant may be charged with knowledge of particular legal requirements. See Sledge v. Kooi, 564 F.3d 105, 109-110 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing circumstances where frequent pro se litigant may be charged with knowledge of particular legal requirements).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges that White Plains Hospital declined to hire him, and that "the decision not to hire was based on discrimination based on [his] race and national origin." (ECF 1 ¶ IV.) Plaintiff asserts that the failure to hire him "contradicts a stated policy noted on [Defendant's] website," but Plaintiff does not provide any other facts in support of his discrimination claim. Plaintiff acknowledges that he has not exhausted his administrative remedies with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Plaintiff seeks money damages.
Even where a right-to-sue letter is required, such as for a Title VII claim, administrative exhaustion is a claim-processing rule that must be raised as an affirmative defense, rather than a jurisdictional requirement See Fort Bend Cnty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 1846 (2019) ("Title VII's charge-filing instruction is not jurisdictional."); Hardaway v. Hartford Pub. Works Dep 't, 879 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2018).
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff fails to state a claim
Title VII provides that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such, individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The complaint could also be construed as asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits discrimination in the making and enforcing of contracts, including employment contracts, "on account of [a person's] race, ancestry, or ethnic characteristics." Zemsky v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1987).
These antidiscrimination provisions prohibit employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it "confront[]," "resistjs]," or "withstand[s]" unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, "a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision." Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff "may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination," Id. at 87. Plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to state a claim under Title VII or § 1981. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant discriminated against him by not hiring him, but he does not allege facts suggesting that his race, color, or national origin played any role in Defendant's decision not to hire him. Rather, his only allegation is that the failure to hire him "contradicts" a policy statement on Defendant's website. Plaintiff makes a legal conclusion that Defendant discriminated against him but does not show a causal connection between Plaintiff's race, color, or national origin and any adverse employment action taken by Defendant. In short, nothing in the complaint suggests that one of Plaintiff's protected characteristics motivated Defendant not to hire him, Plaintiff seems to rely on the fallacy that because he is a member of a protected class, it is plausible that any adverse employment action directed at him was because of his membership in that class, but it is well settled that such reasoning does not suffice to state a claim. See Watkins v. First Student, Inc., No. 17-CV-1519, 2018 WL 1135480, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2018) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff does not describe the statement on Defendant's website, but it may be that Defendant is an equal opportunity employer.
B. Leave to amend and litigation history
Generally, a court should not dismiss a pro se complaint "without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated." Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 295 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). But a court has inherent power to dismiss without leave to amend or replead in "where ... the substance of the claim pleaded is frivolous on its face," Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F, 2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation omitted), or where amendment would otherwise be futile, Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir, 2011); see also Shapiro v. McManus, 136 S.Ct. 450, 455-56 (2015) (holding that federal-question jurisdiction is lacking where the claims are "wholly insubstantial and frivolous," "essentially fictitious," or "obviously without merit" (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
Nothing in Plaintiff's complaint suggests that one of his protected characteristics motivated Defendant not to hire him. The Court is therefore inclined to dismiss this action, but in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court grants him leave to file an amended complaint. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).
The Court notes, however, that Plaintiff is no stranger to federal litigation. See Benedith v. Dep't of Medicine Metro Health Or., 21-CV-250 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 28, 2021) (indicating that Plaintiff has filed "over a dozen frivolous lawsuits against hospitals across the country" and moving for a filing injunction). Plaintiff is warned that if he continues to file nonmeritorious lawsuits in this District, he may be ordered to show cause why a filing injunction should not be imposed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an "Amended Complaint," and label the document with docket No. 21-CV-8077 (CS). An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form is attached to this order. No. summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and he cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff has consented to electronic service.
SO ORDERED.