Opinion
No. 3:19-cv-01295-HZ
02-07-2021
KEVIN SCOTT BENEDICT, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD LOREN HELD, an individual, MATTHEW WILSON, an individual, UNITY IN LYNNWOOD, a non-profit organization, Defendants.
Kevin Scott Benedict P.O. Box 655 Troutdale, OR 97060 Pro Se Plaintiff John R. Barhoum Jeffrey W. Hansen CHOCK BARHOUM LLP 121 SW Morrison St., Suite 415 Portland, OR 97204 Attorneys for Defendants
OPINION & ORDER Kevin Scott Benedict
P.O. Box 655
Troutdale, OR 97060
Pro Se Plaintiff John R. Barhoum
Jeffrey W. Hansen
CHOCK BARHOUM LLP
121 SW Morrison St., Suite 415
Portland, OR 97204
Attorneys for Defendants HERNÁNDEZ, District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Kevin Scott Benedict brings this action alleging breach of contract, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Defendants Richard Loren Held, Matthew Wilson, and Unity in Lynnwood. Defendants move to dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
BACKGROUND
Defendant Unity in Lynnwood ("Unity") is a community church in Lynnwood, Washington. Am. Compl. 2, ECF 30; Defs.' Mot. 3, ECF 31. Defendant Held is the Senior Minister at Unity and is also a member of Unity's Board of Directors. Am. Compl. 2; Defs.' Mot. 3. Defendant Wilson is the Office Manager and Music Director at Unity. Am. Compl. 2; Defs.' Mot. 3.
Plaintiff and his son Corwin Benedict became members of Unity in or around 2013 or 2014. Am. Compl. 2. Plaintiff asserts that to become a member of Unity he entered into a written contract with Defendants that afforded him certain rights and privileges subject to Unity's bylaws in exchange for donating and volunteering his "money, time and support." Id. Among these benefits was the right to address disputes with the Unity Board of Directors prior to revocation of membership status. Id. at 4.
Plaintiff additionally alleges the existence of an oral contract between him and Defendant Held in which Held agreed to assist Plaintiff with producing, marketing, and distributing a concert DVD of Plaintiff's original music in exchange for Plaintiff's promotion of Unity while performing the concert on a national tour. Id. at 5. Plaintiff asserts that prior to performance of the tour, Defendants breached their contract by "produc[ing] inadequate promotional material [for the concert]," by placing a promotional flyer "behind a doorway where it could not be seen," and by failing to "place the DVD and CD in prominent positions in the [Unity] bookstore." Id. at 6. Plaintiff also "delayed [the] national tour to care for [his] father . . . during the last 10 months of his life" and asserts that Held prevented him from completing the tour after his father passed away. Id. at 10.
Sometime during the ten-month period in which Plaintiff cared for his father, Unity revoked both Plaintiff and his son's memberships for reasons unstated by either of the parties. Id. at 6-8. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Held falsely stated that he had his membership rescinded "for cause," and he was not afforded the opportunity to contest the revocation of his and his son's memberships contrary to the membership agreement and Unity's bylaws. Id. at 4-5.
Plaintiff additionally alleges that Defendants defamed Plaintiff and committed the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") when Defendants disallowed Plaintiff and his son to return to Unity, refused to answer Plaintiff's requests for more information concerning the termination of their memberships, and requested that employees and members of the Unity community no longer speak to Plaintiff or his son. Id. at 6-8.
Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint on May 8, 2020, alleging that Defendants breached their contracts with Plaintiff, defamed Plaintiff, and intentionally subjected Plaintiff to emotional distress. Id. at 4-8. Plaintiff seeks damages for lost income as well as pain and suffering associated with his removal from Unity. Id. at 9-11. Currently before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Defs.' Mot. 2.
Plaintiff also alluded to claims for civil rights violations and dissemination of privileged information in his Amended Complaint but clarified in his Response that he does not intend to bring these claims. Pl.'s Resp. 4-5, ECF 35.
STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the claims. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). When evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint's factual allegations, the court must accept all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Wilson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 668 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2012). A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will be granted if a plaintiff alleges the "grounds" of his "entitlement to relief" with nothing "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action[.]" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)[.]" Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In other words, a complaint must state a plausible claim for relief and contain "well-pleaded facts" that "permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct[.]" Id. at 679.
Courts must liberally construe pro se pleadings. Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, a court cannot dismiss a pro se complaint without first explaining to the plaintiff the deficiencies of the complaint and providing an opportunity to amend. Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1261 (9th Cir. 1992). Dismissal of a pro se complaint without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).
DISCUSSION
Defendants move to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not specify whether he is bringing his claims under Oregon or Washington law. "The threshold question in a choice-of-law problem is whether the laws of the different states actually conflict." Great Am. All. Ins. Co. v. SIR Columbia Knoll Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1102 (D. Or. 2019) (quoting Spirit Partners, LP v. Stoel Rives LLP, 212 Or. App. 295, 301 (2007)). Because there are no substantive conflicts between Oregon and Washington law in regard to Plaintiff's breach of contract and tort claims, Oregon law is appropriately applied here. See Or. Rev. Stat. § ("O.R.S.") 15.360(2) (stating "[t]o the extent that an effective choice of law has not been made by the parties . . . with regard to an issue in a contract . . . [t]he most appropriate law is determined by . . . [i]dentifying the policies underlying any apparently conflicting laws of these states that are relevant to the issue); O.R.S. 15.440(2)(b) (stating that, in regard to noncontractual claims between "persons domiciled in different states[,] [the parties] shall be treated as if domiciled in the same state to the extent that laws of those states on the disputed issues would produce the same outcome.").
I. Breach of Membership Agreement
Plaintiff asserts a breach of contract claim against all Defendants. Am. Compl. 4. To plead a breach of contract claim under Oregon law, a plaintiff must show: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) its relevant terms; (3) the plaintiff's full performance and lack of breach; and (4) the defendant's breach resulting in damage to the plaintiff. Schmelzer v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. CV-10-1445-HZ, 2011 WL 5873058, at *4 (D. Or. Nov. 21, 2011) (citing Slover v. Or. State Bd. Of Clinical Soc. Workers, 144 Or. App. 565, 570-71 (1996)).
While Plaintiff has pleaded the existence of a contract between himself and Unity, he has failed to allege facts that allow a reasonable inference of his full performance and lack of breach of that contract. For example, Plaintiff states that he donated his "money, time and support" to Unity during the years that he was a member, however, it is unclear whether doing so amounted to Plaintiff's full performance of the contract. Am. Compl. 2. Similarly, while Plaintiff states that Defendant Held falsely asserted that his membership had been terminated "for cause," Plaintiff does not expressly allege that he did not breach the contract. Id. at 4-5. Subsequently, absent additional information demonstrating Plaintiff's full performance and lack of breach, Plaintiff has not sufficiently stated a cause of action for breach of contract.
II. Breach of Oral Contract
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of oral contract claim on the basis that the terms of the oral contract alleged in the Amended Complaint are not sufficiently definite to be enforced. Defs.' Mot. 7, 12-13.
The party asserting breach bears the burden of proving the existence of an enforceable contract in the first instance. Holdner v. Holdner, 176 Or. App. 111, 120 (2001). In general, a contract may be oral or written. Ponderosa Props., LLC v. Emp't Dep't, 262 Or. App. 419, 435 (2014). When "determining whether a contract exists and what its terms are," the court "examine[s] the parties' objective manifestations of intent, as evidenced by their communications and acts." Ken Hood Constr. Co. v. Pac. Coast Constr., Inc., 201 Or. App. 568, 578 (2005). "If the parties' communications and actions manifest assent to be bound by promises, they will form a contract unless the promises are 'so indefinite that a court cannot determine what the parties intended.'" Wieck v. Hostetter, 274 Or. App. 457, 472 (2015) (quoting Logan v. D.W. Sivers Co., 343 Or. 339, 347 (2007)). To be enforceable the oral contract must represent a meeting of the minds on "the essential terms," but not necessarily all terms. Pacificorp v. Lakeview Power Co., 131 Or. App. 301, 307 (1994). "A term is 'material' to an enforceable agreement when it goes to the substance of the contract and, if breached, defeats the object of the parties in entering into the agreement." Johnstone v. Zimmer, 191 Or. App. 26, 34 (2003).
Oregon courts have found contract terms too indefinite to be enforced when the terms do not provide a sufficient standard from which to judge the performance of the parties. For example, the Oregon Court of Appeals has found a promise to "check references" of prospective employees to be too indefinite to be enforceable and thus concluded the parties did not mutually assent to essential terms in an oral contract. Vtech Commc'ns, Inc. v. Robert Half, Inc., 190 Or. App. 81, 88-89 (2003). The court reasoned that the term "check references" was too indefinite because the record did not reflect that the parties had agreed on any standard for determining how many references had to be checked, what it meant to "check" a reference, or how to evaluate any information gleaned while checking references. Id. at 89.
Here, Plaintiff alleges he and Defendant Held entered into an oral contract, in which Defendants would produce, market, and distribute a concert DVD of Plaintiff's original music in exchange for Plaintiff's promotion of Unity while performing the concert on a national tour. Am. Compl. 5. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants breached this oral contract by "produc[ing] inadequate promotional material [for the concert]," by placing a promotional flyer "behind a doorway where it could not be seen," and by failing to "place the DVD and CD in prominent positions in the [Unity] bookstore." Id. at 6. As was the case in Vtech Commc'ns, Inc., however, the terms alleged by Plaintiff are too indefinite to be enforceable. For example, while Plaintiff states that Defendants produced inadequate promotional material, Plaintiff does not state what would have been adequate promotional material under the parties' agreement.
On this record, therefore, the Court concludes the oral contract as alleged in the Amended Complaint is not sufficiently definite to be enforceable. Moreover, as is the case with his claim for breach of the membership agreement, Plaintiff has not alleged that he fully performed and did not breach the oral contract. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claim for breach of oral contract.
III. Defamation
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's defamation claim because Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants made a defamatory statement, disseminated any defamatory communication, or that Plaintiff suffered a special harm as a result of a defamatory statement made by Defendants. Defs.' Mot. 7-9.
The elements of a claim for defamation are: (1) the making of a defamatory statement; (2) publication of the defamatory material; and (3) a resulting special harm unless the statement is defamatory per se and therefore gives rise to presumptive special harm. L & D of Oregon, Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 171 Or. App. 17, 22 (2000); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania v. Starplex Corp., 220 Or. App. 560, 584 (2008). Further, for a defamation claim to be actionable, the alleged defamatory statement must assert facts and not mere opinion. Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1990). To discern whether a defamatory statement is an expression of opinion or fact, courts consider several factors including whether "the statement in question is susceptible of being proved true or false." Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 987 (9th Cir. 2009) (applying Oregon law).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Held defamed him by directing the Unity community to not speak to Plaintiff and his son after their memberships were revoked. Am. Compl. 6. However, a statement that instructs others to not speak to an individual or their family is not an assertion of fact that can be proved true or false. Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to allege a defamatory statement made by Defendants, his defamation claim is dismissed.
IV. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's IIED claim because Plaintiff has not alleged sufficiently outrageous conduct on the part of Defendants to state an actionable claim of IIED. Defs.' Mot. 9-11.
"To state a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress, a plaintiff must plead that (1) the defendant intended to inflict severe emotional distress on the plaintiff, (2) the defendant's acts were the cause of the plaintiff's severe emotional distress, and (3) the defendant's acts constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct." McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 543 (1995).
Whether the alleged behavior constitutes an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct is a question of law for the court. Harris v. Pameco Corp., 170 Or. App. 164, 171 (2000). Liability for the tort of IIED has been found "only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." House v. Hicks, 218 Or. App. 348, 358 (2008) (citing the Restatement (Second) Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). Conduct that is merely "rude, boorish, tyrannical, churlish and mean does not satisfy that standard, nor do insults, harsh or intimidating words, or rude behavior ordinarily result in liability even when intended to cause distress." Watte v. Edgar Maeyens, Jr., M.D., P.C., 112 Or. App. 234, 239 (1992) (finding no claim for IIED where employer screamed at his employees, accused them of being "liars and saboteurs," and "refused to explain his conduct and rashly ordered them off the premises.") (internal citations omitted).
Further, the existence of a "special relationship" between the parties, while not an element of IIED, is a significant factor bearing on the "potential characterization of the conduct as extreme or outrageous." Delaney v. Clifton, 180 Or. App. 119, 130 (2002). A special relationship is one that imposes a greater duty on the defendant to "refrain from subjecting the victim to abuse, fright, or shock." Williams v. Tri-Cnty. Metro. Transp. Dist. of Oregon, 153 Or. App. 686, 689-90 (1998). Oregon courts have recognized the pastor-parishioner relationship to be one such example of a special relationship. Erickson v. Christenson, 99 Or. App. 104, 108 (1989).
Presently, while Plaintiff and Defendants may have a special relationship as pastor and parishioner, the Court need not address the import of that relationship here because Plaintiff's allegations do not rise to the level of socially intolerable conduct necessary to state an IIED claim. Manusco v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV-07-835-ST, 2009 WL 130259, at *4 (D. Or. Jan. 16, 2009). Plaintiff claims Defendant Held falsely asserted that Unity "rules" prohibited Plaintiff's son from attending regional youth events, unilaterally altered the rules to prevent his son from attending events and refused to furnish copies of Unity's amended rules upon request, refused to mediate, speak, or pray with him, refused Plaintiff's requests for a meeting with the Board, and directed members of the Unity community to not speak to Plaintiff or his son. Am. Compl. 7-8.
While the above assertions could be construed as rude or morally reprehensible behavior analogous to the circumstances in Watte, none of these assertions rise to the level necessary for an IIED claim. See, e.g., Hetfeld v. Bostwick, 136 Or. App. 305, 310 (1995) (finding no claim for IIED where defendant sought to estrange plaintiff from his children, assaulted plaintiff in front of his children, and encouraged their children to prematurely end visits with plaintiff and no longer use plaintiff's surname); Walsh v. Calvin Presbyterian Church of Tigard, Or., No. CV-06-1581-AS, 2007 WL 3170999, at *3-4 (D. Or. Oct. 26, 2007) (finding no claim for IIED where director of a youth ministry program tried to coerce his former student and coworker into a sexual relationship with him and threatened her with termination if she disclosed his advances); House, 218 Or. App. at 365 (finding no claim for IIED where university banned plaintiff from campus after making frequent unwanted contacts to a university employee). Thus, because Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts demonstrating Defendants' acts constituted an extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's IIED claim.
V. Leave to Amend
If the court dismisses a complaint, it must decide whether to grant leave to amend. See 28 U.S.C. § 1653. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that dismissal without leave to amend is improper, even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it is clear that the defective pleading cannot possibly be cured by the allegation of additional facts. Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 828 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 692 (9th Cir. 2001)); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). Because it is not clear that Plaintiff cannot cure the deficiencies in his complaint, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend. ///
CONCLUSION
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [31] is GRANTED. Plaintiff is granted leave to amend the Amended Complaint to allege facts sufficient to demonstrate that he has stated claims upon which relief can be granted. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his Amended Complaint, he must do so within 30 days of the date below.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 7, 2021.
/s/_________
MARCO A. HERNÁNDEZ
United States District Judge