not synonymous with expenses unless expressly made so by statute." Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 259, 263, 39 O.O.2d 410, 413, 227 N.E.2d 197, 201. * * *Videotape testimony
One of the cases which the court in Jones cited as its authority was Terry v. Burger (1966), 6 Ohio App.2d 53, 35 O.O.2d 156, 216 N.E.2d 383. This case was effectively overruled by the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court in Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 259, 39 O.O.2d 410, 227 N.E.2d 197. Benda cited the dissenting opinion of Judge J.J.P. Corrigan in the Terry case as "correctly assessing this difficult problem." Judge Corrigan in his dissent points to a number of examples showing how meaningless the test of "necessary and vital to the litigation" is.
Appellants find relevance in this court's statements in Williams that "expenses" and "costs" are not synonymous, " `unless expressly made so by statute.' " 71 Ohio St.3d at 643, 646 N.E.2d at 832, quoting Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 259, 263, 39 O.O.2d 410, 413, 227 N.E.2d 197, 201. Appellants characterize travel expenses as nonreimbursable "expenses" rather than "costs."
" Id. at 544, 41 O.O. at 88, 90 N.E.2d at 596. See, also, Smith v. Smith (1952), 93 Ohio App. 294, 51 O.O. 45, 114 N.E.2d 480; Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 259, 39 O.O.2d 410, 227 N.E.2d 197. In recent decisions, however, Ohio courts have shown willingness to expand recovery of costs to those expenses outside the traditional meaning of costs.
Even with the word "all" placed before "costs" in R.C. 3515.09, the key word in the statute is "costs." Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 259, 263, 39 O.O.2d 410, 413, 227 N.E.2d 197, 201 ("costs" and "all costs" synonymous). "Costs are generally defined as the statutory fees to which officers, witnesses, jurors, and others are entitled for their services in an action and which the statutes authorize to be taxed and included in the judgment."
Vance v. Roedersheimer (1992), 64 Ohio St.3d 552, 555, 597 N.E.2d 153, 156. In Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 259, 39 O.O.2d 410, 227 N.E.2d 197, the Ohio Supreme Court held that "costs" are those items that are fixed and taxable according to statute. The Supreme Court has adhered to this position and, in Vance, supra, stated:
Even with the word "all" placed before "costs" in R.C. 3515.09, the key word in the statute is "costs." Benda v. Fana (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 259, 263, 39 O.O.2d 410, 413, 227 N.E.2d 197, 201 ("costs" and "all costs" synonymous). "Costs are generally defined as the statutory fees to which officers, witnesses, jurors, and others are entitled for their services in an action and which the statutes authorize to be taxed and included in the judgment."
The Court in Terrell observed: "It is well-established that when a statute authorizes taxation of costs [referring to 5 V.I.C. § 541(a)], 'costs are not synonymous with expenses unless expressly made so by statute.'" Id. at 591 n.14 (quoting Benda v. Fana, 227 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ohio 1967)). The Supreme Court further explained that "limiting 'costs' to what is specifically provided for in a fee-shifting statute is necessary in order to avoid 'absurd situations' that the legislature could not have intended, such as placing a litigant 'with the burden of paying exorbitant professional witness fees which may very well exceed the amount of the verdict itself.'"
The Court in Terrell observed: "It is well-established that when a statute authorizes taxation of costs [referring to 5 V.I.C. § 541(a)], 'costs are not synonymous with expenses unless expressly made so by statute.'" Id. at 591 n.14 (quoting Benda v. Fana, 227 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ohio 1967)). The Supreme Court further explained that "limiting 'costs' to what is specifically provided for in a fee-shifting statute is necessary in order to avoid 'absurd situations' that the legislature could not have intended, such as placing a litigant 'with the burden of paying exorbitant professional witness fees which may very well exceed the amount of the verdict itself.'"
The Court in Terrell observed: "It is well-established that when a statute authorizes taxation of costs [referring to 5 V.I.C. § 541(a)], 'costs are not synonymous with expenses unless expressly made so by statute.'" Id. at 591 n.14 (quoting Benda v. Fana, 227 N.E.2d 197, 201 (Ohio 1967)). The Supreme Court further explained that "limiting 'costs' to what is specifically provided for in a fee-shifting statute is necessary in order to avoid 'absurd situations' that the legislature could not have intended, such as placing a litigant 'with the burden of paying exorbitant professional witness fees which may very well exceed the amount of the verdict itself.'"