Opinion
Case No. 1:04cv306.
March 16, 2006
ORDER
Before the Court is the December 12, 2005 Motion of Defendant Ohio Civil Rights Commission (hereinafter "OCRC" or "Defendant") for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25). On January 3, 2006, Defendant filed a Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28). Plaintiff Dianne Benaugh (hereinafter "Plaintiff") filed a Memorandum in Opposition on January 9, 2006 (Doc. 31). Defendant filed a Reply Memorandum on January 23, 2006 (Doc. 34).
The Court heard oral arguments on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on February 8, 2006.
These matters are now ripe for review. The Court, having reviewed the motion, memoranda, arguments of the parties and case law, GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the December 12, 2006 Motion of Defendant for Summary Judgment.
I. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff filed the instant action on May 4, 2004 asserting the following causes of action:
1. Defendant's failure to reasonably accommodate Plaintiff's disability as required by the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794;
2. Defendant retaliated against Plaintiff for engaging in a statutorily protected activity under the Rehabilitation Act;
3. Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of her disability and retaliated against her for filing a charge of discrimination in violation of O.R.C. § 4112.01; and
4. Defendant intentionally and negligently inflicted emotional distress on Plaintiff.A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(C). The moving party has the burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the non-moving party cannot rest on his pleadings, but must present significant probative evidence in support of his complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; the evidence must be sufficient for a jury to reasonably find in favor of the non-moving party. Id. at 252. B. Failure to Reasonably Accommodate
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., is designed to assist and protect the rights of the handicapped. Title V of the Act prohibits federal agencies, federal contractors, and recipients of federal funds from discriminating against individuals with disabilities. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) provides in pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
In addition, 29 U.S.C. § 791(b).of the Act requires federal employers, including USPS, "to provide adequate hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities for individuals with disabilities."
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission promulgated administrative regulations which define the duties of federal agencies, making clear that federal employers have an obligation to make reasonable accommodations for handicapped employees. The regulations state in relevant part:
An agency shall make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental limitations of an applicant or employee who is a qualified individual with handicaps unless the agency can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its program.29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(c)(1). A "qualified individual with handicaps" is one "who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the health and safety of the individual or others. . . ." 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203(a)(6).
In order for Plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of handicap discrimination based on failure to accommodate, she must show:
1. she is an individual with a handicap as defined in 29 C.F.R. § 1614.203 (a)(1);
2. she is qualified for the position as discussed in 29 U.S.C. § 1614.203(a)(6);
3. the agency was aware of his disability;
4. an accommodation was needed, i.e., a causal relationship existed between the disability and the request for accommodation; and
5. the agency failed to provide the necessary accommodation. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 882-83 (6th Cir. 1996).
Once the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate that the employee cannot reasonably be accommodated, because the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its programs. Id. at 883. If the plaintiff fails to establish a prima facie case, it is unnecessary to address the question of reasonable accommodation. Jasany v. United States Postal Service, 755 F.2d 1244, 1250 (6th Cir. 1985); Sisson v. Helms, 751 F.2d 991, 993 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 474 U.S. 846, 88 L. Ed. 2d 113, 106 S. Ct. 137 (1985); Daubert v. United States Postal Service, 733 F.2d 1367, 1369-70 (10th Cir. 1984); Pushkin v. Regents of University of Colorado, 658 F.2d 1372, 1387 (10th Cir. 1981).
The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the first three elements of a prima facie case. Instead, the dispute is over the fourth and fifth prongs. Upon review of the evidence and the relevant case law, the Court concludes, construing the evidence most strongly in Plaintiff's favor, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether an accommodation was needed and whether Defendant failed to provide the necessary accommodation. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate at this time.
The Court notes that Defendant originally argued Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the statute. However, in the January 3, 2006 Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 28), Defendant withdrew this argument and conceded Plaintiff was disabled as defined by the statute.
C. Statute of Limitation
A claim pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. James v. Upper Arlington City School Dist., 228 F.3d 764, 769. Upon review of the evidence and the relevant case law, the Court holds Plaintiff timely filed this action. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate at this time.
D. Retaliation
The Rehabilitation Act states "No person shall discriminate against an individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this Act." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Plaintiff must show she engaged in protected conduct, suffered an adverse employment action and the adverse action was casually linked to the protected conduct. Kiel v. Select Artificials, Inc., 169 F.3d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir. 1999).
An adverse employment action is more than a "mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities" or a "bruised ego". White v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Instead, it "constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). Constructive discharge is also an adverse employment action. Saroli v. Automation Modular Components, Inc., 405 F.3d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 2005) citing Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876, 886-87 (6th Cir. 1996).
Upon review of the evidence and the relevant case law, the Court concludes, construing the evidence most strongly in Plaintiff's favor, genuine issues of material fact exist as to Plaintiff's retaliation claim. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate at this time.
E. Constructive Discharge
To demonstrate a constructive discharge, Plaintiff must establish (1) "the employer . . . deliberately created intolerable working conditions, as perceived by a reasonable person," and (2) the employer did so "with the intention of forcing the employee to quit. . . ." Moore v. Kuka Welding Sys., 171 F.3d 1073, 1080 (6th Cir. 1999). "To determine if there is a constructive discharge, both the employer's intent and the employee's objective feelings must be examined." Id., citing Held v. Gulf Oil Co., 684 F.2d 427, 432 (6th Cir. 1982).
Defendant's reliance upon Cartwright v. Lockheed Martin Utility Srvcs., Inc., 40 Fed. Appx. 47, 157 (6th Cir. 2002) for the proposition Plaintiff is unable to establish a constructive discharge claim because she applied for, and was granted, disability retirement in February, 2004, is misplaced. As argued by Plaintiff, the Cartwright court held Mr. Cartwright could not make out a constructive discharge claim based on an adverse letter the employer put in his file while he was on disability leave. Specifically, as Mr. Cartwright was on disability and never sought re-employment, he could not claim the employer failed to re-hire him. As such, this analysis does not support the proposition that taking disability leave bars a constructive discharge claim.
The letter stated Mr. Cartwright was not eligible for re-hire.
Upon review of the evidence and the relevant case law, the Court concludes, construing the evidence most strongly in Plaintiff's favor, genuine issues of material fact exist as to Plaintiff's constructive discharge claim. Accordingly, summary judgment on this issue is inappropriate at this time.
F. State Law Claims
As Plaintiff concedes her state law claims, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and pursuant to O.R.C. § 4112.99, summary judgment is appropriate. However, the dismissal of these claims shall be without prejudice.
II. CONCLUSION
A review of the evidence presented by the parties and the relevant case law results in the conclusion genuine issues of material fact exist as to Plaintiff's claims for violation of the Rehabilitation Act, retaliation and constructive discharge, and on the issue of whether Plaintiff timely-filed this action. Finally, as Plaintiff conceded, summary judgment on Plaintiff's state law claims is appropriate.
Accordingly, the December 12, 2005 Motion of Defendant OCRC for Summary Judgment (Doc. 25) is hereby GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiff's claims for violations of O.R.C. § 4112.01; and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress are hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Additionally, this matter is hereby REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Hogan for a settlement conference. The parties shall receiver notification of the date and time from Magistrate Judge Hogan's office.
Finally, the trial is this matter is hereby CONTINUED to June 12, 2006 @ 9:00 a.m., courtroom to be determined.
IT IS SO ORDERED.