"The chapter prohibits a person from 'interfer[ing] in any way with the right of freedom of speech, full criticism, or disclosure by any public employee.'" Bellerose v. SAU No. 39, No. 13-CV-404-PB, 2014 WL 7384105, at *8 (D.N.H. Dec. 29, 2014) (quoting N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 98-E:2).

A plaintiff can show pretext in a variety of ways, including through "evidence of differential treatment in the workplace, statistical evidence showing disparate treatment, temporal proximity of an employee's protected activity to an employer's adverse action, and comments by the employer which intimate a retaliatory mindset." Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 828 (1st Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted); see Bellerose v. SAU No. 39, 2014 DNH 265, 16. Finally, the First Circuit has cautioned courts to be "particularly cautious about granting the employer's motion for summary judgment" in cases where "the issue becomes whether the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination." Kelley, 707 F.3d at 115-16.

See also Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2001) ("The employee's request must be sufficiently direct and specific, giving notice that she needs a special accommodation. At the least, the request must explain how the accommodation requested is linked to some disability."); Bellerose v. SAU No. 39, 2014 WL 7384105 at *5, 2014 DNH 265 at 13 (D.N.H. Dec. 29, 2014) ("Typically, the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement is not triggered until the employee makes a request because an employee's disability and concomitant need for accommodation are often not known to the employer until the employee requests an accommodation.") (citation and internal punctuation omitted). See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (imposing liability on employers for failing to reasonably accommodate "known physical or mental limitations") (emphasis supplied).