Opinion
Case No. 99-CV-74199-DT
June 30, 2000.
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Petitioner Christopher Bell, a state prisoner currently confined at the Michigan Reformatory in Ionia, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and felony firearm following a jury trial with co-defendant Lawrence Coston in the Genesee County Circuit Court in 1996. Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment without parole on the murder and conspiracy convictions and a consecutive term of two years imprisonment on the firearm conviction.
Petitioner challenges the constitutionality of his state court proceedings, raising claims concerning the failure to transcribe the testimony of a prosecution witness, the insufficiency of the evidence, and the involuntariness of his confession. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner's request for habeas relief is denied and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is dismissed.
I. Factual Background
Petitioner's convictions stem from the killing of Lavelle Mitchell in a drive-by shooting on October 18, 1995 in Flint, Michigan. The testimony presented at trial revealed that Petitioner and co-defendant Lawrence Coston were members of a gang called the Lake Shore Gangsters. Victim Lavelle Mitchell was a member of a rival group called the Crocker Street gang. Petitioner, Coston, and a third member of their gang borrowed a car, obtained a shotgun, drove up to Mitchell and another member of his gang named Eddie Adams, fired several shots at Mitchell, and then fled the scene. Mitchell suffered six gunshot wounds and died from a gunshot wound to the chest.
Eddie Adams testified about the shooting at trial. Due to a recording system operator error, however, his direct examination testimony was not transcribed. On cross-examination, Adams admitted that he was a member of the Crocker Street gang. He testified that a car drive by him and Mitchell three times on the day of the shooting. Adams saw two people in the car, but could not view their faces to identify them.
Several members of Petitioner's gang testified at trial. Steven Tyler testified that Petitioner admitted shooting one of the Crocker gang members with a shotgun during a drive-by with fellow gang members. Christopher Fontana testified that he heard Petitioner say, "We just popped one of them," on October 18, 1995. At a later gang meeting, people talked about the shooting and Petitioner received the rank of "King." To achieve such a ranking, a gang member is required to kill someone.
Three young women also testified at trial. Jennifer Quillen testified that she heard Petitioner state that he wanted to get back at the Crocker Street gang during a meeting at Tina Hurley's house on the day before the shooting. Petitioner returned to the house the next morning with Coston, said that they had seen two Crocker Street gang members on the street, and that they "could do this." Petitioner retrieved a shotgun from Hurley's bedroom and left with Coston. Later, Petitioner, Coston, and a third gang member returned to Hurley's home and called a meeting. At that meeting, Petitioner admitted that he shot one of the Crocker Street gang members and Coston acted out the shooting. Tina Hurley confirmed that Petitioner and Coston came to her home on October 18, 1995, retrieved a shotgun, and left with a third gang member. At a meeting later that day, either Petitioner or Coston stated that they "took care of business with Crocker" and acted out the shooting. Shawntel Pierce testified in a similar manner.
Petitioner did not testify at trial, but his pre-trial statement to police was admitted into evidence. Police Sergeant Charles Middleton testified that he questioned Petitioner about the shooting after twice advising him of his Miranda rights. After initially denying involvement in the crime, Petitioner admitted his role in the shooting. Petitioner described retrieving the shotgun from Tina Hurley's home, loading it, and driving with Coston and another gang member to the area where he had previously seen Lavelle Mitchell and Eddie Adams. After driving by Mitchell and Adams once, Petitioner and Coston changed places in the car so that Coston could drive and Petitioner could ride in the passenger seat to fire the weapon. The third gang member rode in the backseat. When asked about his purpose in undertaking these actions, Petitioner responded, "To shoot Vel."
They drove by Mitchell and Adams a second time. Petitioner put a back scarf up to his eyes and a hood over his head, and pointed the gun out of the window. On the third pass, Petitioner told Coston to turn off the car lights, hid the muzzle of the gun behind the car mirror, and fired four shots at Mitchell. They passed by a police car as they fled the scene. After the shooting, Coston called a gang meeting and gave Petitioner the rank of "King." They also told their fellow gang members about the shooting.
In making his statement, Petitioner told Sergeant Middleton that he did not mean to shoot the boy, that he was high at the time of the shooting, and that he did it to protect himself from getting beaten up by the Crocker Street gang. Petitioner admitted that the shotgun police recovered from Tina Hurley's home was the weapon used in the shooting. A firearms expert confirmed that five shotgun shells recovered from the crime scene were fired by the weapon police recovered from Hurley's home during an investigation of the shooting.
At the close of trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and felony firearm. The trial court subsequently sentenced him to the mandatory terms of life imprisonment without parole plus two years imprisonment.
II. Procedural History
Following his convictions and sentencing, Petitioner filed an appeal as of right with the Michigan Court of Appeals, raising the following claims:
I. He was denied due process because the direct examination of the prosecution's first witness, Eddie Adams, was not transcribed.
II. There was insufficient evidence of intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation to support his convictions
III. His confession was involuntary and should have been suppressed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentence in a per curiam unpublished opinion. People v. Bell, No. 195705 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 18, 1997). Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court raising the same issues, which was denied in a standard order. People v. Bell, No. 111171 (Mich. Oct. 26, 1998).
Petitioner filed the present habeas petition on September 14, 1999, raising the same claims presented to the Michigan appellate courts. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on exhaustion grounds on March 28, 2000. The Court denied Respondent's motion on May 10, 2000. Respondent filed an answer addressing the merits of the petition on June 14, 2000, asserting that Petitioner's claims should be denied for lack of merit.
III. Standard of Review
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), govern this case because Petitioner filed this habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, ___ U.S ___, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000), the United States Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Supreme Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined the by Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 1523 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 1522. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers only to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 1523. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court is restricted to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, § 2254(e)(1) requires that this Court presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied ___ U.S ___, 119 S.Ct. 2403 (1999).
IV. Analysis
A. Failure to Transcribe Testimony
Petitioner first claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because the direct examination testimony of the prosecution's first witness, Eddie Adams, was not transcribed. Due process requires that a defendant in a criminal case be provided with a transcript of a prior proceeding when that transcript is needed for an effective defense or appeal. See, e.g., Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971). However, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas must demonstrate prejudice due to a missing transcript before a constitutional violation of a right to a fair appeal will be found. Bransford v. Brown, 806 F.2d 83, 86 (6th Cir. 1986); accord White v. Florida, 939 F.2d 912, 914 (11th Cir. 1991); Mitchell v. Wyrick, 698 F.2d 940, 941-42 (8th Cir. 1983).
In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed Petitioner's due process claim as follows:
We find that there has been no infringement of defendant's constitutional right to appeal because the available transcript is sufficient to allow evaluation of his claims on appeal. . . . As discussed below, we have found that there was sufficient evidence to establish the element of premeditation and deliberation by looking to testimony that was transcribed. Moreover, the missing testimony has no impact on defendant Bell's other claim on appeal regarding the voluntariness of his confession.People v. Bell, No. 195705, *1.2 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 18, 1997) (citation omitted).
This Court finds that the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision in this regard is consistent with United States Supreme Court precedent and constitutes a reasonable application of federal law. Petitioner neither alleges nor establishes prejudice arising from the trial court's inadvertent failure to transcribe Eddie Adams' direct examination testimony. Petitioner has not shown, nor is there any indication in the record, that a transcript of Adams' testimony was necessary for Petitioner to appeal his convictions. As noted by the Michigan Court of Appeals, the testimony is not essential to Petitioner's insufficient evidence or involuntary confession claims. Accordingly, the failure to transcribe Adams' testimony cannot be said to have prejudiced Petitioner. See Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 332-33 (6th Cir. 1998). Mere speculation that the transcribed testimony was necessary for a fair appeal precludes a finding of a constitutional violation by this Court. See Bransford, 806 F.2d at 86. Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this due process claim.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Petitioner next claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to convict him of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit the same. Specifically, Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to establish that he acted with intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation.
In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), the Supreme Court established that a federal court's review of a sufficiency of the evidence claim must focus on whether "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319; see also DeLisle v. Rivers, 161 F.3d 370, 389 (6th Cir. 1998). Because a claim of insufficiency of the evidence presents a mixed question of law and fact, Huynh v. King, 95 F.3d 1052, 1059 (11th Cir. 1996); Maes v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 979, 988 (10th Cir. 1995), this Court must determine whether the state court's application of the Jackson standard was reasonable.
Under Michigan law, first-degree premeditated murder requires proof that the defendant intentionally killed the victim and that the act of killing was premeditated and deliberate. People v. Schollaert, 194 Mich. App. 158, 170, 486 N.W.2d 312 (1992). Premeditation and deliberation require sufficient time to allow the defendant to take a second look. Id. Premeditation and deliberation may be established by evidence of "(1) the prior relationship of the parties; (2) the defendant's actions before the killing; (3) the circumstances of the killing itself; and (4) the defendant's conduct after the homicide." Id. Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of the crime. People v. Jolly, 442 Mich. 458, 466, 502 N.W.2d 177 (1993).
In concluding that sufficient evidence was presented to support Petitioner's convictions, the Michigan Court of Appeals stated:
Defendant Bell draws a distinction without a difference by claiming that he only meant to wound the victim, not kill him. The evidence showed that he shot the victim four times in the left chest with a shotgun loaded with buckshot. We find that the jury could have inferred that defendant intended to kill, not merely wound, from these facts.
Moreover, we find that there was ample evidence from which the jury could have found that this intent to kill was formed after premeditation and deliberation . . . Sergeant Middleton testified that he conducted both an informal and formal interview with defendant Bell. During these interviews, defendant Bell detailed the events leading up to the murder. Bell told Sergeant Middleton that prior to the shooting, he and defendant Coston had observed the victim and Eddie Adams at a party store. After spotting Mitchell, defendant Bell indicated that he made arrangements to rent a car from a `crackhead.' They then drove the rented car to the home of Tina Hurley to pick up another member of their gang, Kevin `Stretch' Mitchell, and a shotgun. Bell loaded the gun with buckshot, and he, Stretch, and Coston then drove the rented car to the area where they had seen the victim. Bell admitted that their purpose in searching for Mitchell was to shoot him. Once they located Mitchell and Adams, Bell stated that they drove past them and proceeded around the block. Bell then allowed Coston to drive so that he could shoot from the passenger seat. Coston drove past Mitchell and Adams again. Bell pointed the gun, but did not shoot because he `choked up.' Coston drove around the block a third time, and it was on this pass that defendant Bell shot Mitchell. He fired the gun four times, and before firing the gun the fourth time he turned the gun upside down. We find that this evidence was sufficient to establish the elements of premeditation and deliberation. The shooting was planned and defendant had ample opportunity to rethink his actions before shooting the victim.People v. Bell, No. 195705, *2 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 18, 1997) (text and citations omitted).
Having carefully reviewed the record, this Court cannot conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals' determination that the facts demonstrated Petitioner's intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation is unreasonable. The testimony presented at trial revealed that Petitioner sought out the victim, a rival gang member, with the intent to shoot him. After locating the victim, Petitioner and his cohorts rented a car, retrieved a shotgun, and drove by the victim several times. Petitioner loaded the shotgun, pointed at the victim, and shot him four times in the chest area before fleeing the scene. Petitioner and his cohorts then bragged of the shooting to their fellow gang members. Given this evidence, a rational trier of fact could find that the prosecution established beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner acted with intent to kill, as well as premeditation and deliberation.
Petitioner's insufficient evidence claim essentially challenges the inferences that the jury drew from the testimony presented at trial and challenges the weight to be accorded certain pieces of evidence. However, it is well-settled that "[a] federal habeas corpus court faced with a record of historical facts that supports conflicting inferences must presume — even if it does not affirmatively appear in the record — that the trier of fact resolved any such conflicts in favor of the prosecution, and must defer to that resolution." Walker v. Engle, 703 F.2d 959, 969-70 (6th Cir. 1983). Given the evidence presented at trial, including Petitioner's own statement, this Court finds that a rational trier of fact could have found that Petitioner acted with the intent to kill and premeditation and deliberation so as to support his convictions for first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim.
C. Voluntariness of Confession
Lastly, Petitioner claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because his confession to police was involuntary and should have been suppressed at trial. The Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination bars the admission of involuntary confessions. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 163-64 (1986). A confession is considered involuntary if: (1) the police extorted the confession by means of coercive activity; (2) the coercion in question was sufficient to overbear the will of the accused; and (3) the will of the accused was in fact overborne "because of the coercive police activity in question." McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 1988).
The voluntariness of a confession is a mixed question of law and fact. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 108-11 (1995). Therefore, this Court must determine whether the state court's application of Supreme Court precedent was reasonable. See, e.g., Smith v. Sullivan, 1 F. Supp.2d 206, 211 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that "federal habeas corpus courts are no longer authorized to exercise de novo review over the ultimate issue of voluntariness, a mixed question of law and fact. Instead, [the court is] obliged to respect the judgment of the state court, provided it does not constitute an "unreasonable application' of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.") (internal citation omitted).
In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the ultimate question is "whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the challenged confession was obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the Constitution." Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112 (1985). Those circumstances include:
1. Police Coercion (a "crucial element")
2. Length of Interrogation
3. Location of Interrogation
4. Continuity of Interrogation
5. Suspect's Maturity
6. Suspect's Education
7. Suspect's Physical Condition Mental Health
8. Whether Suspect Was Advised of Miranda Rights
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693-94 (1993). All of the factors involved in the giving of the statement should be closely scrutinized. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961). Without coercive police activity, however, a confession should not be deemed involuntary. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167 ("coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not "voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause"). The burden of proving that a confession was obtained involuntarily rests with the petitioner. Boles v. Foltz, 816 F.2d 1132, 1136 (6th Cir. 1987). Voluntariness need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.
In this case, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court did not err in refusing to suppress Petitioner's confession, stating in relevant part:
After examining the record of the Walker hearing, we find that defendant's confession was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. While defendant Bell now appears to question the wisdom of his decision to waive his right to counsel and speak to Sergeant Middleton, the record indicates that he was twice advised of his Miranda rights, and that he waived his rights both times. Moreover, we find that the trial court did not make a mistake in determining that the fact that defendant Bell was possibly held in police custody for hours prior to being questioned did not affect the voluntariness of his statements. We further find that defendant's suggestion that lengthy questioning and the presence of armed police officers somehow coerced him into making a statement is without merit.People v. Bell, No. 195705, *2-3 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 18, 1997) (internal citations omitted).
Having reviewed the record, this Court is convinced that the Michigan Court of Appeals' determination that Petitioner's confession was voluntary is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and constitutes a reasonable application thereof. The record is devoid of any evidence of police threats, physical abuse, or other coercive conduct in this case. The mere fact that Petitioner was 17 years old and in a room with armed police officers does not establish coercion. Although Petitioner was in custody for approximately four hours before being questioned by police, he was not deprived of necessary nourishment, medical care, or other essentials. Further, Petitioner was advised of his Miranda rights by the police twice prior to being questioned and waived those rights both times. Having scrutinized the relevant factors, the Court is satisfied that Petitioner's confession was voluntary and that his due process rights were not violated by the admission of his confession into evidence at trial. Petitioner is thus not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated, this Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims presented. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner's request for habeas relief is DENIED and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
DATED: 30 June 2000