Opinion
No. 05-02-01837-CR
Opinion issued September 11, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 3, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F01-53975-J. AFFIRMED
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, WRIGHT, and BRIDGES.
OPINION
Christopher Marvin Bell appeals his conviction for aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. Appellant waived a jury trial and entered an open guilty plea. The trial court sentenced appellant to forty-four years' confinement and assessed a $1000 fine. The trial court also made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a firearm, during the commission of the offense. In a single point of error, appellant contends his guilty plea was involuntary. We affirm the trial court's judgment. Appellant argues information was conveyed to him that if he were to be sentenced to penitentiary time, he would receive a term of years in the lower range of punishment. Thus, appellant argues, his guilty plea was involuntary because he believed the trial court would assess punishment in the lower range. The State responds the record does not support appellant's claim that his guilty plea was involuntary. We agree with the State. The punishment range for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a first-degree felony offense, is confinement for life or for any term of not more than ninety-nine years or less than five years, and an optional fine not to exceed $10,000. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 29.03 (Vernon 2003). The record shows the trial judge properly admonished appellant in writing, creating a prima facie showing the plea was voluntary. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a), (c), (d) (Vernon 1989 Supp. 2003); Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 771 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd). At the plea hearing, appellant testified he understood the charges in the indictment and the punishment range for the offense. He also testified he understood the judge could sentence him to any number of years in the penitentiary within the punishment range for a first-degree felony offense, he was freely and voluntarily pleading guilty to the offense as charged in the indictment, and he knowingly and voluntarily signed a judicial confession. During the punishment hearing, a presentence investigation report was admitted into evidence without objection, and the trial court took judicial notice of all the evidence presented in the trial of Frank Tasby, appellant's accomplice. Appellant's forty-four year sentence is within the punishment range for the offense. Nothing in the record shows appellant believed the trial judge would assess a prison term within the lower range of punishment. We conclude appellant has not shown he was not aware of the consequences of his plea and was harmed or misled by the trial court's admonishments. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(c) (Vernon 1989); Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). The fact that appellant received greater punishment than he hoped for does not render his plea involuntary. See Tovar-Torres v. State, 860 S.W.2d 176, 178 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, no pet.). Accordingly, we overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment.