Opinion
C.A. PC-2016-0544
06-26-2018
LORETTA BELAC, Plaintiff v. 3M COMPANY ET AL., Defendants.
For Plaintiff: John E. Deaton, Esq. For Defendant: Andrew R. McConville, Esq. Marc E. Finkel, Esq.
For Plaintiff: John E. Deaton, Esq.
For Defendant: Andrew R. McConville, Esq. Marc E. Finkel, Esq.
DECISION
GIBNEY, P.J.
Before this Court for decision are the Defendant Evenheat Kiln, Inc.'s (Evenheat) motion for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment and the Plaintiff's motion for dismissal without prejudice. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-14.
I
Facts and Travel
The Plaintiff originally filed this asbestos liability action on February 9, 2016 and alleges that she was exposed to asbestos-containing products over the course of her career crafting ceramics from her home business, which caused her to develop mesothelioma. Numerous Defendants are named in the action, including Evenheat. Evenheat filed its Answer on March 11, 2016. The Plaintiff later amended the Complaint twice, on July 28, 2016 and September 8, 2016. Evenheat filed Answers to these Amended Complaints on August 16, 2016 and September 13, 2016.
Beginning shortly after the initial Complaint was filed, between March and September of 2016, various Defendants contested personal jurisdiction in Rhode Island and filed motions for lack of personal jurisdiction and for protective orders to stay or limit discovery. Evenheat, however, did not contest Rhode Island jurisdiction. The Plaintiff was deposed over the course of six days from June to September of 2016, and Evenheat was present during that deposition. Evenheat also participated in trial testimony preservation via telephone conference on September 2, 2016. The Plaintiff died shortly thereafter due to complications from her illness.
At the time of this Decision, Plaintiff's counsel has not moved for the appropriate substitution of parties through Rule 25 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.
Evenheat filed a motion for summary judgment on December 22, 2016 and argued that the Plaintiff failed to adequately demonstrate product identification and a causal connection. The motion argument was set for hearing on January 4, 2017 and then rescheduled for March 29, 2017.Oral arguments on the motion were not heard on either of those dates, however. Instead, the Administratrix of the Plaintiff's Estate refiled this action in Pennsylvania on March 22, 2017 and then brought a voluntary motion to dismiss the charges against all of the Defendants without prejudice on April 12, 2017.
Evenheat filed an objection to Plaintiff's motion to dismiss. On April 20, 2017, this Court found that a dismissal at that time would cause prejudice to Evenheat because it had actively participated in litigation and had a pending summary judgment motion. See Belac v. 3M Company, No. PC-2016-0544, 2017 WL 1504687, *4 (R.I. Super. Apr. 20, 2017) (Gibney, P.J.). This Court allowed the Plaintiff one month to respond to Evenheat's motion for summary judgment and noted that oral arguments on the motion would be scheduled thereafter. Id. This Court then granted Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice with respect to the Defendants except Evenheat and another Defendant, Sargent Art, Inc. Id.
This Court also denied the Plaintiff's motion as to Sargent Art Inc. (Sargent Art). See Belac v. 3M Company, 2017 WL 1504687, *4. Like Evenheat, Sargent Art filed a motion for summary judgment and objected to Plaintiff's motion to dismiss. This Court similarly found that dismissal would cause prejudice to Sargent Art because it had actively participated in the litigation and had a pending motion for summary judgment. Id.
Following this order, the Plaintiff responded to Evenheat's summary judgment motion on May 22, 2017. In support of her objection, the Plaintiff proffered an affidavit from her daughter, Faith Belac Cope (Ms. Belac Cope). Evenheat filed a motion to strike the affidavit on August 31, 2017. Oral arguments on Evenheat's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike were heard on September 6, 2017. In a written decision, this Court, Taft-Carter, J., denied Evenheat's motion for summary judgment and motion to strike on October 19, 2017. See Belac v. 3M Company, No. PC-2016-0544, 2017 WL 4839159, *5 (R.I. Super. Oct. 19, 2017) (Taft-Carter, J.).
This Court denied Sargent Art's motion for summary judgment at the same time as we denied Evenheat's motion for summary judgment and to strike the affidavit. See Belac v. 3M Company, 2017 WL 4839159, *5. Sargent Art did not file a motion for relief following that decision. The Plaintiff and Sargent Art entered into a stipulation to dismiss the claims against Sargent Art with prejudice on December 13, 2017.
Following this decision, Evenheat filed a motion for relief on December 1, 2017 and argued that the Court should have stricken the affidavit from Ms. Belac Cope and that the Plaintiff did not provide sufficient exposure evidence. This Court heard oral arguments on the motion for relief on December 13, 2017. In a bench decision, this Court, Taft-Carter, J., denied Evenheat's motion for relief.
Evenheat noticed a deposition of Ms. Belac Cope for March 2018 and filed the instant motion for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment on March 19, 2018. The same day, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to dismiss all claims against Evenheat without prejudice. Both parties have filed memoranda on the matter, and this Court heard oral arguments on March 28, 2018. Evenheat remains the only Defendant in the Rhode Island case.
II
Standard of Review
"'[A]fter a judge has decided an interlocutory matter in a pending suit, a second judge, confronted at a later stage of the suit with the same question in the identical manner, should refrain from disturbing the first ruling.'" Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 424 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Chavers v. Fleet Bank (RI), N.A., 844 A.2d 666, 677 (R.I. 2004)). This principle, known as the law-of-the-case doctrine, is "particularly applicable when the rulings under consideration pertain to successive motions for summary judgment. . ." Ferguson v. Marshall Contractors, Inc., 745 A.2d 147, 151 (R.I. 2000). The law-of-the-case doctrine applies unless a subsequent motion is based on an expanded record, in which case "'it is within the trial justice's sound discretion whether to consider the issue.'" Id. at 152 (quoting Goodman v. Turner, 512 A.2d 861, 864 (R.I. 1986)).
A plaintiff may bring a voluntary dismissal of an action if the motion is brought before the adverse party files an answer or a motion for summary judgment, or by filing a stipulation of dismissal that is signed by the parties. Super. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1). Such a dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise noted in the notice of dismissal or the stipulation. Id. When the plaintiff brings a voluntary dismissal after this period, "an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper." Super. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Courts generally consider the circumstances of the case to determine whether to grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion, including "'the defendant's effort and expense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, and the fact that a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant.'" Doe v. Urohealth Sys., Inc., 216 F.3d 157, 160 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Pace v. S. Express Co., 409 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1969)). These factors, however, are guidelines and the Court maintains discretion in its analysis. Id. (citing and quoting Tyco Labs, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir. 1980), in which the court said that "'[t]he enumeration of the factors to be considered . . . is not equivalent to a mandate that each and every such factor be resolved in favor of the moving party before dismissal is appropriate. It is rather simply a guide for the trial judge, in whom the discretion ultimately rests'").
III
Analysis
When this Court denied the Plaintiff's first motion for voluntary dismissal as to Evenheat, we noted that a dismissal would prejudice Evenheat because it had a pending motion for summary judgment. See Belac v. 3M Company, 2017 WL 1504687, *4. Accordingly, this Court first addresses Evenheat's motion for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment. In its motion, Evenheat argues that it should be permitted to depose Ms. Belac Cope in order to obtain an expanded record upon which to base a subsequent motion for summary judgment.
Through this motion, Evenheat seeks to argue issues that this Court already has addressed twice: whether the Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence of product identification and causal connection. Evenheat first advanced its argument that the Plaintiff failed to provide adequate evidence of product identification and causation and that the affidavit attesting to such evidence should be stricken in its motion for summary judgment. This Court rejected this argument and denied Evenheat's motion for summary judgment and to strike the affidavit, finding that the product identification and causation evidence was sufficient. Evenheat then sought relief from that judgment because this Court "did not substantively" address the issues, and again advanced the exact same arguments that the affidavit should be stricken and the Plaintiff did not show product identification and causation evidence. This Court denied Evenheat's arguments a second time. Now, through the instant motion, Evenheat again seeks to attack the sufficiency of the Plaintiff's product identification and causal connection evidence and the validity of Ms. Belac Cope's affidavit, without providing any additional evidence in support thereof. Evenheat does not provide an expanded record to support this motion. Rather, the motion is premised on Evenheat's conjecture that deposing Ms. Belac Cope would produce enough favorable evidence to warrant a renewed motion for summary judgment on the same bases that this Court already addressed twice. This Court cannot permit a third bite of the proverbial apple. Evenheat's motion for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment is denied.
Having denied Evenheat's motion for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment, this Court now turns to the Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice and considers the circumstances of this case. See Doe, 216 F.3d at 160. Evenheat has actively participated in this litigation and expended expenses and effort in their trial preparation and discovery. Since the case was filed in February of 2016, Evenheat has answered three Complaints, participated in master discovery and one day of trial testimony preservation over the phone, and attended the Plaintiff's deposition. Evenheat also filed a motion for summary judgment and prepared for oral arguments on that motion. Subsequent to the Plaintiff's first motion to voluntarily dismiss the case against Evenheat in this jurisdiction, Evenheat filed a motion for relief and the instant motion, and prepared for oral arguments. Similarly, the Plaintiff actively pursued this action in this Court. The Plaintiff participated in discovery and responded to various motions. Importantly, the Plaintiff only moved to voluntarily dismiss the case after a significant number of Defendants, including the so-called "Primary Defendants, " contested personal jurisdiction in Rhode Island. Following these Defendants' motions, the Plaintiff acted diligently in refiling the action in another jurisdiction. This Court finds that there was no delay in the Plaintiff's pursuit of this action and that the Plaintiff has a sufficient explanation for seeking a voluntary dismissal. Finally, with this Court's denial of Evenheat's motions for summary judgment, for relief, and for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment, Evenheat no longer has any pending motions in front of this Court. Considering the aforementioned factors and the circumstances of this case, this Court finds that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is proper.
"Primary Defendants" are the Defendants that were identified by the Plaintiff as potentially bearing greater liability in this action than other Defendants.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, this Court denies Evenheat's motion for leave to renew its motion for summary judgment and grants the Plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice.