"A restrictive covenant which contains or may be read as containing distinct undertakings bounded by different limits of space or time, or different in subject-matter, may be good as to part and bad as to part." Id. (quoting Beit v. Beit, 63 A.2d 161, 166 (Conn. 1948). But severance is proper only if the covenant "is in effect a combination of several distinct covenants."

There is a narrow exception to this rule whereby courts may strike an unreasonable restrictive covenant where the parties intended for the contract to be severable and the covenants "may be read as containing distinct undertakings bounded by different limits of space or time." Deming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. , 279 Conn. 745, 769, n.21, 905 A.2d 623 (2006) (quoting Beit v. Beit , 135 Conn. 195, 204-205, 63 A.2d 161 (1948) ). This is often referred to as the blue pencil rule.

"Professor Samuel Williston, who drafted § 518 for the Institute, agreed with this. In a note on Beit v. Beit, 63 A.2d 161, 135 Conn. 195, [10 A.L.R.2d 734] (1948), 23 Conn.Bar Jour. 40, he later said: `I have concluded and have so stated in § 1660 of the Revised edition of my treatise on Contracts in spite of the contrary rule stated in § 518 of the Restatement of Contracts, that in such a case the unquestionably legal part of this covenant should be enforced. * * * If any part of the covenant promised anything criminal or seriously bad in itself the whole covenant, whether in divisible form or not, should be unenforceable. But this is not the case.'

79; 206 S.C. 1, 18, 32 S.E.2d 889; 2 McMul. 348; 128 S.C. 434, 442, 122 S.E. 868; 46 Am. Jur., Sales, Sec. 791, 792; 231 S.C. 493, 504-5, 99 S.E.2d 187; 23 S.C. 297. As to where contracts are prepared by one of theparties, and by its legal counsel, any ambiguity in the instrumentsmust be construed against the author: 183 S.C. 399, 191 S.E. 209; 173 S.C. 256, 175 S.E. 510; 172 S.C. 399, 174 S.E. 231. As to the Trial Judge properly holding thatthe Restrictive Covenant was unenforceable because it containedan unreasonable territorial and time restraint: 46 A.L.R.2d 187; 158 S.C. 411, 155 S.E. 734; 200 S.C. 494, 21 S.E.2d 184; 30 S.C. 412, 9 S.E. 422. As toCourt having no power to make contract between the parties: 222 S.C. 248, 72 S.E.2d 446; 229 S.C. 388, 93 S.E.2d 118; 200 S.C. 494, 21 S.E.2d 184; Williston on Contracts (4th Ed.), Sec. 1660; 46 A.L.R.2d 204; Restatement of Contracts, Sec. 518; 224 F.2d 693; 139 N.E.2d 124; 127 N.E.2d 235; 12 A.2d 369, 127 N.J. Eq. 202; 69 F. Supp. 278; 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161, 10 A.L.R.2d 734. July 14, 1958.

The court finds that a restriction of unlimited duration is patently unreasonable under the circumstances. The plaintiff, apparently recognizing the difficulty in meeting the first prong of the five-prong test, suggests that the court invoke its power under Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (1948), to " blue pencil" the agreement and limit the length of the restriction to one of reasonable duration. APPLICATION OF THE " BLUE PENCIL" RULE

There is, however, an aspect of this case that should be settled first. One of the defendant's contentions is that the plaintiff has misrepresented Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195 (1948) as authority for the proposition that the provisions of paragraph 15, ante, should be treated in a divisible manner rather than as a unitary whole. According to the defendant, the plaintiff is attempting to have the court rewrite the contract of the parties.

As noted by the parties, the only pertinent difference between Connecticut and Massachusetts law with regard to the enforcement of a noncompete provision is the extent to which the courts are permitted to "blue pencil" a facially unenforceable noncompete provision so that it may be enforced. This different use of the so called "blue pencil" rule is explained by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195 63 A.2d 161 (1948). In Beit, the plaintiffs sold two grocery businesses to the defendant, one in the City of Norwich and one in the City of New London, and as part of the sale, the plaintiffs agreed "not to engage in the meat market or grocery business within the limits of New London County" for thirty years.

This court cannot accept any claim, therefore, that this language was intended to be other than that of an entirety and, hence, not divisible. See Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 205, 63 A.2d 161 (1948). For this court, therefore, to try to fashion out of the language the parties themselves chose, an area restriction it would claim reasonable would clearly be rewriting the contract the parties agreed upon. This, the court cannot do. Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 204-205; Hatcho Corporation v. Aella Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 485 A.2d 1285 (1985); See Durham v. Stand-By Labor of Georgia, Inc., 198 S.E.2d 145, 149 (1973).

Where the covenant is intended by the parties to be an entirety, it cannot properly be divided by a court. Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195. There is also another line of authority — the Massachusetts rule — which states that even though the territory is not divisible in the wording of the contract, it will be enforced as to so much of the area included as would have been a reasonable area for the application of the restrictive covenant.

If I should conclude that the restrictive covenant is invalid because contrary to public policy, serious consideration would have to be given to the question whether a person who has received consideration for a covenant will be allowed to come into court and obtain a declaration that it is contrary to public policy. For a discussion of that question, see Beit v. Beit ( 135 Conn. 195). The next question, therefore, is whether the restrictive covenant is valid and enforcible; and I am bound to say that if I had been left to my own resources I would not have thought that even a plausible argument could be constructed in support of plaintiff's view that it is invalid.