Opinion
No. C03-2163 TEH.
February 14, 2005
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Kenneth Hedrick and Darin Nishimoto. After carefully considering the parties' written arguments, the record in this case, and relevant case law, the Court finds oral argument to be unnecessary and now GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendants' motion for the reasons discussed below.
BACKGROUND
The following is a brief summary of the undisputed facts underlying this action: Plaintiff Easa Begzad immigrated to the United States from Afghanistan. He leased commercial property from Defendants Sherman L. Balch and Shirley C. Balch, and Defendant Sandy Fresno worked for the Balches. On May 24, 2002, Fresno, also known as Sandryna L. Hayter, spoke with Begzad via telephone about the Balches' decision not to renew Begzad's lease. Following that call, Fresno called the Hayward Police Department to express her concern that Begzad might harm himself or his family.
Two Hayward police officers, Kenneth Hedrick and Keith Bryan, responded to Fresno's call. Hedrick first interviewed Fresno in person and then called Bryan en route to Begzad's office. Hedrick and Bryan interviewed Begzad and ultimately took Begzad into custody pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, which authorizes involuntary detention of mentally disordered individuals who pose a risk of harm to themselves or others.
The first amended complaint misnames Hedrick as "Hendrick" and also names "D. Nishimoto" as a defendant. Bryan is not named as a defendant in the first amended complaint, but the Court recently granted Begzad's motion for leave to amend the complaint to add Bryan as a defendant.
Begzad was taken for evaluation to the John George Psychiatric Pavilion, which is part of the Alameda County Medical Center. The intake physician reported that Begzad was "[c]alm" and "cooperative," and that "no evidence of affective or pychotic [sic] illness [was] apparent in the mental status exam." Ex. L to Hom Reply Decl. at 000004-5. Nonetheless, the doctor decided to hold Begzad overnight, with plans for re-evaluation in the morning, because of inconsistencies between Begzad's statements and the police's statements on the 5150 report. The next morning, Begzad was released. The doctor's final progress evaluation note states that Begzad's "5150 [was] a misunderstanding and [Begzad] is neither suicidal nor hmicidal [sic]." Id. at 000008.
Begzad claims that he was never suicidal and that his detention was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Begzad, who is Muslim, further claims that the officers detained him based on religious and racial discrimination. After two rounds of motions to dismiss, the following claims remain in this case:
• Section 1983 claims based on due process, unlawful seizure, and equal protection against the individual officers;
• Various state constitutional claims against the individual officers; and
• Various state law claims, including false arrest, false imprisonment, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, against the individual officers, the Balches, and Fresno.
Although Begzad makes arguments in his papers relating to an excessive force claim, there is no such claim in this case. Begzad failed to plead an excessive force claim in the first amended complaint ("FAC"). When the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions to dismiss the FAC, the Court granted Begzad leave to amend his complaint to state an excessive force claim. However, Begzad inexplicably failed to file a second amended complaint by the ordered deadline. Accordingly, the Court dismissed several of Begzad's claims, including his excessive force claim, with prejudice on February 3, 2004.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Toscano v. Prof'l Golfers Ass'n, 258 F.3d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 2001). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute as to a material fact is "genuine" if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. The court may not weigh the evidence and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. at 255.
A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery responses that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the moving party will have the burden of proof at trial, it must affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party. Id. at 322-23. However, on an issue for which its opponent will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party can prevail merely by "pointing out to the District Court . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. at 325. If the moving party meets its initial burden, the opposing party must then "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" in order to defeat the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
DISCUSSION
I. Defendant Nishimoto
Defendants first move for summary judgment on all claims asserted against Defendant Darin Nishimoto. Begzad apparently agrees that he has no basis for recovering from Nishimoto. See Opp'n at 3 (stating that Begzad's counsel agreed to dismiss Nishimoto from this suit). Moreover, Nishimoto filed a declaration stating that he was not at the scene of the incident in question and that he did not otherwise participate in Begzad's detention, Nishimoto Decl. ¶ 3, and Begzad has offered no evidence to the contrary. Consequently, the Court finds no triable issue as to Nishimoto's liability and therefore GRANTS Defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted against Nishimoto.
II. State Law Claims
Defendants next move for summary judgment on all state law claims against the individual officers on grounds that Begzad did not comply with the California Tort Claims Act. The Act requires Begzad to have filed a timely written claim with the City of Hayward and to have filed this case within six months of the City's rejection of his claim. Cal. Gov't Code § 911.2 (providing that a "claim relating to a cause of action for death or for injury to person or to personal property or growing crops" against a public entity must be presented to the public entity no later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action); id. § 945.6 (providing that if such a claim is rejected, any lawsuit by the claimant must be filed within six months of the date of rejection).
Begzad's amended complaint alleges that Begzad filed a timely claim with the City of Hayward and includes as an attached exhibit a copy of the claim submitted on November 8, 2002 — within the six-month statutory period. FAC ¶ 16 Ex. 1. However, the FAC does not contain any allegations regarding the City's rejection of Begzad's claim. The City moved to dismiss the state law claims asserted against it on that ground, and the Court granted the City's motion on January 21, 2004. Because Begzad submitted evidence of the City's rejection of the claim with his opposition to the motion to dismiss, the Court dismissed the state law claims against the City without prejudice. However, the Court ordered Begzad to file his amended complaint by January 30, 2004. The Court warned that, "[i]f Plaintiff fails to file and serve an amended complaint by that date, dismissal of . . . all state law claims against Defendant City of Hayward shall become with prejudice." Jan. 21, 2004 Order Granting in Part Denying in Part Defs.' Mots. to Dismiss at 11. Begzad never filed a second amended complaint, nor did he respond to the Court's order in any other way by, for example, requesting an extension of time. As a result, on February 3, 2004, the Court dismissed all state law claims against the City with prejudice.
The FAC erroneously alleges that the claim was filed on November 8, 2003. The attached exhibit shows that the claim was actually filed on November 8, 2002.
Although the City and the individual officers jointly brought the motion to dismiss, Defendants made no mention in that motion of how the Tort Claims Act affected claims against the individual officers. In the motion for summary judgment, however, Defendants rely on California Government Code section 950.2, which provides that a suit against a public employee for acts performed in the scope of his or her employment is barred if suit against the public entity is barred for failure to present a timely written claim. Defendants reason that since the state law claims were dismissed against the City, section 950.2 requires that the claims now be dismissed against the officers.
Clearly, Defendants' argument would be correct if Begzad did not, in fact, comply with the Tort Claims Act. However, although Begzad failed to plead that his claim was rejected or deemed rejected by the City, he has submitted with his opposition a copy of the City's rejection of his claim, dated December 9, 2002. Ex. 10 to Khawaja Decl. Begzad filed suit on May 8, 2003, which is within the six-month statutory period set forth in Government Code section 945.6. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Begzad timely filed this action after his claim was rejected by the City, and the Court therefore cannot find that Begzad failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Begzad's state law claims against the individual officers.
To conform the pleadings to the evidence, the Court will allow Begzad to amend his complaint to assert that his claim was rejected by the City on December 9, 2002. However, the Court will not allow Begzad to reinstate his state law claims against the City itself. Begzad had an opportunity to state such claims against the City when the Court granted him leave to amend after ruling on Defendants' motions to dismiss the FAC, as well as when the Court granted leave to amend after ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint. Begzad failed to take advantage of those opportunities, and the Court does not find good cause to grant Begzad another opportunity to do so. The Court allows the state law claims against the officers to proceed because these claims were not previously subject to the motions to dismiss, and Begzad therefore was never on notice that those claims might be subject to dismissal with prejudice if he did not timely file an amended complaint.
Begzad filed his second amended complaint, in accordance with the Court's order allowing him leave to add officer Bryan as a defendant, on February 11, 2005. Although the Court had not yet granted Begzad leave to add an allegation that his claim was denied by the City, Begzad nonetheless included that allegation in his second amended complaint. Second Am. Compl. ("SAC") ¶ 16. However, as with the date Begzad alleges for the filing of his claim with the City, the date alleged for the City's denial contains the wrong year. As the attached exhibits to the SAC demonstrate, Begzad's claim was both filed and rejected in 2002, not in 2003.
III. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure Claim
Finally, Defendants move for summary judgment on Begzad's Fourth Amendment claim by arguing that the officers had probable cause to detain Begzad under section 5150 or, alternatively, that even if probable cause was lacking, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because they acted reasonably under the circumstances. Section 5150 authorizes officers to detain a person who "is a danger to others, or to himself" as a "result of mental disorder." Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 5150. The statute allows officers to take such a person to a county-designated facility for a 72-hour hold for treatment and evaluation. Officers "shall consider available relevant information about the historical course of the person's mental disorder if . . . the information has a reasonable bearing on the determination as to whether the person is a danger to others, or to himself." Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 5150.05. The probable cause standard applies in the section 5150 context, and probable cause is determined using a wholly objective standard. See Maag v. Wessler, 960 F.2d 773, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that seizure of a mentally ill person "is analogous to a criminal arrest and must therefore be supported by probable cause"); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that "[s]ubjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis").
To determine whether the officers had qualified immunity even if there was not probable cause to detain Begzad, the Court must first determine whether the right in question was clearly established at the time of the incident. This is a clear-cut issue, and Defendants never argue that the right was not clearly established. The Ninth Circuit held in 1991 that probable cause was required to detain a mentally ill person. Maag, 960 F.3d at 775-76. Similarly, a 1983 California appellate case, People v. Triplett, held that probable cause was the standard for 5150 detentions and further held that probable cause must be evaluated by analyzing the totality of the circumstances, including the "past conduct, character, and reputation of the detainee." Triplett, 144 Cal. App. 3d 283, 288 (1983).
Because the right not to be detained under section 5150 without probable cause was clearly established at the time of Begzad's detention, the next step in the qualified immunity analysis is to determine whether a reasonable officer in Defendants' position could have believed that probable cause existed. Act Up!/Portland v. Bagley, 988 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1993). When making this determination at summary judgment, the usual summary judgment standard applies — i.e., the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. LaLonde v. County of Riverside, 204 F.3d 947, 953 n. 10 (9th Cir. 2000) ("The court should have determined whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law on the basis of undisputed facts and, where material facts were disputed, on the plaintiff's version of events.").
In this case, the disputed facts are numerous. For example, the parties dispute what Fresno told Hedrick when Hedrick met with her before going to Begzad's office. Hedrick testified that Fresno told him that Begzad threatened to kill himself and his family, and also said that his family's blood would be on her and the Balches' hands, multiple times — approximately three times a week for the past two weeks. Hedrick Dep. at 62:14-66:10 (Ex. 6 to Khawaja Decl.). Fresno testified, however, that Begzad never told her, and she never told the police that he did tell her, that he was going to kill himself or his family. Instead, she claims that she told the police that Begzad said she was destroying his business by not extending the lease, that his daughter would not be able to go to college, and that Fresno could answer to the world after she saw what was in the news the next day. Hayter Dep. at 50:20-51:3, 59:11-25 (Ex. 7 to Khawaja Decl.). Fresno testified that these comments led her to believe that Begzad might harm himself or his family, but that he never directly threatened to do so, nor did she tell the police that Begzad told her that his family's blood would be on her or the Balches' hands. Id. at 50:2-15, 60:1-65:10. She further testified that she never told the police that Begzad made these comments multiple times and, in fact, he only said them once. Id. at 51:4-6, 60:16-61:14.
Fresno is also known as Sandryna L. Hayter.
The transcript of the telephone call Fresno made to the police dispatcher calls Fresno's testimony into question. For example, the transcript quotes Fresno as saying that Begzad "keeps calling [her] and telling [her] that if the lease is not renewed that he will kill his family and himself and that the blood will be on my hands and that it will be on the news." Rep. Tr. of Audio Tape at 2:7-10 (Ex. B to Hom Decl.). This discrepancy with Fresno's deposition testimony places doubt on Fresno's credibility as a witness, but the Court may not weigh evidence or witnesses' credibility at summary judgment. In addition, the transcript of Fresno's call to the dispatcher sheds no light on what Fresno told Hedrick when he interviewed her personally, and Fresno's and Hedrick's deposition testimony are at odds on this issue.
The parties also dispute what happened when Hedrick and Bryan interviewed Begzad before detaining him. Begzad claims that he was sitting at his desk looking at a lottery ticket when the officers came in and grabbed the ticket from his hands. Begzad Dep. at 145:25-146:19 (Ex. 8 to Khawaja Decl.). Begzad further testified that the officers called him "garbage" and a "Muslim, terrorist," and said that he was gambling and that was why he could not afford to pay his rent to the Balches. Id. at 146:12-147:7, 154:4-11. Begzad claims that the officers lost control and that their faces and eyes were shaking, making them appear nervous. Id. at 155:9-23. Begzad further testified that he was pushed hard into a chair and had his arms twisted. Id. at 147:8-148:1, 154:12-15. Beyond that, Begzad said that he never told the officers or Fresno that he was going to kill himself or his family. Id. at 144:9-17, 181:2-7, 182:1-5.
Defendants overstate the importance of Begzad's saying, "I don't remember anything. I don't think so," in response to a question about whether he ever told Fresno that he would kill himself or his family. Begzad Dep. at 182:4-5. Even though Begzad's case would have been stronger had he said definitively that he never made such statements, saying that he does not remember saying them and does not think he did raises some question about whether he ever said those words. In addition, Defendants' reliance on that statement is misplaced given that Begzad clearly testified that he never told the officers that he was going to kill himself or his family. Id. at 181:2-7.
Two third parties also submitted declarations on Begzad's behalf stating that they walked in on the police interview with Begzad. One of these individuals stated that one of the officers asked her if Begzad had ever been "irrational, angry, mad, or yelling at people." Gonzalez Decl. ¶ 7. She told him that she had never seen Begzad angry or mad and had never heard him threaten anyone. Id. The other person stated that he told one of the officers that Begzad was not a violent person and would not harm himself or others. Alocozy Decl. at ¶ 6.
The Gonzalez and Alocozy declarations do not identify the officer they spoke with by name but instead refer to him as the "tall" or "tall and thin" officer, in contrast to the "big and heavyset" officer whom Gonzalez says she saw push Begzad into a chair. Gonzalez Decl. ¶¶ 5, 7; Alocozy Decl. ¶¶ 5-6. It is not disputed that Hedrick was the officer who pushed Begzad into a chair, so Gonzalez and Alocozy apparently claim to have spoken with Bryan.
As might be expected, the officers have a very different version of events. They deny making any derogatory comments about Begzad's religion or nationality. Hedrick Dep. at 108:1-25, 129:12-130:18; Bryan Dep. at 51:24-53:18 (Ex. 7 to Khawaja Decl.). They further contend that Begzad had a "Jekyll and Hyde" demeanor, was agitated throughout the interview, and kept going back to talking about how his business plummeted after September 11. Hedrick Dep. at 83:12-87-13, 103:15-106:15; Bryan Dep. at 32:13-33:9, 47:17-49:19. The officers testified that Begzad initially denied telling Fresno that he was going to kill himself or his family, then said that Fresno was lying, then admitted that he did say those words to Fresno, and finally told Hedrick, "Yes, I was going to kill myself" or "I am going to kill myself." Hedrick Dep. at 93:5-94:20; Bryan Dep. at 40:20-45:23. Based on these factors, the officers testified that they thought Begzad was suicidal and needed psychiatric help. Hedrick Dep. at 114:13-114:24; Bryan Dep. at 66:6-68:16. The officers also testified, in direct contradiction to the declarations submitted by Begzad, that they did not speak to anyone around Begzad's office about their concerns that Begzad might be suicidal. Hedrick Dep. at 126:20-127:2; Bryan Dep. at 71:17-72:3 (Ex. 7 to Khawaja Decl.).
The officers dispute whether Bryan was present when Begzad allegedly admitted that he said he was going to kill himself. Compare Hedrick Dep. at 94:18-20 (stating that Bryan was in the office at the time Begzad allegedly made this admission) with Bryan Dep. at 43:6-45-9 (stating that Begzad said that he "may" have made those statements in Bryan's presence in the office, but that Hedrick told Bryan that Begzad directly admitted to making the statements at some point while Begzad was outside the building and out of Bryan's presence).
At summary judgment, this Court cannot weigh the evidence to determine which version of events is more credible. Instead, the Court must view the facts in a light most favorable to Begzad, the non-moving party. Doing so yields the following story: Fresno did not tell Hedrick that Begzad threatened to kill himself and his family multiple times; instead, she told him that Begzad made comments on one occasion that led her to believe he was going to do something drastic. Begzad never told the police that he was going to kill himself or harm anyone else, and two witnesses told the police that Begzad was not violent and that they never heard him threaten anyone before. During the police interview, Begzad became agitated because the officers were attacking his religion, calling him names, and shoving him around, not because he was mentally unstable. While Begzad was concerned about his financial situation following a drop in business after September 11, that did not make him suicidal or homicidal. Under this view of the facts, which the Court finds that a reasonable juror could adopt based on the testimony in the record, the Court does not find that Begzad's behavior exhibited any mental disorder or that he posed a danger to himself or to others. Nor does the Court find that a reasonable officer would have thought that he had probable cause to detain Begzad for an evaluation pursuant to section 5150.
Defendants also rely on the fact that Begzad was actually held overnight for psychiatric evaluation to support their claim of qualified immunity. Defendants assert that it must have been reasonable for the officers to think that they had probable cause to detain Begzad because the doctors ultimately did detain Begzad overnight. However, this argument is not persuasive. The doctors' reports state that Begzad appeared "[c]alm" and "cooperative" with "grossly intact" cognitive functions, and that he was "likely at low risk of violence." Ex. L to Hom Reply Decl. at 000004 (intake evaluation form), 000007 (progress evaluation note). The doctors held him overnight only because of the discrepancies between Begzad's comments to the doctors and the statements contained in the officer's 5150 report. Id. at 000007. Thus, the doctors assumed that the 5150 report contained credible and reliable information, but the truth of the events reported by Hedrick in the 5150 report is exactly what Begzad disputes.
Because of the factual disputes between Begzad's and the officers' versions of events, the Court can say neither that the officers had probable cause to detain Begzad nor that, even if the officers lacked probable cause, they are nonetheless entitled to summary judgment because they are qualifiedly immune. Whether Defendants are ultimately found liable will depend on whose story the jury finds more credible. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment on Begzad's Fourth Amendment claim. See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing majority of circuit courts' agreement on the "general prohibition against deciding qualified immunity questions in the face of disputed historical facts"); Ortega v. O'Connor, 146 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "[c]ourts should decide issues of qualified immunity as early in the proceedings as possible, but when the answer depends on genuinely disputed issues of material fact, the court must submit the fact-related issues to the jury").
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the motion for summary judgment brought by Defendants Hedrick and Nishimoto. The motion is GRANTED as to all claims against Defendant Nishimoto and DENIED in all other respects.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that absolutely no further amendments to the complaint shall be permitted. As this Court observed in an earlier order, it is disappointed with the quality of Begzad's counsel's representation in this case. Counsel has already been sanctioned for failing to comply with this Court's rules, and he also failed to file a timely amended complaint, which resulted in dismissal with prejudice of potentially meritorious claims brought by his client. Counsel has now filed a second amended complaint after being granted leave to add another defendant, but he went beyond the leave the Court granted to allege facts that would bring Begzad's state claims into compliance with the California Tort Claims Act. Ordinarily, such an amendment might be subject to dismissal, but fortunately for Begzad, the Court has determined to allow the amendment in this case. However, the amendment alleges that Begzad's claim to the City was filed and rejected in 2003, which would not be in compliance with the Tort Claims Act. It is only because Begzad's counsel attached copies of Begzad's claim to the City and the City's notice of rejection of that claim that the Court was able to reject Defendants' arguments for judgment on all state law claims. In short, Begzad's pleadings in this case have been of poor quality, and the Court will not continue to allow piecemeal amendments. The second amended complaint shall be the final amended complaint in this case.