See Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun Bradstreet, Inc., 149 Vt. 365, 369-70, 543 Ad 1320, 1323-24 (1988) (considering whole statute, subject matter, and effects and consequences in its interpretation). ยถ 11. That intent is reinforced by our analysis in the one decision that discusses the doctrine of informed consent in medical malpractice actions, Begin v. Richmond, 150 Vt. 517, 555 A.2d 363 (1988). We explained in Begin that the informed consent doctrine was intended to expand "the existing ways of showing medical malpractice in order to get around the often insurmountable obstacle of producing expert testimony to show the defendant was negligent."
"These elements must generally be proved by expert testimony." Lockwood, 163 Vt. at 213 (citing Begin v. Richmond, 150 Vt. 517, 520 (1988)); see also Jones v. Block, 171 Vt. 569, 569 (2000). "Except where the alleged violation of the standard of care is so apparent that it can be understood by a layperson without the aid of medical experts, the burden of proof imposed by [Vermont's medical malpractice statute] requires expert testimony."
A prerequisite to liability under ยง 1909 is a finding that a reasonable patient would not have given consent to the medical procedure had he fully known of the risks. Begin v. Richmond, 150 Vt. 517, 555 A.2d 363, 367 (1988). However, the Court does not interpret ยง 1909 as imposing on a physician a general duty to inform a patient of each and every possible risk or treatment.
Ordinarily, these elements must be proved by expert testimony. See Begin v. Richmond, 150 Vt. 517, 520, 555 A.2d 363, 365 (1988). The issue before us centers on the adequacy of the testimony of plaintiff's expert, Dr. Paul Asdourian. He testified that the relevant standard of care required defendant to obtain a new MRI before performing the operation and that defendant failed to do so, thus breaching the standard of care. Defendant concedes that this testimony was sufficient to establish negligence, but contests whether the expert testified adequately that this negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries.
These elements must generally be proved by expert testimony. Begin v. Richmond, 150 Vt. 517, 520, 555 A.2d 363, 365 (1988). Defendant claims plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that the requirements of the second and third elements were satisfied.
The elements of medical malpractice are set out in 12 V.S.A. ยง 1908. Under the statute, plaintiffs must prove: (1) the requisite standard of care; (2) that defendant failed to exercise the applicable degree of care; and (3) as a proximate result of (2), plaintiffs suffered damages. Begin v. Richmond, 150 Vt. 517, 520, 555 A.2d 363, 365 (1988). Defendant's statements, if true, are insufficient to establish an applicable standard of care or to show breach of that standard or causation.
Two jurisdictions recognize the cause of action of "wrongful pregnancy," but do not address child-rearing damages. See Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489 (Haw. 1995); Begin v. Richmond, 555 A.2d 363 (Vt. 1988). 1. Prior Indiana Decisions