Opinion
No. 3:02-CV-0158-L.
July 15, 2003.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, subject cause has previously been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. The findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an inmate in the Hutchins State Jail facility, sues several defendants for their part in the confiscation of two pieces of "legal mail" from him. ( See Compl. at 3-4; Attached pages to Compl.; Answers to Questions of Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire (MJQ).) He identifies the confiscated mail as a motion addressed to the attorney representing inmate Mark Alan Jones and a "writ envelope" addressed to the Dallas Legal Aid Society which sought "to investigate the legitimacy of House Bill 1067." ( See Answer to Question 1 of MJQ.) Plaintiff "constructed" the two documents in his capacity as "writ writer." ( Id.) He contends that the confiscation of the legal mail has denied him access to the courts and violated his right to assist other inmates as a writ writer. (Answer to Question 2 of MJQ.)
Plaintiff's answers to the questions posed by the Court constitute an amendment to the filed complaint. See Macias v. Raul A. (Unknown), Badge No. 153, 23 F.3d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff further contends that he was subsequently charged with (1) simulating a legal process and (2) "operating an unauthorized legal business within TDCJ" by accepting payment for his writ writing, and that his rights to due process were violated during a hearing on those charges because he was not given advance written notice and he was not allowed to call witnesses. (Attached Pages to Compl. and Answers to Questions 4 and 7 of MJQ.) Consequently, plaintiff was "found guilty," and defendants placed him in solitary confinement for five days, placed him in a "lock-down" environment for six months, took away commissary and recreational privileges, placed him in "an M2 level of confinement", removed him from all spiritual and rehabilitative programs, and removed him from the general prison population so that he would be housed in a more aggressive area of the prison. ( Id.; Attached Pages to Compl.) No process has been issued in this case.
II. PRELIMINARY SCREENING
Plaintiff is a prisoner who has been permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. As a prisoner seeking redress from an officer or employee of a governmental entity, plaintiff's complaint is subject to preliminary screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. See Martin v. Scott, 156 F.3d 578, 579-80 (5th Cir. 1998). Because he is proceeding in forma pauperis, plaintiff's complaint is also subject to screening under § 1915(e)(2). Both § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b) provide for sua sponte dismissal of the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the Court finds it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id.
A complaint is frivolous when it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Smith v. Winter, 782 F.2d 508, 511-12 (5th Cir. 1986); Henrise v. Horvath, 94 F. Supp.2d 768, 769 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff seeks relief for the confiscation of legal mail that he created as a "writ writer" and for an "unfair" hearing that resulted in various forms of discipline imposed for his writ writing activities. Such claims arise under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action and affords redress for the "deprivation, under color of law, of a citizen's `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132 (1994). To state a claim under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts that show (1) he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the deprivation occurred under color of state law. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Bass v. Parkwood Hosp., 180 F.3d 234, 241 (5th Cir. 1999).
A. Access-to-court Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he has been denied access to the courts by the confiscation of legal materials. (Compl. at 3-4.) It is well established that inmates have a constitutionally recognized right to access the courts. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). However, such right is limited and simply requires "prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law." Id. at 828. The right does not guarantee any "particular methodology but rather the conferral of a capability — the capability of bringing contemplated challenges to sentences or conditions of confinement before the courts." Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,356 (1996).
To succeed on a claimed denial of access to courts, plaintiff must show that he lost an action able claim or was prevented from presenting such a claim because of the alleged denial. See id.; Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that, to state a sufficient claim of denial of access to the courts, plaintiff must demonstrate that his position as a litigant was prejudiced as a direct result of the denial of access). The "injury requirement is not satisfied by just any type of frustrated legal claim." Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353. Rather, plaintiff must demonstrate that the lack of access has prevented him from filing or caused him to lose a pending case that attacks either his conviction or seeks "to vindicate `basic constitutional rights'" in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 353-54 (quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,579 (1974)). "Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration." Id. at 355. As the right of access to the courts is not a "freestanding right," it is necessary that plaintiff demonstrate actual injury resulting from the alleged denial of access. Id. at 351. Without a showing of an actual injury, plaintiffs lack standing to pursue claimed denials of access to courts. Id. at 349.
Because plaintiff has made no showing of an actual personal injury, he has no standing to proceed with his access-to-courts claims. He must show "that his position as a litigant was prejudiced" as a direct result of the denial of access. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1328 (5th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). To meet the standing requirement plaintiff "must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Raines v. Byrd, 52 1 U.S. 811, 818 (1997) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 73 7, 751 (1984)). Plaintiff "must establish that he has a `personal stake' in the alleged dispute, and that the alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him." Id. at 819.
Plaintiff has shown no personal prejudice from the alleged confiscation of legal materials. His claim merely relates to his ability "to assist other inmates" in pursuing their legal rights. ( See Answers to Questions 1 and 2 of MJQ.) Such harm does not bestow standing upon plaintiff to pursue the claimed denial of access to courts. See Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 311 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that "the right to access to the courts does not accrue to those [inmates] who assist in the preparation of that lawsuit"). Plaintiff, furthermore, has not shown that the actions of defendants have prevented him from filing or caused him to lose a pending case that attacks either his conviction or seeks to vindicate basic constitutional rights. His access-to-courts claims fail due to his failure to show any personal prejudice.
B. Right to Act as Writ Writer
Plaintiff's claims likewise fail to the extent that he alleges violation of his constitutional right to act as a writ writer. Contrary to his views, a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to assist other inmates in their legal proceedings. See Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 43 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1996).
C. Asserting Constitutional Violations on Behalf of Other Inmates
To the extent that plaintiff's action may be construed as asserting violations of other inmates' constitutional rights to access to the courts, he has still failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Inmates v. Owens, 561 F.2d 560, 562-63 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that a plaintiff may only bring a § 1983 action for deprivations he himself has suffered); Green v. State, No. 3:01-CV-0060-D, 2001 WL 548899, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 21, 2001) (accepting findings and recommendation that cites Owens for same proposition). Consequently, the deprivation of another's constitutional rights is not cognizable in the instant action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
D. Denial of Fair Disciplinary Hearing
Plaintiff also complains about an unfair disciplinary hearing that resulted in his temporary placement in solitary confinement, a six-month placement in a "lock-down" environment, the denial of commissary and recreational privileges, placement in "an M2 level of confinement" that removed him from all spiritual and rehabilitative programs and from the general prison population. (Answers to Questions 2 and 4 of MJQ; Attached Pages to Compl.)
Although lawful incarceration results in the loss of many rights and privileges that most citizens enjoy, states may create liberty interests that are protected by the due process clause. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-85 (1995); Madison, 104 F.3d at 767. These liberty interests are generally limited to matters which affect the amount of time served by a prisoner, such as lost good-time credits and eligibility for mandatory supervision. See Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 957-58 (5th Cir. 2000); Madison, 104 F.3d at 767. The Fifth Circuit has recently recognized that there can be due process implications from an inmate's "confinement in extended lockdown" due to disciplinary action, but not due to his or her initial classification. See Wilkerson v. Stalder, 329 F.3d 431, 434-36 (5th Cir. 2003). Wilkerson reiterated the test set forth in Sandin:
[Although the] States may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause . . . these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force, nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.329 F.3d at 434 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. 483-84).
In this case, plaintiff has alleged that he was placed in lockdown for a six-month period as a result of disciplinary action by two defendants (Captain Perez and Officer Scott). He further alleges that he was denied due process during the disciplinary hearing. In view of Wilkerson, such allegations are sufficient to survive complete summary dismissal of his claim related to the hearing.
Other than the alleged six-month period in a lockdown environment plaintiff has stated no cognizable due process violation from the alleged "unfair" hearing. Plaintiff has alleged no loss of good-time credits as punishment for his disciplinary infraction. ( See, generally, Compl.; Answers to Questions of MJQ.) Nor has he alleged any matters that could affect the amount of time he must serve. The due process clause "does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner." See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 478. Disciplinary restrictions that alter the conditions of confinement do not implicate due process protection unless they represent the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might create a liberty interest. See id. at 486 (holding that thirty days of solitary or segregated confinement does not invoke due process protections); Malchi, 211 F.3d at 958 (holding that thirty-day loss of commissary privileges and cell restriction did not implicate due process concerns); Madison, 104 F.3d at 768 (same). Other than the alleged six-months in a lockdown environment, the alleged discipline does not represent a significant, atypical deprivation.
Only the alleged six-month lock-down period experienced by petitioner may rise to the level necessary for due process protection. The Court has insufficient facts to determine whether, as a matter of law, such six-month period constitutes an atypical, significant deprivation in which a state might create a liberty interest. Thus, the allegations suffice to survive summary dismissal at this screening stage. This case is unlike Wilkerson in that plaintiff was not placed in "extended lockdown for approximately thirty years." See 329 F.3d at 433. The Fifth Circuit found that such a lengthy lock-down period is atypical and significant as a matter of law. Whether a six-month period is atypical or significant depends on the particular facts of plaintiff's incarceration. Consequently, he has made sufficient allegations sufficient to order defendants Perez and Scott served. No other named defendants were involved in the disciplinary hearing.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the District Court summarily DISMISS plaintiff's complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b), except for the claim that Captain Perez and Officer Scott violated plaintiff's right to due process for their roles in the alleged "unfair" disciplinary hearing that resulted in plaintiff's placement in a lock-down environment for six months. That claim should proceed and process should issue to Captain Perez and Officer Scott.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
The United States District Clerk shall serve a copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation on plaintiff by mailing a copy to him. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten (10) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions, or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory, or general objections. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) ( en banc).