The district court granted Albert Pickett relief on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate his sentence, ruling that, following changes in constitutional law regarding the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), Pickett no longer qualified as an armed career criminal and was not eligible for an enhanced sentence. The government appealed but, before any briefing took place, this Court ruled in Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017), that § 2255 movants were required to meet a higher burden than the one the district court had applied. The parties agree that Beeman applies.

To resolve that question in his favor, Alvarado-Linares must "bear the burden of showing that he is actually entitled to relief on his Davis claim, meaning he will have to show that his § 924(c) conviction[s] resulted from application of solely the [now-unconstitutional] residual clause." In re Hammoud , 931 F.3d at 1041 ; see also Beeman v. United States , 871 F.3d 1215, 1222–25 (11th Cir. 2017). Sometimes, this kind of question can be resolved by a "finding of historical fact"—in other words, there may be record evidence that the unconstitutional clause did or did not lead to a conviction or sentence.

Under our controlling case law, in order to mount a successful collateral attack on his sentence, Santos must prove (1) that the sentencing court relied solely on the ACCA's residual clause to apply the ACCA enhancement to his sentence, and (2) that absent the residual clause, his sentence cannot stand. Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221–22 (11th Cir. 2017). The resolution of the first element disposes of this case: Santos cannot meet his burden of proving it is more likely than not that in fashioning his sentence, the district judge relied solely on the residual clause.

PER CURIAM: This case is identical to Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017), in every material respect—it presents the same issues and involves the same lawyers (on both sides) making the same arguments about the same statutes. It is thus, not surprisingly, controlled by Beeman.

Section 2255 movants raising Samuel Johnson claims "must show that—more likely than not—it was use of the residual clause that led to the sentencing court’s enhancement of [their] sentence." Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1222 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1168, 203 L.Ed.2d 211 (2019). The necessary showing, according to Beeman, is that the residual clause was the sole basis for the enhancement.

In a Johnson claim, the defendant contends that he was sentenced under the ACCA's residual clause. Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th Cir. 2017). Following Johnson and Welch, this Court, in deciding applications for leave to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, offered in dicta two conflicting approaches for district courts to follow when adjudicating Johnson claims in second or successive § 2255 motions.

See Welch, 136 S. Ct. at 1268. After Mr. Brooks's case was set for oral argument, a panel of this Court decided Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017). Like Mr. Brooks's case, Beeman also involved a § 2255 motion that purported to rely on Johnson but was dismissed because the District Court found it was actually based on Descamps.

C. Movant's BurdenWhile Bivins's § 2255 motion was pending in the district court, this Court, in Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017), addressed what a § 2255 movant must show to be entitled to relief under Johnson. To assert a claim based on Johnson, the movant must contend that he was sentenced under the ACCA's now-void residual clause.

In so doing, we join two of our sister courts. See Dimott v. United States , 881 F.3d 232, 240–43 (1st Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed , 86 U.S.L.W. 3453 (U.S. Mar. 8, 2018) (No. 17-1251); Beeman v. United States , 871 F.3d 1215, 1221–25 (11th Cir. 2017). But see United States v. Geozos , 870 F.3d 890, 896 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding a defendant need only show the sentencing court "may have" relied on the residual clause to establish his claim relies on Johnson ); United States v. Winston , 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017) (same).

In his motion, Upshaw argued he was illegally sentenced both under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and as a career offender under United States Sentencing Guideline ("USSG") § 4B1.1, because his previous convictions for Florida burglary of a dwelling did not qualify as predicate offenses. The district court concluded that Upshaw's arguments were foreclosed by our decisions in Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) and In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). After careful review, we affirm.