Opinion
C. A. 9:23-03323-SAL-MHC
08-30-2023
Isaac Beckman, IV, Plaintiff, v. J. Reuben Long Detention Center, Director Rhodes, Mediko/Med Comp Staff, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry, United States Magistrate Judge.
This a civil action filed by a pretrial detainee. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.
In an Order dated August 9, 2023, Plaintiff was directed to provide documents to bring his case into proper form. ECF No. 5. He was also notified of pleading deficiencies and given the opportunity to amend his Complaint. Plaintiff partially complied with the Order and this case is now in substantially proper form. He filed an Amended Complaint on August 28, 2023. ECF No.9.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee at the J. Reuben Long Detention Center. He brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (§ 1983). In response to the question on the standard complaint form asking him what federal constitutional or statutory right(s) he claims are being violated by state or local officials, he did not name any and instead wrote:
My right to medical care, my right to have a [illegible] and safe area, my right to proper medical treatment *negligence *not having proper precautionary measures in placeECF No. 9 at 4 (errors in original). In response to a question asking him to explain how each Defendant acted under color of state or local law, Plaintiff wrote:
They were completely irrational and they acted with negligence to having proper precautionary measures, also they acted negligently to the injuries which was caused by such improper precaution/none at allId. (errors in original).
Plaintiff claims that the alleged incidents occurred at the J. Reuben Long Detention Center at around 6 pm on March 12, 2023. He allegedly was walking to get dinner when he tripped over his roommate's C-Pap machine and fell into some trays. Plaintiff claims he hurt his lower neck and upper back along his spine. He alleges that medical staff came a few minutes later and forced him to move into a chair. Plaintiff contends that medical staff were negligent as to his injuries because they disregarded his instructions to leave him on the ground. ECF No. 9 at 5-6.
Plaintiff contends he needed to go to the hospital for further analysis, but he was not taken to the hospital. He alleges he did not receive an x-ray and effective medicine for his pain from his injuries, and he was not visited by a doctor. ECF No. 9 at 6. Plaintiff requests “$100,000,0” for his injuries. Id.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A pro se Complaint is reviewed pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992), Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989), Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972), and Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, and a court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). However, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that this Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
III. DISCUSSION
It is recommended that this action be summarily dismissed for the reasons discussed below.
A. J. Reuben Long Detention Center
Plaintiff has named the J. Reuben Long Detention Center, which appears to be a building or group of buildings, as a Defendant. However, courts have routinely held that an inanimate object (such as a building, facility, and grounds) does not act under color of state law and is not a “person” subject to suit under § 1983. See Allison v. California Adult Auth., 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not “person[s]” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., C/A No. 8:10-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (Finding that a detention center, as a building and not a person, was not amenable to suit under § 1983). Thus, this Defendant should be summarily dismissed as a party to this action.
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff named Med. Co. Medical Staff as a defendant. ECF No. 1 at 1. Plaintiff appears to have corrected the name of this Defendant to “Mediko/Med Comp Staff” in his Amended Complaint. See ECF No. 9 at 1.
Defendant Mediko Med Comp Staff appears to be a branch or department of a medical company. However, this Defendant should be summarily dismissed as it is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Dalton v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., C/A No. 8:09-260-CMC-BHH, 2009 WL 823931, at *2 (D.S.C. March 26, 2009) (dismissing the medical staff of SCDC and Prison Health Services as defendants because they were not persons); Barnes v. Baskerville Corr. Cen. Med. Staff, No. 3:07CV195, 2008 WL 2564779 (E.D. Va. June 25, 2008) (“Plaintiff's allegations that unspecified prison personnel violated his rights does not adequately state a § 1983 claim.”).
Moreover, Plaintiff appears to allege that this entity or group was negligent as to his medical care, such that he fails to state a constitutional claim. The Fourth Circuit has held that a negligent medical diagnosis or treatment, without more, does not meet the standard for deliberate indifference. Webb v. Hamidullah, 281 Fed.Appx. 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (“a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment”).
C. Director Rhodes
Although Plaintiff lists Defendant Rhodes in the caption of his Amended Complaint, his pleadings fail to provide any specific facts to support a claim this Defendant violated his federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (requiring, in order to avoid dismissal, “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests'” (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2))). Although the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a) only require a “short and plain” statement of the claim, a plaintiff must “offer more detail ... than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations omitted); see also White v. White, 886 F.2d 721, 723 (4th Cir. 1989) (district court did not abuse discretion by dismissing plaintiff's complaint which “failed to contain any factual allegations tending to support his bare assertion”).
Defendant Rhodes is the Director of the J. Reuben Long Detention Center. To the extent Plaintiff may be attempting to bring a claim against Defendant Rhodes based on a theory of supervisory liability, such a claim is subject to summary dismissal. To state a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege:
(1) that the supervisor had actual or constructive knowledge that [his or her] subordinate was engaged in conduct that posed “a pervasive and unreasonable risk” of constitutional injury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2) that the supervisor's response to that knowledge was so inadequate as to show “deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the alleged offensive practices”; and (3) that there was an “affirmative causal link” between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff.Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 226 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994)). Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to establish supervisory liability as to Defendant Rhodes.
At most, Plaintiff appears to allege that Director Rhodes did not take proper precautionary steps to prevent his slip and fall. However, this claim is subject to summary dismissal. At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was a pretrial detainee; thus, his claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment (which is used to evaluate conditions of confinement claims for individuals convicted of crimes). See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 243-44 (1983). In any event, “[the] due process rights of a pretrial detainee are at least as great as the [E]ighth [A]mendment protections available to the convicted prisoner.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). To state a claim that conditions of confinement violate constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a basic human need and that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to that deprivation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993). The first prong of the Strickler analysis requires an objective showing that the deprivation was sufficiently serious, such that significant physical or emotional injury resulted from it, while the second prong is a subjective test requiring evidence that prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Id. (citing and partially quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Here, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a viable claim that Defendant Rhodes was deliberately indifferent to the condition he alleges (that another inmate's C-Pap machine was left out where Plaintiff walked). Even presuming Defendant Rhodes was negligent, the due process clause of the Constitution is not implicated by a negligent act of a state official which causes unintentional injury. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (finding no constitutional violation when prisoner slipped and fell on pillow negligently left by prison official on prison stairs); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 78 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Snyder v. Blankenship, 473 F.Supp. 1208, 1212-13 (W.D. Va. 1979) (“The mere fortuity that the accident occurred in a prison does not vest [a prisoner] with a right to federal adjudication of what is essentially a state common law tort claim,” and the allegations of a slip and fall incident make out nothing more than a common law tort claim).
D. State Law Claims
Plaintiff may be attempting to allege claims under South Carolina law for negligence. However, any state law claims should be dismissed. As Plaintiff fails to establish federal jurisdiction and fails to state any federal claim, only his state law claims would remain, and federal courts are allowed to hear and decide state-law claims only in conjunction with federal-law claims, through the exercise of “supplemental jurisdiction.” See 28 U.S.C. §1367; Wisconsin Dep't of Corrs. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998). Of course, a district court may have jurisdiction of a civil action “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000...and is between - (1) citizens of different States....” 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, Plaintiff has not alleged complete diversity of the parties. See Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-374 (1978) (Complete diversity of parties means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same State as any party on the other side). In this case, Plaintiff and Defendants are all citizens of South Carolina. See ECF No. 9 at 2-3.
Thus, there is no complete diversity and Plaintiff may not bring his claims pursuant to § 1332. As Plaintiff has asserted no valid federal claim and there is no diversity jurisdiction, this Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ; see also United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 290 F.3d 620, 626 (4th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's dismissal of state law claims when no federal claims remained in the case); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that the Court dismiss this action, without prejudice, without leave to further amend, and without issuance and service of process.
See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790 (4th Cir. 2022) (noting that “[w]hen a district court dismisses a complaint or all claims without granting leave to amend, its order is final and appealable”).
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).