Opinion
No. 25206
Decided June 5, 1935.
Criminal law — Charge to jury — Reasonable doubt — Failure to read statutory definition, not reversible error, when.
In charging a jury in a criminal case, failure to read the definition of reasonable doubt as set forth in Section 13442-3, General Code, is not reversible error where the court charges the jury on reasonable doubt substantially in accordance with that section.
CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county.
Plaintiff in error, Martin Beck, a sergeant in the Police Department of the city of Cincinnati, was indicted jointly with one Mabel Smith on a charge of pandering, under Section 13031-2, General Code. The indictment alleged that the defendant placed a young girl in a house of prostitution in Cincinnati. Both defendants filed motions for separate trials, which were granted. When the case was called for trial, Mabel Smith entered a plea of guilty. Plaintiff in error entered a plea of not guilty on the arraignment and stood trial.
At the close of the argument, counsel for plaintiff in error requested that a special charge be given defining reasonable doubt in the identical words of the statute (Section 13442-3, General Code). The court refused said request and in the general charge gave his own definition of reasonable doubt. The jury returned a verdict finding plaintiff in error guilty of the offense charged in the indictment. Error was prosecuted to the Court of Appeals of Hamilton county, wherein the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed and the cause certified to this court for review as being in conflict with the case of Micella v. State, 38 Ohio App. 1, 175 N.E. 705.
Mr. Alvin H. Rowe, for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Louis J. Schneider, prosecuting attorney, Mr. Dudley M. Outcalt and Mr. Gordon H. Scherer, for defendant in error.
The controversy in this case hinges upon the failure of the trial court, in its charge to the jury, to define reasonable doubt in the exact language of the statute (Section 13442-3, General Code). Whether such failure constitutes reversible error is the principal question presented for our determination.
Section 13442-3, General Code, provides: "A defendant in a criminal action is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty of the crime charged, and in case of a reasonable doubt whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he shall be acquitted. But the effect of this presumption of innocence is only to place upon the state the burden of proving him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: 'It is not a mere possible doubt, because everything relating to human affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge.' In charging a jury the court shall state the meaning of presumption of innocence, and read the foregoing definition of reasonable doubt."
In charging the jury it is mandatory upon the trial court to read or charge substantially the definition of reasonable doubt contained in the above quoted section of the code.
The definition of reasonable doubt was substantially correct as given, although not in the exact language of the statute. The error complained of is technical rather than prejudicial.
The verdict will not be disturbed.
Judgment affirmed.
WEYGANDT, C.J., STEPHENSON, WILLIAMS, JONES, MATTHIAS and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.