No. 05-06-00596-CR
Opinion Filed July 11, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F05-50820-UV.
Before Justices MORRIS, WRIGHT, and FITZGERALD. Opinion By Justice WRIGHT.
CAROLYN WRIGHT, Justice.
William Thomas Beane appeals his conviction for aggravated sexual assault. After the jury found appellant guilty, it assessed punishment at 65 years' confinement. In four issues, appellant contends (1) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction, and (2) the trial court improperly granted the State's challenges for cause to certain prospective jurors. We overrule appellant's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his third and fourth issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. Specifically, although appellant admits he was in M.V's apartment and committed aggravated robbery, he contends the State failed to prove he sexually assaulted M.V. After reviewing the record, we cannot agree. When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Sanders v. State, 119 S.W.3d 818, 820 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). In contrast, when reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact finder was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). Under either review, the fact finder is the exclusive judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Jones v. State, 944 S.W.2d 642, 647-48 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996); Harvey v. State, 135 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). To support appellant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault, the State was required to prove that, without M.V.'s consent, appellant intentionally and knowingly penetrated M.V's mouth with his sexual organ and he used or exhibited a firearm in the course of the sexual assault. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.021 (Vernon Supp. 2006). The testimony of a victim, standing alone, is sufficient to support a conviction for sexual assault. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990); Jensen v. State, 66 S.W.3d 528, 534 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). M.V. testified that she was sleeping in her apartment bedroom with her husband and son when she heard someone trying to open the door. She sat up and saw appellant enter the bedroom through the sliding glass door. Appellant pulled a gun from his jacket and told her to come towards him. When she did so, appellant held the gun to her head and told her to lie on the floor. He began touching and rubbing her between her legs. As he did so, he pointed the gun at M.V.'s husband and demanded money. After her husband gave appellant the money, appellant told him to move away. Appellant then unzipped his pants and demanded that M.V. perform oral sex. As she was doing so, her son awoke. Appellant then moved everyone from the room at gunpoint. As they walked out of the bedroom, M.V.'s nephew, Jose Rodriquez, opened his bedroom door. Rodriquez immediately closed his door and refused to open it. Appellant fired the gun at the door, hit M.V. with the butt of the gun, and fled the apartment. Later that night, the police apprehended appellant and brought him to the apartment parking lot. M.V. identified appellant as her assailant at that time. Rodriguez testified he was sleeping in his bedroom when he heard arguing in his aunt's bedroom. After he heard his aunt crying, he got up to see what was happening. When he opened his bedroom door, Rodriguez saw his aunt coming out of her bedroom with appellant. Appellant had a gun and when appellant saw Rodriguez, he pointed the gun at him. Rodriguez closed the door and got between the bed and the wall. A short time later he heard a gunshot. He hid in the closet with his two cousins for a few minutes and then went out to check on his aunt. After reviewing the record under the appropriate standards, we conclude a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant penetrated G.V's mouth with his sexual organ and he used or exhibited a firearm in the course of the sexual assault. In his written statement, appellant initially admitted that "while [he] was in [M.V.'s] apartment, [he] placed his penis inside [M.V.'s] mouth," and M.V. testified that appellant did so at gunpoint. Although appellant later testified at trial that he did not sexually assault M.V., appellant's testimony does not render the State's evidence insufficient. It was the role of the fact finder, not this Court, to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to determine the credibility of any witnesses. After considering the evidence presented at trial, the jury choose to believe M.V. and disbelieve appellant. We conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support appellant's conviction for aggravated sexual assault. We overrule appellant's third and fourth issues. Challenges for Cause
In his first and second issues, appellant contends the trial court erred by granting the State's challenges for cause to prospective jurors 12 and 33. Under these issues, appellant sets out the relevant discussion from the hearing on the State's challenges for cause and then states "[t]he two prospective jurors were not subject to a challenge for cause, nor were they disabled." Other than citing cases for the general proposition that by improperly granting the State's challenges for cause, the trial court effectively gave the State an additional peremptory challenge, appellant fails to cite any relevant statute or legal authority. Appellant has not provided any meaningful analysis or argument in support of his contention that the trial court improperly granted the State's challenges. It is appellant's responsibility to provide argument and applicable case law to assist this Court in evaluating his contentions. Because appellant's briefing under these issues is inadequate, he has presented nothing for our review. Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); McDuff v. State, 939 S.W.2d 607, 621 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 23 n. 5 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Tong v. State, 25 S.W.3d 707, 710 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 20 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). We overrule appellant's first and second issues. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.