The language of a tax statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning in the absence of an ambiguity therein. Beach v. Livingston, 248 S.C. 135, 139, 149 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1966) (citation omitted). However, regardless of how plain the ordinary meaning of the words in a statute, courts will reject that meaning when to accept it would lead to a result so plainly absurd that it could not have been intended by the General Assembly. Kiriakides v. United Artist Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994) (citing Stackhouse v. Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs for Dillon Cnty., 86 S.C. 419, 422, 68 S.E. 561, 562 (1910));Kennedy v. S.C. Ret. Sys., 345 S.C. 339, 351, 549 S.E.2d 243, 249 (2001) (citation omitted) (finding statutes should not be construed so as to lead to an absurd result). If possible, the Court will construe a statute so as to escape the absurdity and carry the intention into effect.
(emphasis added). While there is no case in Maryland interpreting this term, courts in other jurisdictions under statutes similar to the one here have held, either through judicial construction or by definitions in the statutes themselves, that "admission," as used in this context, means the charge for permission or right to enter a place, see Fritz v. Jarecki, 189 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1951); Grauer v. Director of Revenue, 193 Kan. 605, 396 P.2d 260 (1964); Beach v. Livingston, 248 S.C. 135, 149 S.E.2d 328 (1966); Department of Revenue v. Pelican Ship Corporation, 257 So.2d 56 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); see also dissent of Musmanno, J., in Fierro v. City of Williamsport, 384 Pa. 568, 120 A.2d 889 (1956). It logically follows that the legislature contemplated a tax on the "price of entrance" to "any place," and not on a service provided for one's convenience prior to entering.
We have also held that if the legislative intent is clearly apparent from the language of the Statute there is no occasion for resort to the rule of statutory construction. Beach v. Livingston, 248 S.C. 135, 149 S.E.2d 328. The Statute, Section 37-247, mandatorily requires that all policies be countersigned by a resident agent of the company.
Messrs. Lee Ball, for Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to when the terms of a statute or rule are clear and notambiguous there is no room for construction and the courtsare required to apply such according to their literal meaning: 247 S.C. 132, 146 S.E.2d 166; 213 F. Supp. 174, rev. 322 F.2d 502; 251 S.C. 242, 161 S.E.2d 822; 250 S.C. 344, 157 S.E.2d 864; 248 S.C. 135, 149 S.E.2d 328; Webster's Third New International Dictionary, p. 2627; Black's Law Dictionary, (4th Ed.) 1778. As to one of the rules of construction in interpreting astatute or rule being that the court must ascertain and giveeffect to the real intent of the statute or rule: 250 S.C. 187, 156 S.E.2d 769; 249 S.C. 609, 155 S.E.2d 859; 249 S.C. 388, 154 S.E.2d 674; 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E.2d 788; 200 S.C. 127, 20 S.E.2d 645.
Messrs. Daniel L. McLeod, Attorney General, and Joe L.Allen, Jr., and G. Lewis Argoe, Jr., Assistant AttorneysGeneral, of Columbia, for Appellants, cite: As to respondent'scharter establishing it as a business corporation: 210 N.Y. 216, 104 N.E. 714; 79 Utah 515, 3 P.2d 568; 249 S.C. 337, 154 S.E.2d 361; 119 A.L.R. 1013; 18 Am. Jur.2d, Corporations, Sec. 6. As to the chargemade by the Respondent to members and non-members foruse of the golfing and swimming facilities being an admissioncharge subject to taxation: 248 S.C. 135, 149 S.E.2d 328; 107 F. Supp. 668; 315 U.S. 32, 62 S.Ct. 425, 86 L.Ed. 619; 315 U.S. 42, 62 S.Ct. 430. John A. Martin, Esq., of Winnsboro, for Respondent, cites: As to respondent's charter not conclusively establishingit as a profit corporation: 111 S.E.2d 568; 222 F.2d 227; 103 S.E.2d 908; 230 S.C. 357, 95 S.E.2d 628.
"Thus if the words are unambiguous, we must apply their literal meaning." Id. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 ; Beach v. Livingston , 248 S.C. 135, 139, 149 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1966) ("The language of a tax statute must be given its plain ordinary meaning in the absence of an ambiguity therein."). "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo."
"The language of a tax statute must be given its plain ordinary meaning in the absence of an ambiguity therein." Beach v. Livingston, 248 S.C. 135, 139, 149 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1966). Our Supreme Court applied just such a plain meaning in construing the phrase "not connected with the trade or business of the taxpayer."
Beachv. Livingston, 248 S.C. 135, 139, 149 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1966). For these reasons, this court holds charges made by Meyers Arnold for gift wrapping are exempt from sales tax.