Opinion
No. 4-17-0334WC
05-01-2018
BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF COMMUNITY COLLEGE DISTRICT NO. 505/PARKLAND COLLEGE, Appellant, v. THE ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al., (Lisa Eller, Appellee).
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Champaign County No. 16 MR 1022 Honorable Thomas J. Difanis, Judge, Presiding. JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justices Hudson, Harris, and Barberis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission finding that the claimant was injured out of and in the course of her employment when she slipped and fell on black ice in the parking lot of her employer and awarding her benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2012)) for the injuries she sustained is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 2 ¶ 2 The Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 505/Parkland College (Parkland) appeals from an order of the circuit court of Champaign County which confirmed a decision of the Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) finding that the claimant, Lisa Eller, sustained an injury that arose out of and in the course of her employment with Parkland when she slipped and fell on black ice in its parking lot and awarding her benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2012)). For the reasons which follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court. ¶ 3 The following factual recitation is taken from the evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing held on January 28, 2016. ¶ 4 The claimant testified that, on January 25, 2013, she was employed by Parkland as an instructor at its veterinary school. That evening, she exited the building via an outdoor staircase leading to a paved area that was situated between the building's security office entrance and a lot reserved for police, handicapped, and temporary parking. She decided to cross the reserved lot in order to reach her vehicle in another lot. While stepping over a "concrete parking barrier" that separated the paved area from an empty parking space, she slipped on black ice in the parking space and injured her right shoulder. ¶ 5 According to the claimant, Parkland never restricted her from the route she followed on the day of her injury, which was frequently used by faculty and students. Further, other people entered the reserved lot by crossing the same parking space where she fell. On weekends, the claimant, faculty, and students parked in the reserved lot due to its proximity to the security office entrance. On cross-examination, the claimant agreed that a path led around a transformer 3 located near the parking space where she fell. She also agreed that no one told her to take the route she did, and acknowledged that another, "more common" route existed by which she could have left the building. ¶ 6 Parkland called its buildings and grounds manager, Troy Burns, as a witness to testify at the arbitration hearing. Burns testified that faculty, staff, and students regularly walked through the reserved lot to reach the security office entrance and that the paved area between the reserved lot and the building was salted. Burns stated that the reserved lot was plowed and the path around the transformer was customarily shoveled and salted, but the parking space where the claimant fell would not have been salted. ¶ 7 Due to her fall, the claimant required surgical repair of her right rotator cuff, which was performed on April 22, 2013. Her surgeon released her to work on May 5, 2014, but, as of the date of her arbitration hearing, she had stiffness and decreased range of motion in her right shoulder that limited her ability to perform certain work and leisure activities. ¶ 8 Following the hearing, the arbitrator determined that the claimant sustained accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of her employment. Specifically, the arbitrator found that she was injured while stepping on ice in Parkland's parking lot, a risk that was "incidental" to her employment and "involved a causal connection between the employment and the injury." The arbitrator held that the claimant's current condition of ill-being in her right shoulder is causally related to the work accident, and awarded her all medical expenses for treatment of her right shoulder since January 25, 2013, along with reimbursement for any deductible she paid to her private health insurer, under sections 8(a) and 8.2 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(a), 8.2 (West 2012)). Additionally, the arbitrator awarded the claimant 75 weeks of permanent partial 4 disability benefits under section 8(d)2 of the Act (820 ILCS 305/8(d)2 (West 2012)) because her right shoulder injury caused a 15% loss of use of the person as a whole. ¶ 9 Parkland filed a petition for review of the arbitrator's decision before the Commission. On October 12, 2016, the Commission issued a unanimous decision that affirmed and adopted the arbitrator's decision. The Commission awarded the claimant interest, if any, pursuant to section 19(n) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(n) (West 2012)), and granted Parkland credit for any payments already made. ¶ 10 Parkland sought a judicial review of the Commission's decision in the circuit court of Champaign County. On March 31, 2017, the circuit court confirmed the Commission's decision. Parkland now appeals. ¶ 11 On appeal, Parkland contends that the Commission erred in finding that the claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment because she did not park in the reserved lot where she was injured, but crossed into the lot instead of following the path around the transformer. Thus, according to Parkland, the claimant undertook a risk for her own benefit and did not act subject to Parkland's control. ¶ 12 Preliminarily, the parties dispute the applicable standard of review. Parkland argues that de novo review is appropriate because this appeal "involves only an application of the law to *** undisputed facts." The claimant, on the other hand, submits that the manifest weight standard applies because the Commission's decision relied on an inference—specifically, that her injury 5 occurred at a location Parkland maintained for pedestrian use. We agree with the claimant, and find that the manifest weight standard is appropriate. ¶ 13 Generally, whether an injury arose out of and in the course employment is a question of fact for the Commission and its determination will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Peoria Motors, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 92 Ill. 2d 260, 264-65 (1982). Even where the facts are undisputed, we must apply the manifest weight standard when more than one reasonable inference might be drawn therefrom. See Orsini v. Industrial Comm'n, 117 Ill. 2d 38, 44 (1987). In doing so, this court will not reject "permissible inferences drawn by the Commission for the reason that different or conflicting inferences might also reasonably be drawn from the same facts, nor will we substitute our judgment for that of the Commission on such matters unless its findings are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." Health & Hospitals Governing Comm'n of Cook County Hospital v. Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 28, 32 (1975). The Commission's decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the record "disclose[s] that an opposite conclusion clearly was the proper result." Land & Lakes Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 359 Ill. App. 3d 582, 592 (2005). ¶ 14 A claimant's injury is compensable under the Act if it arises out of and in the course of her employment. 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 2012). Both elements must be present at the time of the injury in order to justify compensation. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 131 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (1989). For an injury to "arise out of" employment, its origin must be 6 connected with, or incidental to, the employment so as to create a causal connection between the employment and the injury. See Jewel Cos. v. Industrial Comm'n, 57 Ill. 2d 38, 40 (1974). A risk is incidental to the employment "where it belongs to or is connected with what an employee has to do in fulfilling his duties." Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 Ill. 2d 52, 58 (1989). "In the course of the employment" refers to the time, place, and circumstances under which the claimant is injured. See Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361, 366 (1977). Injuries sustained on an employer's premises, or at a place where the claimant might reasonably have been while performing her duties, and while she is at work, or within a reasonable time before and after work, are generally deemed to occur in the course of employment. See Caterpillar Tractor Co., 129 Ill. 2d at 57-58. ¶ 15 When an employee is injured away from the employer's premises while traveling to or from work, her injuries are ordinarily not compensable under the Act. See Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 Ill. 2d 213, 216 (1981). Relevant here, however, an exception applies where the employee is injured by some hazardous condition in a parking lot that is provided and controlled by the employer. See Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 131 Ill. 2d at 484. Under the parking lot exception, "[w]hether a parking lot is used primarily by employees or by the general public, the proper inquiry is whether the employer maintains and provides the lot for its employees' use." Mores-Harvey v. Industrial Comm'n, 345 Ill. App. 3d 1034, 1040 (2004). If so, the lot constitutes part of the employer's premises, and the presence of a hazardous condition will support the finding of a compensable claim. Id. ¶ 16 Turning to the present case, we find that the manifest weight of the evidence supports the Commission's determination that the claimant's injury arose out of and in the course of her employment. At her arbitration hearing, the claimant testified that she slipped while stepping 7 from a paved area onto black ice in an empty parking space located in the reserved lot. While the claimant did not park in that lot on the day of the accident, she stated that the lot was regularly traversed by faculty and students and that she sometimes parked there on the weekends due to its proximity to the security office entrance. Burns, Parkland's buildings and grounds manager, testified that he was aware that faculty, staff, and students walked through the reserved lot, and that the lot was plowed and the paved area between the lot and the building was salted. These facts support a reasonable inference that Parkland maintained and provided the reserved lot for its employees' use, either for parking their cars or for accessing the building, and that, under the parking lot exception, the lot constituted part of Parkland's premises. See id. ¶ 17 The evidence adduced at the arbitration hearing also supported a finding that the claimant's injury "arose out of" her employment. As discussed, her injury occurred on Parkland's premises when she slipped on ice in an area that Parkland personnel frequently used to access the building. See Litchfield Healthcare Center v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 Ill. App. 3d 486, 491 (2004) ("Special hazards or risks encountered as a result of using a usual access route satisfy the 'arising out of' requirement of the Act."). Moreover, because the claimant was injured on Parkland's premises, her accident also occurred "in the course of" her employment. See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Ill. 2d 210, 214, 216-17 (1982) (injury occurred in the course of employment where the claimant slipped on ice while walking from the employer's parking lot to the factory grounds); Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 41 Ill. 2d 429, 430-31 (1968) (injury occurred in the course of employment where the claimant injured his hand after he slipped and fell in the employer's icy parking lot because "[h]is presence in the lot was due entirely to his employment"). 8 ¶ 18 In so holding, we reject Parkland's reliance on Dodson v. Industrial Comm'n, 308 Ill. App. 3d 572 (1999), and Hatfill v. Industrial Comm'n, 202 Ill. App. 3d 547 (1990). Unlike those cases, where employees were injured after ignoring safe routes towards or through employers' parking lots, no evidence in the present case suggests that the claimant chose an unsafe route when she stepped from the paved area, over a low concrete parking barrier, into a plowed parking lot. Cf. Dodson, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 574 (the employee "left the sidewalk and walked across a grassy slope"); Hatfill, 202 Ill. App. 3d at 549 (the employee "jumped across some water which had accumulated at the base of the five-foot incline"). Further, while Burns testified that a nearby path was customarily shoveled and salted, the testimony of both Burns and the claimant established that the entire vicinity of the icy parking space where the claimant fell was plowed, salted, and available for pedestrian use. Under these circumstances, the evidence does not show that the claimant undertook a personal risk that rendered her injury non-compensable. Based on this record, the Commission's finding that claimant's accident arose out of and in the course of her employment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. ¶ 19 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court which confirmed the Commission's decision. ¶ 20 Affirmed.