However, we do find persuasive the mother's argument that, even if this court or the juvenile court were to interpret K.P.'s arguments in case number JU–12–742.01 as a claim pursuant to § 26–17–609(b), the mother was not afforded notice of the nature of that claim or notice that the juvenile court would consider a claim seeking to disprove R.D.C.'s parentage in case number JU–10–742.01. Accordingly, the mother was not properly afforded due process with regard to such a claim. See Neal v. Neal, 856 So.2d 766, 782 (Ala.2002) ( “ ‘ [D]ue process of law means notice, a hearing according to that notice, and a judgment entered in accordance with such notice and hearing.’ ” (quoting Frahn v. Greyling Realization Corp., 239 Ala. 580, 583, 195 So. 758, 761 (1940))); and B.B. v. D.H., 93 So.3d 949, 952 (Ala.Civ.App.2012) (holding an order void for failure to afford the mother due process). That part of the November 1, 2013, order, finding R.D.C. not to be the child's father and adjudicating K.P.'s paternity is void.