Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-09-004-ESB
Date Submitted: April 24, 2002
Date Decided: July 22, 2002
Karl Haller, Esquire, Haller Hudson
Eric G. Mooney, Esquire, Eric G. Mooney, P.A.
Dear Counsel:
This is the Court's decision on Bay City Inc.'s ("Bay City") appeal from an order by the Court of Common Pleas granting Kenneth C. and Gay L. Chubb's (the "Chubbs") motion for summary judgment. This case involves a dispute between Bay City and the Chubbs over Bay City's attempt to change the standards for the width of manufactured homes in Bay City's manufactured home park. For the reasons set forth herein, the order of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I.
The Chubbs own a manufactured home that sits on a leased lot in Bay City's manufactured home park (the "Park"). The home is 62 feet long and 12 feet wide, with an addition that is 24 feet long and 12 feet wide. The Chubbs and Bay City entered into a lease agreement for the lot on December 5, 1997. The lease term was for four years, commencing on April 1, 1998. Attached to the lease (the "Lease") were the Bay City Rules and Regulations (the "Rules"), which contained various rules relating to the safety and welfare of the park, as well as standards for the manufactured homes within the park. Paragraph 31 of the Rules required that "no manufactured home less than twelve (12) feet wide may be resold on its lot."
This action was prompted by a letter, dated March 30, 1999, from Bay City to the Chubbs entitled "Addendum to Lease Agreement Effective September 1, 1999" (the "Letter"). The Letter indicated a change in the minimum width for manufactured homes in the Park. Specifically, the Letter stated that "no manufactured home less than fourteen (14) feet wide may be resold on its lot." Sometime after the change took effect, the Chubbs attempted to sell their home, but were unsuccessful allegedly as a result of the Rule change prohibiting the resale of homes less than 14 feet wide.
The Chubbs filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas, seeking a declaratory judgment holding the Rule change unlawful. The Chubbs then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the unilateral Rule change was unreasonable and an unlawful change to the Lease. Bay City filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that it may change its Rules at any time.
The Court of Common Pleas granted the Chubbs' motion for summary judgment and denied Bay City's cross-motion, reasoning that the change in the Rule was an unlawful modification to the Lease. Bay City appealed to this Court.
II. A. Standard of Review
When reviewing an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, this Court reviews the decision below as the Supreme Court would consider an appeal. Baker v. Connell, 488 A.2d 1303, 1309 (Del. 1985). A two-fold standard of review is employed. First, this Court reviews errors of law de novo. Downs v. State, 570 A.2d 1142 (Del. 1990). Second, this Court is bound by findings of fact made by the Court of Common Pleas which are supported by the record and which are the product of a logical and deductive process. Id. at 1144.
B Discussion
Summary judgment may be granted only when no material issues of fact exist, and the moving party bears the burden of establishing the non-existence of material issues of fact. Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.d. 679, 680 (Del. 1979). If, however, material issues of fact exist or if the Court determines that it does not have sufficient facts to enable it to apply the law to the facts before it, then summary judgment is inappropriate. Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.d. 467, 470 (Del. 1962).
In reaching its conclusion, the Court of Common Pleas relied on Silver View Farm v. Marsh, Del. Super., C.A. No. 94C-02-018, Graves, J. (December 16, 1994). In that case, the landlord attempted to impose a security deposit on an existing lease subject to automatic renewal. The Court held that "a landlord may not force unilateral changes on the tenant, except for modifications relating to rental fees." Id. at *5; 25 Del. C. § 7006(b). The Court concluded that the imposition of the security deposit in a renewal lease was statutorily prohibited because it was not a rental fee.
The pertinent portion states: "[u]pon the expiration of the initial term, the rental agreement shall be automatically renewed for the same term as the original agreement subject to modified provisions relating to the amount and payment of rent."
The Court of Common Pleas followed the approach of the Silver View Court, stating that the change Bay City proposed was an unilateral attempt to change the terms of the Lease. The Court of Common Pleas cited the title of the letter as proof that it was a lease amendment. The Court reasoned that because the change was not related to rental fees, it was prohibited under 25 Del. C. § 7006. Therefore, the Court of Common Pleas granted the Chubbs' motion for summary judgment.
It is correct that modifications to lease agreements are prohibited except where they pertain to rental fees. However, the Mobile Home Lots and Leases Act (the "Act") permits a landlord to "amend existing rules and regulations at any time." 25 Del. C. § 7015(e). The limitations on a landlord's authority to promulgate rules, regulations and standards are set forth in 25 Del. C. § 7015(a)-(d). Despite the Letter's title, its substance concerned a change in the minimum size requirement for the resale of a manufactured home in the Park. Such requirements are rules and regulations that may be amended at any time by Bay City. Id. As such, the Letter may well have been a proper exercise of Bay City's power to amend one of its Rules.
To the extent that there is any doubt that the "standards" for manufactured homes are a part of the "rules and regulations," and can be amended in the same manner as the "rules and regulations," the legislative history of the Act clearly reflects the legislature's intent that "standards" be treated as a part of the "rules and regulations." See subparagraph (6) of the Synopsis to H.B. 695 of 133rd General Assembly, which states "requiring disclosure of written rules and regulations setting standards for the homes which may be placed, sold, or retained in the mobile home park after an in-park sale has been consumated."
However, that does not end the analysis. There is no factual basis in the record to determine whether or not the change from 12 to 14 feet is in compliance with the Act's requirements. The Court of Common Pleas must make factual findings so that this determination can be made. Because a material issue of fact remains, summary judgment is inappropriate at this point in time. Therefore, the order of the Court of Common Pleas is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
IT IS SO ORDERED.