In determining whether due diligence was exercised in apprehending the defendant, the trial court may consider actions taken by the State before the motion to revoke was filed and the capias issued. Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex.Crim. App. 2002). Due diligence can be shown by proof of reasonable investigative efforts made to apprehend the person sought.
In determining whether due diligence was exercised in apprehending the defendant, the trial court may consider actions taken by the State before the motion to revoke was filed and the capias issued. Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Due diligence can be shown by proof of reasonable investigative efforts made to apprehend the person sought.
In determining whether due diligence was exercised in apprehending the defendant, the trial court may consider actions taken by the State before the motion to revoke was filed and the capias issued. Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). In the instant case, the motion to revoke was filed on February 9, 1998 and the capias was issued on February 13, 1998.
It was an unjustifiable, court-created expansion.SeeBawcom v. State , 78 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (a factor that supports overruling precedent is when the original rule was "flawed from the outset"). Moon is also unworkable.
or offers no reasoning in support of a proposition that is crucial to its holding.Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Tex.Crim.App.2002); Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 236–37, 239 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Maxwell did not discuss the issue of procedural default at all, and consequently, it failed to offer any authority or reasoning in support of a procedural-default holding.
TEX. GOVT. CODE § 311.023.Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 363-65 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (that a decision was poorly reasoned is a factor that can be considered in determining whether to overrule precedent).2. Statutory language
.Jordan; Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002).
He further asserts that he had numerous affirmative defenses that could have been raised to counter the motion's allegations but that he was not informed of them. See Stanfield v. State, 718 S.W.2d 734 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (stating that inability to make probation payments is an affirmative defense for a probationer to raise and to prove by a preponderance of evidence); Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (stating that the timing of the State's efforts to locate the probationer, including whether those efforts occurred before or after the filing of a motion to revoke and the issuance of a capias, are factors that reflect on the diligence of the State's efforts); cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.12 § 24 (effective June 18, 2003, due diligence defense only applicable to allegation of failure to report). He states that had he been properly informed of these facts, he would not have taken the plea agreement for concurrent terms of eighteen years on the three cases.
For multiple reasons, Sanchez' contention is without merit. At common law, a trial court's jurisdiction over a motion to revoke community supervision did not survive the expiration of the community supervision period unless (1) a motion to revoke was filed before the community supervision period expired, (2) an arrest warrant, capias, or summons was issued before the community supervision period expired, and (3) the State exercised due diligence in having a revocation hearing. Peacock v. State, 77 S.W.3d 285, 287-88 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), superseded by statute as recognized in Garcia v. State, 387 S.W.3d 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); see Harris v. State, 843 S.W.2d 34, 35 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled by Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (due diligence may be shown by pre-capias diligence). Under prior caselaw, the State had the burden to prove its due diligence once the defendant raised the issue.
“Due diligence” has been defined, however, in other contexts. See e.g., Bawcom v. State, 78 S.W.3d 360, 363 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (holding due diligence may be shown by pre-capias diligence); In re N.M.P., 969 S.W.2d 95, 100 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.) (explaining that due diligence generally requires that party not simply sit on their rights or duties). Due diligence requires the State to “move ahead” or “reasonably explain delays.” In re N.M.P., 969 S.W.2d at 100;see also In re C.B., No. 2–05–341–CV, 2006 WL 1791731, at *2 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth June 29, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Due diligence does not require the State to “do everything perceivable and conceivable to avoid delay.