Opinion
1:24-cv-00246-AKB
07-23-2024
STEPHEN MARK BAUMGARDNER, Plaintiff, v. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, Defendant.
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE
AMANDA K. BRAILSFORD, U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Stephen Mark Baumgardner's Complaint because of Plaintiff's status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. A “conditional filing” means that a plaintiff must obtain authorization from the Court to proceed. Upon screening, the Court must dismiss claims that state a frivolous or malicious claim, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
Having reviewed the record, the Court enters the following Order dismissing this case with prejudice.
1. Standards of Law for Screening Complaints
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly “to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
To state an actionable claim, a plaintiff must provide “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest” that the defendant committed the unlawful act, meaning that sufficient facts are pled “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal [activity].” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Iqbal, 556 US. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). Moreover, even if a complaint meets the pleading requirements, dismissal under §§ 1915 and 1915A is still appropriate if an affirmative defense is an “obvious bar to securing relief on the face of the complaint.” Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 833 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Discussion
Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”), currently incarcerated at the Idaho Maximum Security Institution. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the federal civil rights statute. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff contends the IDOC has been violating his right to due process in numerous ways, including denying access to legal resources, using lockdowns excessively, committing health and safety violations, and defrauding inmates. (See Compl., Dkt. 1, at 3-4). Plaintiff's claims are implausible, however.
The only named Defendant in this case is the IDOC-a state entity. That states and state entities are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983 is well-established. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Further, even if the IDOC were a person for purposes of § 1983, it would be immune from suit in federal court. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1890); see also Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 342-44 (1979) (holding that § 1983 does not waive state sovereign immunity); Esquibel v. Idaho, No. 1:11-cv-00606-BLW, 2012 WL 1410105, at *6 (D. Idaho Apr. 23, 2012) (holding that Idaho itself has not waived state sovereign immunity for constitutional claims). For these reasons, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 3. Opportunity to Amend
The Court now considers whether to allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend the Complaint. Amendments to pleadings are governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule states that the Court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). The Ninth Circuit has explained the reasoning behind allowing the opportunity to amend:
In exercising its discretion with regard to the amendment of pleadings, a court must be guided by the underlying purpose of Rule 15-to facilitate decision on the merits rather than on the pleadings or technicalities. This court has noted on several occasions that the Supreme Court has instructed the lower federal courts to
heed carefully the command of Rule 15(a) . . . by freely granting leave to amend when justice so requires. Thus Rule 15's policy of favoring amendments to pleadings should be applied with extreme liberality.Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). “In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.,” it is appropriate for a court to grant leave to amend. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
This liberal amendment policy is even more important with respect to pro se plaintiffs, who generally lack legal training. Courts must liberally construe civil rights actions filed by pro se litigants so as not to close the courthouse doors to those truly in need of relief. Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1135, 1137. A pro se litigant bringing a civil rights suit must have an opportunity to amend the complaint to overcome deficiencies unless it is clear that those deficiencies cannot be overcome by amendment. Id. at 1135-36. Although several factors contribute to the analysis of whether a plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to amend, futility alone can justify denying such an opportunity. Johnson v. Buckley, 356 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2004).
The Court concludes that amendment in this case would be futile. Plaintiff's claims are barred because it is clear from the face of the Complaint that the only named defendant is not subject to liability under § 1983 and is immune from suit in federal court. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without leave to amend. If Plaintiff intends to proceed on claims against the IDOC, he must do so in state court.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) & 1915A(b)(1).