Opinion
No. 36757.
June 14, 1948.
TAXATION.
Supreme Court would not disturb assessment of taxpayer's land at $2.50 an acre, on ground that assessor and board of supervisors of county placed all cutover lands in county, except those in swamp, at an arbitrary assessment value of $2.50 an acre, though taxpayer's land was allegedly not worth as much as the average of other lands in the class, where evidence showed that taxpayer's land was not assessed at more than its true value, and taxpayer failed to show any case under statute allowing appeals from assessment, that would have allowed circuit court on appeal to have entire assessment roll of all lands in the county received in evidence to emphasize taxpayer's point (Code 1942, sec. 1196).
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Pearl County.
Jones Ray, of Jackson, and Ben Stevens, of Hattiesburg, for appellee.
The assessment in this case is violative of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it denies to the appellant equal protection of the law and takes from him property without due process of law.
Stern v. Parker, 200 Miss. 27, 25 So.2d 787; Gully v. J.J. Newman Lumber Co, 176 Miss. 48, 168 So. 258; George County Bridge Co. v. Catlett, 161 Miss. 120, 135 So. 217; Nickey v. State, 167 Miss. 650, 145 So. 630, 146 So. 859, 147 So. 324, 292 N.S. 393, 78 L.Ed. 1323, 54 S.Ct. 743; City of Greenwood v. Humphreys, 157 Miss. 879, 127 So. 694; Mississippi Railroad Commission v. Western Union Tel. Co., 107 Miss. 442, 65 So. 505; Adams v. Mississippi State Bank, 75 Miss. 701, 23 So. 395; Stuart v. Board of Sup'rs of Scott County, 195 Miss. 1, 11 So.2d 212; Cumberland Coal Co. v. Board of Revision, 284 U.S. 23, 52 S.Ct. 48, 76 L.Ed. 146; Chicago G.W.R. Co. v. Kendall, 266 U.S. 94, 98, 99, 45 S.Ct. 55, 69 L.Ed. 183; Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445, 43 S.Ct. 190, 67 L.Ed. 340, 28 A.L.R. 979; Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20, 37, 28 S.Ct. 7, 52 L.Ed. 78, 12 Ann. Cas. 757; Cummings v. Merchants National Bank, 25 L.Ed. 903; Edward Hines, etc., Trustees v. Stewart, 51 S.Ct. 654; Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Wakefield, 38 S.Ct. 495; Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 52 S.Ct. 133, 76 L.Ed. 265; Code of 1942, Secs. 9746, 9759, 9769; Constitution of 1890, Secs. 14, 112; Laws of 1946, Ch. 459; Constitution of the United States, 14th Amendment; 34 C.J. 532; 26 R.C.L. 449.
J.M. Morse, of Poplarville, for appellee.
The assessment in this case was proper and should not be distrubed.
Crawford et al. v. State, 162 Miss. 158, 138 So. 589; Charles Weaver Co. v. Phares, 185 Miss. 224, 188 So. 12; Day Bros. v. Board of Sup'rs of Webster County, 183 Miss. 240, 184 So. 453; Batson v. Pearl River County (Miss.), 22 So.2d 248; Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Gully, 179 Miss. 847, 175 So. 185; Cotton v. Harlan, 124 Miss. 691, 87 So. 152; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis v. Wall, 138 Miss. 204, 103 So. 5; McIntosh v. Munson Road Machinery Co., 167 Miss. 546, 145 So. 731; Stern et al. v. Parker, 200 Miss. 27, 25 So.2d 787; Gully v. J.J. Newman Lumber Co., 176 Miss. 48, 164 So. 891, 168 So. 258; Knox v. L.N. Dantzler Lumber Co., 148 Miss. 834, 114 So. 873; Robinson Land Lumber Co. v. Roberson, 126 Miss. 535, 89 So. 160; Smith et al. v. Board of Sup'rs of Tallahatchie County, 124 Miss. 36, 86 So. 707; McPherson v. Richards, 134 Miss. 282, 98 So. 685; Bridges Hill v. Board of Sup'rs of Clay County, 58 Miss. 817; Pearl Realty Co. v. State Highway Commission, 170 Miss. 103, 154 So. 292; Scott County v. Dubois, 158 Miss. 245, 130 So. 106; Martin v. Newell et al., 198 Miss. 809, 23 So.2d 796; State Highway Department v. Duckworth et ux., 178 Miss. 35, 172 So. 148; Constitution of 1890, Sec. 135; Griffith's Mississippi Chancery Practice, Sec. 633.
Appellant offered to prove and we will concede, for the purposes of this case, did prove that the assessor and board of supervisors of the county placed all cut-over lands in the county, except those in Pearl River swamp, at an arbitrary assessment value of $2.50 per acre, and that the greater area of all the taxable lands was in the said cut-over class assessed at $2.50 per acre; and we may concede that appellant's land in the said $2.50 class, as well as that the assessor and board knew it, was not worth on an average as much as the average of other lands in that class, but it must be stated at the same time that appellant's land was worth, according to the evidence in the case, in actual value more than the $2.50 per acre at which it was assessed.
Appellant's complaint is then that the assessor and board of upervisors knowingly and intentionally placed his land arbitrarily in said $2.50 class, knowing that his land was not worth as much as the average of other land in said class and thereby worked an unconstitutional discrimination against him. In fact, appellant attempted to have the entire essessment roll of all the lands in the county received in evidence to emphasize his point.
Appellant has not pointed to any case or cases under our statute, Section 1196, Code 1942, allowing appeals from assessment, which would permit the circut court on such an appeal to go into the broad question here prescribed by appellant. The farthest towards it, so far as we can at the present find, would appear to be that allowed in Redmond v. City of Jackson, 143 Miss. 114, 108 So. 444. Such a question was not involved in Knox v. L.N. Dantzler Lbr. Co., 148 Miss. 834, 114 So. 873, and the language therein used is to be interpreted in the light of the facts with which that case dealt. In Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. Stewart, 5 Cir., 46 F.2d 910, arising in this same county, the Court seems to have recognized that relief of a character such as here mentioned could not be afforded in a proceeding by appeal, and thereupon sustained a bill in equity.
Appellant having failed to show us that the stated questions could be reviewed on an appeal to the circuit court, and for the reason that the evidence showed that appellant's land was not assessed at more than its true value, we simply affirmed without an opinion, and for the same reason we overrule the suggestion of error.
But in what we have above said we do not finally foreclose the stated point. We are saying only that up to the present time we have not been shown that the broad issue raised by appellant could be adjucated on a statutory appeal.
Suggestion of error overruled.