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denying motion for remittitur of front pay award representing approximately twenty years of lost wages at $20,565 per year
Summary of this case from Zielinski v. SPS Techs. LLCOpinion
C.A. No. 97-394-SLR.
March 31, 2000.
Michael R. Ippoliti, Esquire, Counsel for plaintiff. Of counsel: Alan B. Epstein, Esquire and Scott A. Burr, Esquire of Jablon Epstein.
Robert K. Pearce, Esquire, and James F. Kipp, Esquire of Trzuskowski, Kipp, Kelleher Pearce, P.A., Counsel for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently before the court are several post-trial motions filed by plaintiff Debra S. Bates and by defendant Board of Education of the Capital School District. (D.I. 197, 198, 201, 204) Plaintiff initiated this suit on July 3, 1997, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111-12117 (1994), and of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 et seq. (1994) stemming from the nonrenewal of her contract with defendant as principal of West Dover Elementary School and defendant's retaliation against her for asserting her rights under Title VII and the ADA. In addition to her federal claims, plaintiff alleged state law claims against defendant founded on breach of contract, breach of implied warranty of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. (D.I. 1 at 7-8) On June 30, 1998, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment (D.I. 38) on all of plaintiff's claims, which the court granted in part and denied in part on September 28, 1998. (D.I. 91-92) In its memorandum opinion, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's breach of contract and breach of implied warranty claims. In all other respects, the court denied the motion. The court held a jury trial on the surviving claims that ran from February 16, 1999 to February 25, 1999. After plaintiff had rested her case, defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law. (D.I. 187) On March 1, 1999, the jury returned a verdict, rejecting plaintiff's gender and disability discrimination claims, but finding defendant guilty of retaliation. The jury awarded plaintiff twenty years of front pay and $750,000 for mental anguish and embarrassment.
The court held an earlier trial beginning on October 5, 1998, but it ended in a mistrial after eight days of testimony when one of defendant's witnesses made a highly prejudicial statement to the jury.
On March 12, 1999, plaintiff filed a motion to amend the judgment. (D.I. 197) Three days later, defendant filed the present renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL") pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b) and an alternative motion for a new trial/amendment of the judgment. (D.I. 198, 201) On March 12, 1999, plaintiff filed its own motion to amend the judgment. (D.I. 197) Plaintiff also filed a motion for attorney's fees and costs (D.I. 204), but the parties have stayed briefing until after the court's decision on the instant post-trial motions. (D.I. 206)
II. DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR JMOL
A. Standard of Review
By its motion for entry of JMOL or, alternatively, for a new trial, defendant seeks relief from an adverse jury verdict. To prevail on a renewed motion for JMOL following a jury trial, the moving party must show that the evidence and the justifiable inferences therefrom do not afford any rational basis for the verdict. See Delli Santi v. CNA Ins. Cos., 88 F.3d 192, 200 (3d Cir. 1996). In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. See Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258, 269-70 (3d Cir. 1995). The appropriate inquiry is whether "`the record is `critically deficient of the minimum quantity of evidence from which the jury might reasonably afford relief.''" Simone v. Golden Nugget Hotel Casino, 844 F.2d 1031, 1034 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 959 (3d Cir. 1980)).
In making such a determination, "the court may not weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version of the facts for the jury's version." While a "scintilla of evidence is not enough to sustain a verdict of liability," the question is "whether there is evidence upon which the jury could properly find a verdict for that party."Jaguar Cars, Inc., 46 F.3d at 269-70 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993)).
B. Discussion
In addition to seeking JMOL on plaintiff's retaliation claim, defendant also asks the court for JMOL on plaintiff's gender and disability discrimination claims, even though defendant prevailed at trial on these issues. It should be obvious to defendant that federal courts rule only on matters presenting a case or controversy. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1965) (explaining that the case and controversy requirement "limit[s] the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context"). Here, given the jury's rejection of plaintiff's gender and disability discrimination claims and plaintiff's acquiescence in that verdict, there is no justifiable controversy. Accordingly, the court confines its analysis to the jury's verdict on plaintiff's retaliation claim.
The jury answered in the affirmative the following interrogatory relating to plaintiff's retaliation claim:
Has plaintiff proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the fact that she filed charges of disability or gender-based discrimination with the Delaware Department of Labor and the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission was a determinative factor in the decision of defendant to not consider or to not reassign her to an administrative position prior to the expiration of her contract, or to assign her to the special education teacher position at Dover High School, or to reject her for administrative, teaching, and counseling positions?
(D.I. 188 ¶ 64) In reviewing that verdict, it is helpful to keep in mind plaintiff's evidentiary burden.
The same burden-shifting framework applicable to Title VII and ADA claims applies to retaliation claims. See Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). As such, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII and the ADA. To state a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity, and (3) that a causal link exists between the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse action. See Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., No. 98-6410, 2000 WL 236418, at *6 (3d Cir. Mar. 3, 2000). An employment action is "adverse" if it "`alters the employee's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,' deprives him or her of `employment opportunities,' or `adversely affect[s] his [or her] status as an employee.'" Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)). Once plaintiff states a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the defendant is successful in meeting this burden, "the plaintiff must produce evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could conclude either that the defendant's proffered justifications are not worthy of credence or that the true reason for the employer's act was discrimination." Bray v. Marriott Hotels, 110 F.3d 986, 990 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted); see also Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996).
Both the ADA and Title VII use substantially the same language to prohibit retaliation against an employee when that employee "has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this Act or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation . . . under this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)(ADA); see also id. § 2000e-3(a) (Title VII).
The court's jury instructions reiterated this test. See D.I. 186 at 32-33).
In its renewed motion for JMOL, defendant argues that the court must overturn the jury's verdict because plaintiff failed to "make out a prima facie case of discrimination based on a failure to hire or promote." (D.I. 199 at 19) It is undisputed that plaintiff satisfied the first prong of her prima facie case by filing a complaint with the Delaware Department of Labor ("DDOL") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on July 20, 1995 following defendant's decision to not renew her contract as principal of West Dover Elementary School. At issue, then, is whether plaintiff satisfied the remaining prongs of her prima facie case and whether she otherwise carried the burdens allocated to her under the McDonnell Douglas framework.
At trial, the parties stipulated to plaintiff's DDOL complaint. The court did not allow plaintiff to submit evidence of the DDOL's findings.
In light of the jury interrogatory, plaintiff had to present evidence that the Board retaliated against her by (1) not considering or reassigning plaintiff to an administrative position prior to the expiration of her contract, or (2) by assigning her to the special education teacher position at Dover High School, or (3) by rejecting her for administrative, teaching, and counseling positions. (D.I. 188 ¶ 64) A review of the record establishes that plaintiff presented evidence sufficient to lead a reasonable jury to conclude that defendant retaliated against plaintiff.
Plaintiff filed her DDOL and EEOC complaint on July 20, 1995. Thereafter, plaintiff repeatedly applied for numerous administrative and teaching positions in the school district. (See, e.g., D.I. 211 at B83, 87, 303) The Board rejected her applications, even though she presented evidence that she was qualified for many of the positions. The August 21, 1996 minutes of defendant's meeting indicate that the individual members of the Board were opposed to assigning plaintiff to alternative positions within the school district:
There was a general discussion of the Board's options. There was concern expressed about her skills as a teacher since many of them are the same as for a principal. Mr. Burns stated that his inclination was to deny Ms. Bates a position. Mr. Fores agreed. Dr. Mishoe had mixed feelings. Mr. Moretti expressed his opinion in regards to Ms. Bates that the potential court costs to the District and then the probability of still having her as a teacher was a possibility.
(D.I. 211 at B438) (emphasis added). A reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence that the Board decided to retaliate against plaintiff for her EEOC and DDOL complaints by not rehiring her to a position commensurate with her skills.
Moreover, there is ample evidence to indicate that the Board's last-minute assignment of plaintiff to Dover High School was retaliatory. On August 29, 1996, immediately prior to the beginning of the school year and after plaintiff had applied for unemployment compensation, the district Superintendent, Dr. Crossen, transferred plaintiff to Dover High School to serve as a special education teacher, even though plaintiff was not certified for this position. (D.I. 211 at B192-93, B422) Plaintiff informed the district's human resources director that she was not certified and that, because of her back injury, she could not handle the physical rigors of this job. (D.I. 211 at B336) Her concerns went unanswered. Plaintiff testified that, shortly after assuming her position at Dover High School, she was injured by a student who shoved her into a wall. (D.I. 211 at B207-08) Because of this injury, plaintiff missed several weeks of work. (D.I. 211 at B208) Following her injury, plaintiff requested a transfer but, according to plaintiff's testimony, the Board "just continued to ignore me like I didn't even exist." (D.I. 211 at B207)
The aforementioned testimony and evidence could cause a rational jury to conclude that plaintiff's transfer to Dover High School as a special education teacher constituted an adverse employment action because it detrimentally affected the terms and conditions of her employment in the school district. See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300. Furthermore, plaintiff's evidence of intervening antagonistic behavior could lead a reasonable jury to find a causal link between plaintiff's protected activity (i.e., her July 20, 1995 complaint to the DDOL and the EEOC) and her assignment to Dover High School in August of 1996. See Farrell, 2000 WL 236418, at *6 (explaining that intervening antagonistic behavior can satisfy the causal link prong of the prima facie test).
This evidence of antagonism consisted not only of the Board's refusal to consider her for other available administrative and teaching positions during 1995 but also testimony relating to a security alarm incident at West Dover Elementary School the day after plaintiff's contract expired. Specifically, plaintiff testified that after the school year had ended, she returned to the building on Sunday, June 30, 1996 to retrieve personal belongings from her office. (D.I. 211 at B177) After unlocking the door, she entered her personal access code on the security system. The system, which triggered an alarm after she unlocked the door, rejected her code and continued to sound the alarm. (D.I. 211 at B178) According to established procedures, the security company phoned the school's main office. Plaintiff answered this telephone call herself, and the security personnel informed her that her access code was invalid. At trial, plaintiff testified as to what occurred next:
And then the next thing I know, there were police officers all around the school. They even brought in dogs. And then one of the District custodians came and said to me, "What are you doing in here," like I was some criminal.
. . .
He ordered me to surrender my keys to him immediately and not touch anything. And they told me I couldn't take the things that were in my office . . . [Including,] my own children's pictures.
. . .
And I was told to leave the property or I would be arrested for trespassing. I was just so humiliated.
(D.I. 211 at B178, 179, 180) From this testimony, a reasonable jury could infer that the Board or its delegates changed the building security code in an effort to antagonize or humiliate plaintiff. Indeed, plaintiff presented evidence that a Board member knew plaintiff still had personal belongings in her office prior to the security alarm incident. (D.I. 211 at B176) A reasonable jury could infer that changing her access code while her belongings remained in the building was particularly antagonistic, especially when the Board knew plaintiff likely would return to retrieve those belongings and thereby trip the security alarm.
In short, plaintiff presented sufficient evidence at trial to state a prima facie case of retaliation. With respect to her assignment to Dover High School as a special education teacher, defendant did not rebut plaintiff's assertion that this transfer was an adverse employment action. Nor did defendant put forth legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for assigning plaintiff to a position for which she was not certified and that presented increased risks of reinjuring her back. Because defendant failed to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case of retaliation, the court shall deny defendant's renewed motion for JMOL.
II. Defendant's Motion for a New Trial/Amendment of the Judgment
A. Standard of Review
The standard for granting a motion for a new trial is less demanding than that for granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 802 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993). A new trial may be granted "to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues . . . in an action where there has been a trial by jury, for any of the reasons for which new trials have heretofore been granted in actions at law in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a). In considering a new trial motion, the court must "`view all the evidence and inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party with the verdict.'" Marino v. Ballestas, 749 F.2d 162, 167 (3d Cir. 1984) (quoting Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir. 1979)).
A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial on the grounds of improperly admitted or excluded evidence, the court's ruling on points for charge, misconduct of counsel, or newly discovered evidence. See Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 921-22 (3d Cir. 1986). The court may consider the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence.See Lightning Lube, 802 F. Supp. at 1185. In evaluating a motion for a new trial on the basis of trial error, the court's inquiry is twofold: (1) whether an error was in fact committed, and (2) whether that error was so prejudicial that denial of a new trial would be "inconsistent with substantial justice." Farra v. Stanley-Bostitch, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1021, 1026 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 61). To uphold the verdict, the court need only determine that the record contains the "`minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief.'" Dawson, 630 F.2d at 959 (quoting Denney v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 443, 439 (3d Cir. 1969)).
The trial court's discretion, however, is more limited in granting a new trial on the ground that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The Third Circuit has cautioned that the trial court should grant a new trial on this basis "only when the record shows that the jury's verdict resulted in a miscarriage of justice or where the verdict, on the record, cries out to be overturned or shocks our conscience."Williamson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 926 F.2d 1344, 1353 (3d Cir. 1991). This more stringent standard is necessary to ensure that the trial court does not substitute its "`judgment of the facts and the credibility of the witnesses for that of the jury.'" Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 980 F.2d 171, 211 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Lind v. Schenley Indus., 278 F.2d 79, 90 (3d Cir. 1960) (en banc)). The trial court is not allowed to "`substitute its own judgment for that of the jury simply because the court night have come to a different conclusion.'" Lightning Lube, 802 F. Supp. at 1186 (quoting Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., 774 F. Supp. 266, 269 (D.N.J. 1991)).
1. Jury Instructions
At the charge conference, defendant requested jury instructions on mitigation of damages. A Title VII plaintiff has a statutory duty to mitigate damages: "Interim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the back pay otherwise allowable." See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1); Robinson v. SEPTA, Red Arrow, 982 F.2d 892, 897 (3d Cir. 1993). The court refused defendant's request because a litigant is entitled to an instruction on a theory of its case only if the proffered instruction is supported by the law and the evidence. See Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir. 1994); 9 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 51.11[1][d], at 51-18 (3d ed. 1999). At trial, there was overwhelming evidence that plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence to mitigate her damages. Plaintiff, for example, applied for countless administrative and teaching positions in the school district and in other states. When these efforts proved futile, plaintiff accepted the lower paying special education position at Dover High School. Thus, because there was no evidence of lack of mitigation, defendant was not entitled to its proffered instruction.
Plaintiff contends that defendant waived any right to raise mitigation because, as an affirmative defense, defendant had to raise mitigation in its answer to the complaint, which it did not. While true, it is also the case that "[w]hen issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(b). In the present case, the parties spent considerable trial time arguing about plaintiff's efforts to land other administrative and teaching positions both within the school district and in other states. Accordingly, defendant did not waive its right to argue lack of mitigation.
Apparently, defendant sought the instructions so that it could argue that plaintiff did not exercise reasonable diligence in mitigating her damages.
Even if the court's failure to instruct the jury on mitigation were error, it was a harmless error. Harmless errors do not warrant a new trial. See Farra, 838 F. Supp. at 1026 (explaining that only errors so prejudicial that denial of a new trial would be "inconsistent with substantial justice" require ordering a new trial). The so-called harmless error analysis applies to errors in jury instructions. See Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 121 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 786 (2000). "Harmless errors" are technical errors or defects that do not affect the rights of the parties. See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 760 (1946). In conducting a "harmless error" analysis, a court must consider the record before it and the circumstances of the particular case. See id. at 762. If the alleged error affected the substantial rights of a party, a new trial must be ordered; otherwise, the error is harmless and should be disregarded. See Harkins v. Ford Motor Co., 437 F.2d 276, 278 n. 5 (3d Cir. 1970); see also McQueeney v. Wilmington Trust Co., 779 F.2d 916, 924 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a trial court's "errors are harmless only if it is highly probable that the errors did not affect the outcome of the case"). Where, in light of the entire record, it is highly probably that the jury would have returned the same verdict even if it had been correctly charged, the error is harmless. See Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 357-58 (3d Cir. 1999);Hurley, 174 F.3d at 121-22; Pressley v. Haeger, 977 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying harmless error analysis to faulty jury instructions where, in light of the entire record, the erroneous instruction had no effect on the verdict).
In the present case, the record is replete with evidence of plaintiff's efforts to mitigate her damages by securing equivalent employment positions. Plaintiff testified at length about her attempts to secure other principalship or administrative positions within the school district. (D.I. 211 B163-64, 169-70, 172-73, 190-91, 200-02, 212-13) Plaintiff eventually took the special education position at Dover High School, even though she was not certified for this position and feared the physical dangers of the job. (D.I. 211 at B192-93) She also accepted lower paying summer school teaching positions to make ends meet while she applied for other administrative positions. (D.I. 211 at B196) Significantly, the Board assigned her to teach a summer school health class, a relatively low paying position, but denied her higher paying grant-subsidized positions for which she applied. (D.I. 211 at B196-98) In light of this overwhelming evidence of mitigation, no reasonable jury could have concluded that plaintiff failed to mitigate her damages. Accordingly, the court's failure to include a mitigation instruction was harmless error.
2. Uncertainty in the Back Pay Award
Defendant argues that it is impossible to determine when the jury first found that defendant had retaliated against plaintiff and, therefore, the court must order a new trial so that back pay damages can be calculated with certainty. Back pay is "the difference between the actual wages earned and the wages the individual would have earned in the position that, but for discrimination, the individual would have attained." Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1988). Since the inception of her suit, plaintiff has alleged that, but for defendant's retaliation, she would have been hired for an administrative position following the expiration of her contract as principal of West Dover Elementary School. For example, in her complaint, plaintiff alleged that
Defendant violated the anti-retaliation provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act in that it terminated plaintiff's employment as an administrator for filing Charges of discrimination with the State and federal agencies and opposing defendant's disability discrimination, and only hired plaintiff for a lower paying and lesser professional position after a finding of discrimination was made by the State of Delaware.
(D.I. 1 ¶ 34; see also D.I. 1 ¶ 38) Prior to the close of trial, the parties stipulated to the amount that plaintiff would receive in back pay if the jury returned a favorable verdict:
MR. EPSTEIN: Page 37, we agreed on back pay. We both agree back pay should be judged on the difference of the two salaries which is just slightly in excess of $20,000. It's $20,320 for approximately, it's a little more than two year period. I'm sure we can do that calculation. . . .
THE COURT: Yes, I didn't include that [in the jury instructions] because I thought you had. I mean, we say it was agreed to.
(D.I. 211 at B450-51) The agreed upon amount represents the salary and benefits plaintiff received as an administrator for two years less those she earned as a special education teacher at Dover High School. (D.I. 85 at 42)
Defendant now contends that its stipulation to this amount of back pay "was predicated on the jury's determining that she was entitled to the full amount." (D.I. 213 at 7) Defendant argues that it is impossible to determine whether plaintiff is entitled to the full amount because the interrogatory did not permit the jury to indicate when plaintiff first suffered retaliation. Prior to the instant motion, defendant never alerted the court to the qualifications it now places on its stipulation of back pay. Moreover, defendant submitted jury instructions that permit the award of back pay "should [the jury] find defendant liable." (D.I. 90 at 29) Defendant did not further qualify the award of back pay. Although there is some uncertainty as to when the jury thought defendant's retaliation began, "back pay is intended as an equitable remedy [and] mathematical certainty and exactitude is not required, especially as long as the award is based on a reasonable method of calculation." Weiss v. Parker Hannifan Corp., 747 F. Supp. 1118, 1132 (D.N.J. 1990). Given both this standard and the parties' stipulation as to the method of calculating back pay, defendant cannot prevail in its argument that a new trial is warranted because of uncertainty in back pay damages.
3. Inclusion of Front Pay within the Statutory Cap
Defendant argues that the jury's award of twenty years of front pay (at $20,565 per year) should be included within 42 U.S.C. § 1981a's cap on compensatory damages. Enacted in 1991, § 1981a places limits on the amount of compensatory damages plaintiffs can recover in actions brought under Title VII and the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b). Under § 1981a, "[t]he sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded . . . for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded . . . shall not exceed" $300,000 for employers, like defendant, with more than 500 employees. Id. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (emphasis added) Defendant argues that front pay constitutes "future pecuniary losses" and, thus, the front pay award is subject to the statutory cap.
The Third Circuit has yet to address whether front pay awards fall within the ambit of "future pecuniary losses" subject to § 1981a's compensatory damages cap. This issue has arisen in other circuits, and at least five circuit courts have addressed it in detail. Defendant relies primarily upon a decision reached by the Sixth Circuit. That court looked to the "ordinary, contemporary, common meaning" of the phrase "future pecuniary losses" and concluded that this term includes front pay awards, thereby subjecting such awards to the relevant statutory cap. See Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1203-04 (6th Cir. 1997). At least four other circuit courts, however, have disagreed with this construction.
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Tenth Circuit explained that front pay awards are equitable remedies excluded by § 1981a(b)(2) from the limitations on compensatory damages set forth in § 1981a(b)(3). See Medlock v. Ortho Biotech. Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555-56 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 48 (1999). Section 1981a(b)(2) provides that, "[c]ompensatory damages awarded under this section shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.c. § 2000e-5(g)]." Section 2000e-5(g) permits a court to order "any other equitable relief [it] deems appropriate." Id. § 2000e-5(g). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that "[a]n award of front pay fits squarely within this list of exclusions because it constitutes `other equitable relief' that `the court may grant if deemed appropriate' pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)." Medlock, 164 F.3d at 556 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "front pay is an equitable remedy excluded from the statutory limit on compensatory damages provided for in section 1981a(b)(3)." Kramer v. Logan County Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1998); see also Gotthardt v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1154-55 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that front pay is an equitable remedy and not subject to § 1981a's compensatory damages cap); Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1348-49 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (same),cert. dismissed, 120 S. Ct. 1155 (2000).
Although the Third Circuit has not squarely addressed this issue, it has ruled that front pay awards are equitable remedies.See Bruno v. W.B. Sanders Co., 882 F.2d 760, 771 (3d Cir. 1989);Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 382-83 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that, "[a] front pay award . . . is the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement"); see also Gunby, 840 F.2d at 1123 n. 15 (noting that equitable relief in Title VII actions may take the form of front pay awards). It is likely, then, that the Third Circuit would conclude that front pay awards are a form of "other equitable relief" authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) and that, as such, § 1981a(b)(2) excludes front pay awards from the compensatory damages cap of § 1981a(b)(3). Accordingly, the court shall not limit plaintiff's front pay award to the statutory cap of $300,000.
4. Evidentiary Support for the Front Pay Award
Defendant next contends that, regardless of whether front pay falls within § 1981a's damages cap, plaintiff did not submit evidence sufficient to justify the award of twenty years of front pay. A review of the law governing front pay awards is helpful in assessing defendant's argument.
Although reinstatement is the preferred remedy to avoid future lost earnings, it may not be feasible in all cases. See Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 796 (3d Cir. 1985). In the present case, the evidence indicates that the animosity between plaintiff and defendant precludes plaintiff's reinstatement as a principal or administrator in the school district. See id. Accordingly, a front pay award is an appropriate alternative. Front pay damages are "an award for a reasonable future period required for the victim to reestablish her rightful place in the job market." Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1984). They are appropriate where "a victim of employment discrimination will experience a loss of future earnings because he or she cannot be placed in the employment position that was unlawfully denied." Bartek v. Urban Redev. Auth. of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 739, 747 (3d Cir. 1989). Calculating the amount of front pay damages is left to the jury, see Maxfield, 766 F.2d at 796, and the plaintiff bears the burden of providing the essential data necessary to calculate a reasonably certain front pay award, including "the amount of the proposed award, the length of time the plaintiff expects to work for the defendant, and the applicable discount rate." Barbour v. Merrill, 48 F.3d 1270, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
At trial, plaintiff presented ample evidence that defendant would not consider or hire her for alternative administrative positions within the district. She testified that she hoped to work as an administrator in the school district for seventeen more years: "Until I was 65 or, like I said, they took me out feet first." (D.I. 211 at B218) Plaintiff also stated that it was not unusual for principals in the district to keep their positions for this amount of time. At the time of trial, plaintiff was 48 years old. (D.I. 211 at B217) Defendant presented no evidence that plaintiff was able to obtain other administrative positions outside the district.
After considering this evidence, the jury found that "plaintiff would work as an administrator in the Capital School District" for twenty years "if given the opportunity." (D.I. 188 ¶ 65) Although there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that plaintiff would suffer a loss of future earnings due to defendant's conduct, plaintiff presented no evidence to justify the award of twenty years of front pay. At best, plaintiff's testimony indicated that she planned to work until she reached 65. Given that she was 48 years old at the time of judgment and that she planned to retire at age 65, she would be entitled to only seventeen years of front pay. There is simply no support in the record for the jury's award of three additional years of front pay beyond plaintiff's stated retirement age of 65. See Blum, 829 F.2d at 374 (explaining that, "[i]n calculating a front pay award, the jury must consider the expected future damages caused by defendant's wrongful conduct from the date of judgment to retirement"). As such, the jury's award of these three additional years was unreasonable. The court shall uphold the award of front pay but reduce its duration to seventeen years. See Motter v. Everest Jennings, Inc., 883 F.2d 1223, 1230 (3d Cir. 1989) (commenting that, in reviewing the propriety of a jury verdict, the court's "obligation is to uphold the jury's award if there exists a reasonable basis to do so").
5. The Compensatory Damages Award
The jury awarded plaintiff $750,000 for "mental anguish, embarrassment, humiliation, or loss of enjoyment of life's pleasures as a result of defendant's conduct." (D.I. 1886¶ 6) Both parties agree that this amount must be reduced to the statutory cap of $300,000. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) Defendant goes one step further and argues that there is no support in the record for even this amount of compensatory damages. Defendant seeks either a new trial or a remittitur.
Plaintiff has filed a separate motion to amend the judgment (D.I. 197) in which she asks, inter alia, that the court amend the compensatory damages to $300,000.
Whether or not a damages award is excessive is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Edynak v. Atlantic Shipping, Inc. CIE Chambon, 562 F.2d 215, 225-26 (3d Cir. 1977). If the damages assessed by the jury shock the judicial conscience and are the product of passion and prejudice, the trial judge may set aside the award and grant a new trial. See Dunn v. Hovic, 1 F.3d 1371, 1383 (3d Cir. 1993); Schreffler v. Board of Educ. of Delmar Sch. Dist., 506 F. Supp. 1300, 1309 (D. Del. 1981). If the court merely finds the award excessive, but not the product of passion or prejudice, the proper remedy is to order the plaintiff to remit the portion of the verdict in excess of the maximum amount supportable by the evidence or, if the remittitur is refused, to submit to a new trial. See Dunn, 1 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Kazan v. Wolinski, 721 F.2d 911, 914 (3d Cir. 1983)). "The rationalization for, and use of, the remittitur is well established as a device employed when the trial judge finds that a decision of the jury is clearly unsupported and/or excessive."Spence v. Board of Educ. of the Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1200 (3d Cir. 1986).
In the present case, there is no evidence that the jury's compensatory damages award was the product of passion or prejudice. Thus, the court shall deny defendant's motion for a new trial on these grounds. The request for a remittitur, likewise, shall be denied. Although $300,000 is a substantial award for intangible injuries, nevertheless, there is evidence of record that supports the existence of such injuries and no principled way of reducing the statutory limit to some lesser extent.
Defendant offers no suggestions in this regard.
III. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND THE JUDGMENT
Plaintiff's motion raises the same issues as defendant's motions, and the court's rulings on defendant's motions shall apply to plaintiff's.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, the court shall deny defendant's renewed motion for JMOL, deny defendant's motion for a new trial, and grant in part plaintiff's and defendant's motions to amend the judgment. Appropriate orders shall issue.