Generally, evidence of similar accidents is not admissible to prove negligence. Bassham v. Diamond, 148 Ga. App. 620, 621(1) ( 252 S.E.2d 23) (1979). Although evidence of similar collisions has been admitted in the past to show the Department of Transportation's knowledge of the need for traffic control devices, see Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183(4) ( 460 S.E.2d 812) (1995), the decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Brown, 218 Ga. App. 178, 183 (4) ( 460 SE2d 812) (1995). See also Bassham v. Diamond, 148 Ga. App. 620, 621 (1) ( 252 SE2d 23) (1979). Compare Whitley v. Gwinnett County, 221 Ga. App. 18 ( 470 SE2d 724) (1996).
The evidence was not offered to show negligence on the part of Pembrook in maintaining the drainage grill over a long period of time. The evidence was offered to show that Pembrook had knowledge of what appeared to be a defect over a long period of time. It was for the jury to determine if that defect was the proximate cause of Ms. Cossaboon's injury; whether the defect constituted negligence at all and whether Ms. Cossaboon failed to exercise reasonable care for her own safety or was guilty of a degree of comparative negligence to preclude or reduce any recovery should the jury find negligence on the part of Pembrook. Where evidence of a prior similar accident tends to show condition and knowledge of that condition, the evidence is admissible. Bassham v. Diamond, 148 Ga. App. 620 ( 252 S.E.2d 23); City of Dublin v. Howell, 68 Ga. App. 463 ( 23 S.E.2d 177). All that is required is that the prior accident be sufficient to attract the owner's attention to the dangerous condition which resulted in the litigated accident. Wright v. Dilbeck, 122 Ga. App. 214, 216 (4) ( 176 S.E.2d 715). This evidence falls within such a description.