Summary
vacating as void the sentence imposed after defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea on a sexual offense count, because although the defendant’s sentence fell within the applicable statutory range, the trial court failed to impose a split sentence under OCGA § 17-10-6.2 (b)
Summary of this case from Rice v. StateOpinion
A16A0745
08-15-2016
Barton v. The State
Paul Barton, for Appellant. Harold Winfred Goldin Jr., Leigh Ellen Patterson, Rome, for Appellee.
Paul Barton, for Appellant.
Harold Winfred Goldin Jr., Leigh Ellen Patterson, Rome, for Appellee.
Opinion
Miller, Presiding Judge. This is Paul Bartons' second pro se appeal arising from his 2013 conviction for two counts of sexual battery, including one count against a child under the age of sixteen (OCGA § 16–6–22.1 ). Barton was sentenced by the trial court to two consecutive five-year terms. Barton now appeals from the denial of his motion to set aside his sentence, contending that the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him to a split sentence, which would have included at least one year of probation, as required by OCGA § 17–10–6.2 (b). We agree fully. Accordingly, we vacate Bartons' sentence and remand this case to the trial court for resentencing.
In Barton v. State , 331 Ga.App. 887, 769 S.E.2d 96 (2015), this Court affirmed the denial of Bartons' motion to withdraw his guilty plea.
“A person convicted of the offense of sexual battery against any child under the age of 16 years shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than five years.” OCGA § 16–6–22.1 (d).
Here, Barton entered a negotiated guilty plea to two counts of sexual battery, including one count against a child under the age of sixteen and the trial court sentenced him to two consecutive five-year terms. Bartons' sentence was governed by OCGA § 17–10–6.2 (b), which pertinently provides:
any person convicted of a sexual offense shall be sentenced to a split sentence which shall include the minimum term of imprisonment specified in the Code section applicable to the offense. No portion of the mandatory minimum sentence imposed shall be suspended, stayed, probated, deferred, or withheld by the sentencing court and such sentence shall include , in addition to the mandatory imprisonment, an additional probated sentence of at least one year .
(Emphasis provided.); see also Hedden v. State , 288 Ga. 871, 873, 708 S.E.2d 287 (2011).
“A sentence is void if the [trial] court imposes punishment that the law does not allow.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rooney v. State , 287 Ga. 1, 2, 690 S.E.2d 804 (2010). The trial court had jurisdiction to correct Bartons' void sentence, and Barton was entitled to directly appeal the denial of his motion to correct his sentence. Id; see also Williams v. State , 271 Ga. 686, 689, 523 S.E.2d 857 (1999).
Barton was convicted of two crimes charged in the same indictment. Accordingly, as the trial court correctly noted, Barton is deemed to have only one conviction for recidivist purposes.
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In this case, the underlying offenses were two counts of sexual battery, including one count against a child under the age of sixteen, OCGA § 17–10–6.2 required the trial court to issue a split sentence that included a mandatory minimum sentence of at least five years of imprisonment and at least one year of supervised probation. Here, although Bartons' sentence fell within the applicable statutory range set forth in OCGA § 16–6–22.1, the trial court failed to impose a split sentence. See Spargo v. State , 332 Ga.App. 410, 411, 773 S.E.2d 35 (2015) ; New v. State , 327 Ga.App. 87, 108, 755 S.E.2d 568 (2014). Consequently, we vacate Bartons' sentences for the two counts of sexual battery and remand this case for resentencing.
Judgment vacated and case remanded.
McFadden and McMillian, JJ., concur.