Opinion
No. 05-09-01173-CR
Opinion Filed January 11, 2011. DO NOT PUBLISH Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from the 292nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F09-00416-LV.
Before Justices BRIDGES, O'NEILL, and RICHTER.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant appeals his conviction for capital murder. The trial court assessed an automatic life sentence. In four points of error, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment. On the night of October 31, 2006, complainant went outside to get her son's pacifier from her car so she could put him to sleep. She never returned. She was found a few hours later stabbed in the driver's seat of her burned vehicle. Appellant, complainant's former boyfriend and the father of her youngest child, was charged with capital murder. The indictment alleged he knowingly or intentionally caused complainant's death while in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnaping or robbery. A jury found appellant guilty as charged. On appeal, appellant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. At trial, the State presented evidence that appellant and complainant had a turbulent on-and-off relationship. When she was pregnant with their child, she broke off their relationship and kicked him out of her apartment. Appellant was then homeless. Appellant continued to hang around complainant's apartment complex. Complainant called the police on three occasions to complain of his behavior. During this period, one witness testified appellant went to complainant's apartment and threatened, "if I can't have you, nobody else will." On another occasion, about three weeks before she was killed, appellant attacked complainant, strangling her neck and then punched her male companion. On the day she was murdered, complainant was packing to move out of her apartment the following day. That evening she took her children trick-or-treating. Later that night, between nine and ten p.m. as the children were getting ready for bed, complainant went outside to get her infant son's pacifier from her car. A few hours later, police responded to a call about a burning car. Complaint's dead body was inside the car. She had died of stab wounds and thermal burns. Thomas Pinson, a homeless person who knew appellant because they stayed in the same area of Dallas, saw appellant driving complainant's car on the night of the offense. According to Pinson, appellant picked him up in complainant's car at about "dusk." They saw another homeless person, Fred Chipps, who they picked up at a bus stop. Chipps also testified at trial corroborating that appellant was driving complainant's vehicle that night. According to Chipps, however, it was much later when appellant picked him up, closer to 9:30 p.m. After appellant picked up Pinson and Chips, they went to a "dope house" to get some crack. After getting the drugs, appellant took Chipps back to the bus stop. After dropping Chipps off, Pinson and appellant went "copperheading," meaning they stole copper parts from sprinklers to sell as scrap. Pinson testified they collected about 80 pounds of copper that night, which they put in a black bag. Pinson repeatedly asked appellant to put the bag in the trunk so no one could see the bags and because the bags were getting the car dirty. Appellant would not allow Pinson to open the trunk, claiming it was too full with complainant's things. He also told Pinson not to worry about dirtying the car because complainant's cousins were going to burn the car later for "insurance purposes." After they collected all the copperheads, they went to a gas station and filled a jug and a thermos with gas. Pinson asked to put the jug in the trunk because it smelled and because he smokes a lot of cigarettes. Again, appellant would not allow Pinson to open the trunk. Appellant dropped Pinson and the copperheads off under a bridge where Pinson lived with several other homeless people. Pinson was to hide the copperheads until the next day when they were going to sell them. Later that night, police found complainant's dead body in her car. The medical evidence showed she had been stabbed before she was set on fire and was still alive at the time of the fire. There was evidence that she could have lived for up to an hour after she was stabbed. After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of capital murder. This appeal followed. In four issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support his conviction. He complains specifically of the evidence to show his identity as the killer and evidence to show the murder was committed in the course of kidnaping or robbery. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has overruled Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), holding that the Jackson v. Virginia standard is the only standard a reviewing court is to apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.). Therefore, we will address appellant's issues under the Jackson v. Virginia standard alone. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We are required to defer to the jury's credibility and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given their testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326. It is the jury's responsibility to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable facts from basic facts to ultimate facts. Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to establish guilt. Id. Appellant first asserts the evidence is insufficient to prove his identity as the person that killed complainant. He complains there was no eyewitness testimony showing him committing the offense. He also complains there was no physical evidence and no murder weapon connecting him to the offense. In making these arguments, appellant focuses on what the State failed to present, not the evidence the State did present. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether the jury's finding of guilt was justified considering the evidence the State did present, not what it failed to present. Appellant also complains the State did not disprove the "possibility" that another individual murdered the complainant, a known drug user, after she had left the apartment to smoke crack. This argument sounds very much like the "reasonable hypotheses" standard that was rejected years ago in Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Finally, appellant asserts the jury could not find appellant guilty without impermissibly stacking inference upon inference. However, inference stacking is not itself prohibited. Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 16-17. The proper inquiry is whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the combined and cumulate force of all the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. With the appropriate standards in mind, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding that appellant killed complainant. The State presented evidence that appellant had previously assaulted complainant and told her if he could not "have her" nobody could. The murder occurred the night before complainant was moving from the apartment complex appellant frequented. Complainant's daughters both testified that the day she was killed, they saw appellant around the apartment. After complainant and her vehicle disappeared that night, appellant was seen driving the vehicle. Pinson testified appellant would not allow him to open the trunk of the vehicle. Moreover, both Pinson and Chips both testified appellant said the vehicle was going to be burned for insurance purposes that night. Complainant's dead body was found in the vehicle shortly thereafter. In arguing the evidence is insufficient, appellant largely disregards Pinson's and Chipp's testimony and then asserts the jury could not rationally infer his guilt from the remaining evidence. While there are some discrepancies in their testimony and other credibility issues, these were for the jury to resolve. Viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to prove appellant was the person that murdered complainant. Appellant also contends the evidence is insufficient to prove the murder occurred in the course of committing robbery or kidnaping. Again, appellant complains mostly of the lack of direct evidence proving a robbery or a kidnaping. The evidence showed complainant suddenly disappeared from her apartment complex while she was in the process of putting her young children to bed. Her daughters testified she never would have left them alone like that. The jury could reasonably infer from evidence of complainant's prior relationship with appellant, his threats against her, and her sudden disappearance, that complainant did not voluntarily go with appellant when he took her car. A jury could thus reasonably infer the murder occurred in the course of kidnaping and/or robbery. We conclude the evidence is sufficient to support appellant's conviction for capital murder. We affirm the trial court's judgment.