Opinion
No. 3-395 / 02-1371
Filed October 15, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court forFremont County, Gordon C. Abel, Judge.
Employee appeals from the district court decision that affirmed an agency denial of her claim for workers' compensation benefits. AFFIRMED.
Jon Johnson of Johnson Law, P.L.C., Sidney, for appellant.
Charles Cutler of Cutler Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
We are faced with the question of whether the workers' compensation commissioner properly determined that an injury occurring in the course of a claimant's employment nevertheless did not arise from that employment. Our review of this question is for the correction of errors at law. IBP, Inc. v. Harpole, 621 N.W.2d 410, 414 (Iowa 2001). The agency decision is reversed if the claimant's substantial rights have been prejudiced because the agency's decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record when that record is viewed as a whole, or if the decision was otherwise affected by error of law. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10) (2001). Upon such review, we uphold the agency decision.
In November 1998 Pearl Bartle, then sixty-nine years old, was injured in the course of her regular job duties as an aide at Sidney Care, Inc. (Sidney), a nursing home facility. Bartle fell and injured her left knee while carrying two water pitchers into a resident's room, one pitcher in each hand. She filed a petition for workers' compensation benefits. Although the deputy workers' compensation commissioner found Bartle's injury had arisen out of and in the course of her employment with Sidney, upon agency appeal the chief deputy determined Bartle's knee injury had not in fact arisen out of her employment. She determinedthe precipitating fall was not caused by Bartle's job duties or employment environment, but rather was a product of Bartle "tripp[ing] over her own feet." The chief deputy determined that this was an idiopathic cause, or one personal to Bartle, and thus the injury was non-compensable. The agency decision was affirmed by the district court, and Bartle appeals.
It is well established that Bartle, as claimant, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her injury not only occurred in the course of, but arose out of her employment with Sidney. See2800 Corp. v. Fernandez, 528 N.W.2d 124, 128 (Iowa 1995). For an injury to arise out of employment there must be some causal nexus between the nature of that employment and the risk which gives rise to the injury. Thayer v. State, 653 N.W.2d 595, 600 (Iowa 2002). The agency concluded Bartle had not demonstrated that her injury was caused by an aspect of her employment, but rather was the result of an idiopathic, or personal risk. Upon review of the record, we question the agency's determination as to the nature of the risk, but nevertheless conclude that we must uphold its ultimate decision to deny benefits.
The record reveals that the floor in the area where Bartle fell was level, dry, and unobstructed. While Bartle testified at the arbitration hearing that she did not know what caused her to fall, statements she made close in time to the injury, as well as her own deposition testimony, indicated that she fell onto her left knee when she stubbed the toes of her left foot on the floor or otherwise tripped over her own feet. The evidence before the agency, including Bartle's own deposition and hearing testimony, indicated that carrying the pitchers neither contributed to her fall nor prevented her from breaking her fall.
The foregoing testimony does not constitute substantial evidence that the fall was due to a risk personal to Bartle. We believe that in a case such as this, where the claimant slips or trips or falls for no specifically identifiable reason, that the cause of the fall and resulting injury is not idiopathic, but rather neutral or unexplained. See 1 Arthur Larson Lex K. Larson, Larson's Worker's Compensation Law §§ 4.02-.03, at 4-2 to 4-3 (2003).
This conclusion does little to assist Bartle, however, as our reading of prior case law indicates she still must establish a causal nexus between a job duty or condition of employment and her injury. See Meade v. Ries, 642 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Iowa 2002) (quoting 82 Am.Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 263, at 258-59 (1992)) ("Such a connection `is supplied when there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment.'"). Whether the risk in this case is denominated as idiopathic or unexplained, substantial evidence in the record supports the agency's conclusion that Bartle has failed in this task. Bartle's own testimony indicated that carrying the water pitchers did not contribute to her fall, and nothing indicates that any other condition of her employment contributed to the injury.
The dissent urges us to join a growing number of states which have adopted the position that an unexplained fall is compensable because "[t]he particular injury would not have happened if the employee had not been engaged upon an employment errand at the time." 1 Larson on Workers' Compensation § 7.04(1)(a), at 7-15. Under this theory, the injury is compensable, not because it was caused by a condition of employment, but because employment obligations placed the claimant in the particular place, at the particular time, when the injury occurred. We conclude, however, that to accept this position would render superfluous the requirement that a claimant must establish a causal nexus between a duty or condition of employment and the injury.
Bartle has failed to establish that her injury arose out of her employment with Sidney. Accordingly, the agency did not err in its ultimate determination that Bartle was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. As Bartle's substantial rights have not been prejudiced by the agency decision, that decision is affirmed. AFFIRMED.
Because we conclude the agency decision should be upheld, we need not address Bartle's claim that she was entitled to penalty benefits.
Eisenhauer, J., concurs; Hecht, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent. I conclude the agency made a legal error when it determined Bartle's injury was "personal" or "idiopathic" and therefore uncompensable. Although I agree with the majority's conclusion that the injury was neither "personal" nor "idiopathic," I cannot join their determination that Bartle's claim must fail due to the insufficiency of the nexus between her knee fracture and an activity of the employment.
Bartle sustained a knee fracture when she fell while carrying pitchers of water in the course of her employment. An injury "arises out of" the employment if a causal connection exists between the employment and the injury. Bailey v. Batchelder, 576 N.W.2d 334, 338 (Iowa 1998). "Such a connection `is supplied when there is a nexus between the injury and some condition, activity, environment or requirement of the employment.'" Meade v. Ries 642 N.W.2d 237, 245 (Iowa 2002) (quoting 82 Am.Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 263, at 258-59 (1992)). The "arising out of" requirement refers to the origin of the cause of the incident resulting in the injury. 82 Am.Jur.2d Workers' Compensation § 265, at 261 (1992). To meet the "arising out of" test, the incident that caused the injury must have "occurr[ed] while the employee [was] engaged in some activity or duty which [the employee was] authorized to undertake, and which [was] calculated to further, indirectly or directly, the employer's business." Id. at 261-62.
It is undisputed that Bartle fractured her knee when she fell while performing a job activity: carrying two pitchers of water in the workplace. The agency erred as a matter of law when it found insufficient the causal nexus between the fracture and work activity.
The agency found Bartle was injured when she "tripped over her own feet." I believe this finding, supported by substantial evidence in the record, presents a clear example of what a leading workers' compensation treatise describes as "unexplained injury." The majority rule is that injuries sustained as a consequence of unexplained falls in the course of employment are compensable. 1 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, § 7.04(1)(a), at 7-15 (noting that "most courts confronted with the unexplained-fall problem have seen fit to award compensation"). I believe our court should align itself with the majority rule.
After rejecting the agency's determination that Bartle's injury should be classified as "personal" or "idiopathic," the majority also articulates the view that this case presents what Larson's treatise describes as a "neutral" or "unexplained" injury.
I reject the agency's determination that our supreme court's holding in Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309 (Iowa 1996)supports the proposition that a knee fracture sustained in an unexplained fall in the course of employment is not compensable under Iowa Code chapter 85 (1999). In Miedema, the claimant alleged he sustained a back injury in a workplace bathroom while turning to flush a toilet. Our supreme court was unable to identify a causal nexus between a work-related activity and Miedema's claimed injury. In sharp contrast to the facts in Miedema, however, Bartle fell to the floor and sustained a significant physical trauma resulting in a knee fracture while performing a routine
job duty. In my view, the facts in Miedema are so clearly distinguishable from those in the instant case as to render the rule announced in Miedema inapplicable here. Thus, the agency's reliance upon Miedema resulted in an error of law. As a consequence of this error in the application of Iaw, I would reverse the agency decision and remand for further proceedings.
Except in a few instances irrelevant to this case, "there is no general principle in workers' compensation law that requires, as a condition of compensability, that workplace activities must involve more hazard or exertion than a claimant's activities outside the workplace," Floyd v. Quaker Oats, 646 N.W.2d 106, 108 (Iowa 2002). Although there is no evidence tending to prove Bartle's fall and injury were precipitated by an obstruction or other identified hazard on the workplace floor, the risk of her serious physical injury occasioned by an unexplained fall while performing job duties was not so insubstantial or attenuated as to render Bartle's claim uncompensable. Although the risk of injury encountered in the course of employment by a drill press operator or a truck driver are perhaps greater than that to which Bartle was exposed while walking on an unobstructed floor surface, the risk of a traumatic injury from an unexplained fall is no less real and no less deserving of compensation as a matter of law. Accordingly, I would reverse the agency decision and remand for further proceedings.