Bartl v. Enhanced Recovery Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Wood v. N. Miss. Health Servs.

    Civil Action 1:20-cv-42-TBM-RP (N.D. Miss. Sep. 29, 2023)   Cited 3 times
    Explaining that a similar argument was “more properly addressed under a statutory standing analysis”

    For these reasons, the Court finds Sayles distinguishable and inapplicable to this case. The Court also finds the Woods' reliance on Bartl v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, No. 16-cv-252-JNE, 2017 WL 1740152 (D. Minn. May 3, 2017) is unpersuasive. There, the court found that because a third party sent a letter to the debt collector on the consumer's behalf, that the “letter qualifies as a dispute letter for purposes of Section 1692g(b).”

  2. Seifert v. N. Tier Retail LLC

    20-cv-62 (JNE/ECW) (D. Minn. Nov. 30, 2021)

    This Court consistently has recognized that emotional distress can be sufficiently concrete to constitute an injury-in-fact. E.g., Bartl v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC, No. 16-CV-252 (JNE/KMM), 2017 WL 1740152, at *2 (D. Minn. May 3, 2017) (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that "generalized anxiety and stress" was sufficient to confer standing)); Potocnikv. Carlson, No. 13-CV-2093 (PJS/HB), 2016 WL 3919950, at *3 (D. Minn. July 15, 2016) ("There is no doubt that emotional distress is an injury in fact. . . .").

  3. Camaj v. Makower Abbate Guerra Wegner Vollmer PLLC

    Case No. 19-cv-10179 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 14, 2019)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that plaintiff's assertion that, as a result of defendant's FDCPA violations, "he suffered both 'emotional distress' (including 'anxiety') and 'physical symptoms including weakened nails and hair loss," sufficiently alleged concrete and particularized injuries for purposes of FDCPA claim

    These are concrete and particularized injuries. See Ben-Davies v. Blibaum & Assocs., P.A., 695 F. App'x 674, 676 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding, in the context of a claim under the FDCPA, that emotional distress is a concrete injury sufficient to support Article III standing); Bartl v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 16-CV-252, 2017 WL 1740152, at *2 (D. Minn. May 3, 2017) (same). The Court respectfully disagrees with Makower's contention that Camaj has alleged nothing more than a mere procedural violation of the FDCPA.

  4. Bell v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC

    Civ. No. 18-1027 (PAM/TNL) (D. Minn. Sep. 21, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    This is, at least at this stage, "sufficient to meet the 'irreducible constitutional minimum' of standing." Bartl v. Enhanced Recovery Co., No. 16cv252, 2017 WL 1740152, at *2 (D. Minn. May 3, 2017) (Ericksen, J.) (quotation omitted). Plaintiffs have standing to bring their FDCPA claims.