Opinion
Civil Action No: 99-1623 SECTION: "C" (4)
July 14, 2000
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
On May 12, 2000, the defendants, Kody Marine, Inc., Clyde Naquin, and Paul Boudreaux, (collectively "Kody") filed a Motion for Attorney's Fees (doc #105), which was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge to conduct hearings, including an Evidentiary Hearing, if necessary, and to submit Proposed Findings and Recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b). The defendants seek to recover attorney's fees totaling $10,150.00 as the prevailing parties in the subject litigation. Upon review of this matter, the Court has determined that it can be disposed of without an Evidentiary Hearing.
I. Factual Summary
On November 30, 1998, the plaintiff, Audrey Barrios ("Barrios"), filed suit seeking damages for the alleged unlawful sexual harassment and hostile working environment she experienced when she was constructively discharged from her job as the bookkeeper by Kody Marine. Barrios filed suit, seeking recovery, pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (e-5k).
The claim was originally filed in the 24th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson and later removed to the federal district court on May 24, 1999.
On April 24, 2000, the matter proceeded to trial by jury. After three days of evidence, the jury ruled in favor of the plaintiff on the battery claim asserted against Paul Boudreaux and the hostile work environment sexual harassment claim asserted against Kody Marine, Inc. The judgment was entered on April 28, 2000. The plaintiff's claims against Clyde Naquin were dismissed with prejudice on April 26, 2000.
Further, the trial judge granted motions for directed verdict in favor of Clyde Naquin and Paul Boudreaux, with respect to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims against Kody Marine in which she sought recovery on the theory of vicarious liability. The issue for the Court's consideration is whether the defendants are entitled to recover attorney's fees because they prevailed on some of their claims. For the reasons detailed herein, the Court finds that the request for fees should be denied.
Id.
II. Standard of Review
The Supreme Court in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978), set forth the standard of review for district courts faced with determining whether to award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in a Title VII case. In Christianburg, the Court held that subject to the district court's discretion, attorneys fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant, upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 421.
The Court further cautioned the district court from engaging in a post-hoc reasoning process of concluding that because the plaintiff did not prevail, then the claim was frivolous. The Court further noted that even when the facts appear questionable or unfavorable at the outset, a party may have had an entirely reasonable ground for bringing suit.
"Frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," in this context, implies "groundless . . . rather than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case." Id. at 421-22. Such post hoc reasoning "would substantially add to the risks inherent in most litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to promote the vigorous enforcement of the provisions of Title VII." Id. at 422. Thus, "[i]t is clear from Chiristiansburg that attorney's fees to a prevailing Title VII defendant are not routine, but are to be only sparingly awarded." Quiroga v, Hasbro, Inc., 934 F.2d 497, 503 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 940 (1991).
"Cases where findings of 'frivolity' have been sustained typically have been decided in the defendant's favor on a motion for summary judgment or a . . . motion for involuntary dismissal. In these cases, the plaintiffs did not introduce any evidence to support their claims. Sullivan v. School Bd., 773 F.2d 1182, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985). On the other hand, in cases where the plaintiffs introduced evidence sufficient to support their claims, findings of frivolity typically do not stand." Sullivan, 773 F.2d at 1189.
In determining if an award of fees to a Title VII defendant is appropriate, courts should consider several factors including "(1) whether the plaintiff established a prima facie case; (2) whether the defendant offered to settle; and (3) whether the trial court dismissed the case prior to trial or held a full-blown trial on the merits." Id. These factors are, however, guideposts, not hard and fast rules. "Determinations regarding frivolity are to be made on a case-by-case basis." Id.
But see Greenberg v. Hilton Int'l Co., 870 F.2d 926, 940 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Cases that are ultimately viewed as frivolous may well survive motions to dismiss under a system of notice pleading that does not require factual detail and even motions for summary judgment in which the evidence may be presented in sketchy fashion and credibility may not be taken into account.").
Even though an inquiry into an award of attorney's fees to a Title VII defendant is individualized, specific examples of awards that have been reversed assist in illustrating the policy behind the rule enunciated in Christiansburg. For example, in EEOC v. Kenneth Balk Assocs., 813 F.2d 197 (8th Cir. 1987), the EEOC filed a Title VII action on behalf of a former employee alleging that the employer, Kenneth Balk Associates ("KBA"), had discharged her on the basis of race.
The case was tried for three days before being continued to permit the parties to conduct additional discovery. The Court then heard more evidence and granted the parties time to file post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ultimately, judgment was entered in favor of KBA, the Court awarded counsel fees; and the EEOC appealed. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the district court had misapplied the Christiansburg standard. Kenneth, 813 F.2d at 198.
The procedural history of the case suggested that the EEOC's claim was not baseless, as KBA neither sought a pretrial dismissal nor moved for summary judgment or a directed verdict. In addition, the district court had permitted the parties to file post-trial briefs and proposed factual and legal conclusions. Furthermore, the district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law disclosed that the court's ruling was based upon its credibility determinations. Id. Thus, the record suggested that the EEOC had some basis for its claim, and the Court of Appeals reversed the award of counsel fees. Id.
In doing so, the Court stated that "however unpersuasive the EEOC's evidence ultimately proved to be, this evidence provided 'some basis' for the EEOC's claim. Accordingly, the district court misapplied the Christiansburg standard. . . ." Id.; see also EEOC v. Bruno's Restaurant, 13 F.3d 285, 290 (9th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the "district court failed to exercise its discretion within the permissible bounds of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (k) and within the requirements of Christianburg in awarding fees on the ground that the EEOC presented no credible evidence of discriminatory conduct").
In contrast, the appellate court affirmed the district court's award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant, where the plaintiff failed to conciliate, a jurisdictional condition precedent to a suit by the EEOC. See EEOC v. Pierce Packing Co., 669 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982). An award of attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant was also approved in Gipson v. Roseberg, 797 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1007 (1987), where the plaintiff's § 1983 claim was summarily dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Other cases in this circuit typically have been found frivolous where the district court has decided a summary disposition motion in the defendant's favor. See, e.g., Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 638 F.2d 1272 (5th Cir. 1981); Jones v. Dealers Tractor and Equipment Co., 634 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981).
In the case at bar, the plaintiff failed to provide valid legal support for her claims against Clyde Naquin and Paul Boudreaux, with respect to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The remaining claims against Clyde Naquin were dismissed on April 26, 2000. The vicarious liability theory asserted against Kody Marine was dismissed as moot. Yet, the plaintiff prevailed on her primary claim of hostile work environment and sexual harassment against Kody Marine.
Further, the procedural posture of the case indicates that the plaintiff's claims were not baseless. According to the record, the defendants did not seek summary dismissal of the claims prior to trial. The trial judge further permitted the parties to file post-trial briefs and proposed factual and legal conclusions. Finally, the plaintiff was awarded $115,000 with prejudgment interest against Kody Marine and Paul Boudreaux. A fee award to the prevailing defendants in this case would result in the exact post-hoc evaluation that our circuit courts have cautioned against.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees ( doc# 105) be DENIED.
A party's failure to file written objections to the Proposed Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation in a Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation within ten (10) days after being served with a copy shall bar that party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the Unobjected-to Proposed Factual Findings and Legal Conclusions accepted by the district court, provided that the party has been served with notice that such consequences will result from a failure to object. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1430 (5th Cir. 1996).