Opinion
No. 1:03-cv-353.
January 18, 2005
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiff William James Barr ("Barr") brought this action against Officer Marty Kyle ("Kyle), Officer Conway S. Mason ("Mason"), and the City of Sweetwater, Tennessee, ("City") (collectively "the Defendants") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988, alleging violations of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and of the laws of the State of Tennessee. Specifically, Barr asserts that the Defendants violated his right to be free from illegal search and seizure, wrongful arrest, and excessive force and that the City failed to properly train Kyle and Mason. Barr also asserts state law claims of false arrest and assault and battery against the Defendants. [Court File No. 1]. The Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims. [Court File No. 26]. Barr opposes this motion [Court File No. 35]; the Defendants filed a reply brief [Court File No. 38]; Barr filed a response to the Defendants' reply [Court File No. 39]; and the Defendants filed a response to Barr's response [Court File No. 42]. Now that the parties have finished responding to one another, this motion is ripe for review.
Barr specifies that the failure to train claim is alleged against the City. Barr does not specify whom the remaining claims are alleged against. Accordingly, the Court will treat these remaining claims as alleged against each Defendant.
I. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Shah v. Racetrac Petroleum Co., 338 F.3d 557, 566 (6th Cir. 2003). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the facts contained in the record and all inferences that can be drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; Nat'l Satellite Sports, Inc. v. Eliadis Inc., 253 F.3d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 2001). The Court cannot weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or determine the truth of any matter in dispute. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). To refute such a showing, the non-moving party must present some significant, probative evidence indicating the necessity of a trial for resolving a material, factual dispute. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252; Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; McLean v. Ontario, Ltd., 224 F.3d 797, 800 (6th Cir. 2000). "Evidence suggesting a mere possibility" of a factual dispute is not enough to preclude summary judgment. Shah, 338 F.3d at 566; Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Court's role is limited to determining whether the case contains sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 249; Nat'l Satellite Sports, 253 F.3d at 907. While the Court draws all reasonable factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, it may grant summary judgment if the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational, objective jury to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; McKinnie v. Roadway Express, Inc., 341 F.3d 554, 557 (6th Cir. 2003).
II. Facts
The Court finds the undisputed facts, taken in the light most favorable to Barr, are as follows. At the time this event occurred, Barr lived with his fiancé, Kim Christianson ("Christianson"), in an apartment in Sweetwater, Tennessee. [Court File No. 26, Barr Dep. at 53-54]. On October 16, 2002, Barr had an argument with Christianson. [ Id. at 84, 119]. Though Barr initially denied drinking alcohol on the day of the argument, [ Id. at 83], he later admitted he was drinking that day, [ Id. at 114].
Where the Defendants' and Barr's versions of the facts differ, the Defendants accept Barr's version for the purposes of this summary judgment motion. [Court File No. 27 at 3 n. 3].
Eventually, Barr's neighbor placed a 911 call regarding a domestic disturbance at Barr's residence. [Court File No. 26, Ex. 1, Scruggs Aff. at ¶ 4-5]. Officer Kyle and Sergeant John Scruggs ("Scruggs") responded to the call. [ Id. at ¶ 5]. When Kyle and Scruggs arrived at the apartment complex, they mistakenly went to the neighbor's apartment — the same neighbor that placed the 911 call. [ Id. at ¶ 5]. The neighbor informed the officers that he "had heard loud arguing coming from Mr. Barr's apartment and it sounded like a female was getting killed." [ Id. at ¶ 6]. The neighbor further said that he heard a woman scream "`if you don't stop you are going to kill me.'" [ Id. at ¶ 6].
Barr does not allege any claims against Sergeant Scruggs.
When the officers went to Barr's apartment, the front door was open, but the screen door was closed and locked. [ Id. at ¶ 7; Court File No. 26, Barr Dep. at 86-87]. Barr admitted to the officers that he and his fiance were fighting and claimed the situation was over. [ Id.]. Barr refused to let the officers speak with the female and refused to let the officers into the apartment to insure that the female was safe and uninjured. [ Id.; Barr Dep. at 86-88].
According to Barr, Officer Kyle broke through and unlocked the screen door and entered Barr's apartment alone. [Court File No. 26, Barr Dep. at 86-87, 89]. Officer Kyle attempted to arrest Barr, but Barr, admittedly, resisted. [ Id. at 89-93]. The two struggled for three or four minutes; eventually the struggle took them both to the ground, with Barr on his back. [ Id.]. Somehow Barr managed to get up on his knees at which point Officer Mason entered the apartment. [ Id.]. Together Officers Kyle and Mason handcuffed Barr. [ Id.]. At some point during the struggle, Barr sustained an abrasion to his elbow when Officer Kyle was trying to handcuff him; Barr suffered no other abrasions, bruises, or cuts anywhere on his body. [ Id.; Court File No. 35, Barr Dep. at 79]. Officer Kyle used only his hands and fists during the struggle and did not use his flashlight, his baton, his pepper spray, his boots, or his weapon to subdue Barr. [ Id.]. Upon searching the apartment, the officers learned that Christianson was not present. [Court File No. 26, Scruggs Aff. at ¶ 9].
III. Analysis A. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Seizure Claim
"[I]t is well established that any arrest without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment." Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2003). "For a police officer to have probable cause for arrest, there must be `facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing or is about to commit an offense.'" Id. (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). "Probable cause requires only the probability of criminal activity not some type of `prima facie' showing." Id. (quotation omitted). "The probability of criminal activity is assessed under a reasonableness standard based on `an examination of all facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge at the time of the arrest.'" Id. (quoting Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999)). In a § 1983 action, the existence of probable cause is a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. Thacker v. Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 252-53 (6th Cir. 2003); Crockett, 316 F.3d at 581.
In the instant case, the officers claim they had probable cause to arrest Barr for domestic abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-619. Section 36-3-619(a) provides: "If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime involving domestic abuse, whether the crime is a misdemeanor or felony, or was committed within or without the presence of the officer, the preferred response of the officer is arrest." The Defendants argue that the following facts gave the officers probable cause to believe Barr committed a crime involving domestic abuse: Barr's neighbor placed a 911 call reporting a domestic disturbance at the Barr apartment; when the officers arrived the same neighbor informed them that he "had heard loud arguing coming from Mr. Barr's apartment and it sounded like a female was getting killed" and that he heard a woman scream "if you don't stop you are going to kill me;" finally, when the officers went to Barr's apartment, Barr admitted that he and the female had been fighting.
Barr neither disputes these facts nor contends that the officers did not have probable cause to arrest him. Instead, Barr's only response to the Defendants' argument is to provide the Court with the text of § 36-3-619.
Based on the undisputed facts, the Court finds that the officers had probable cause to believe Barr committed a crime involving domestic abuse. The Court is aware that the existence of probable cause is a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. And in this case, there is only one reasonable determination: given the neighbor's 911 call, his statements to the officers at the scene, and Barr's admission, the officers had probable cause to arrest Barr. Accordingly, Barr's unlawful seizure claim will be DISMISSED. B. Fourth Amendment Unlawful Entry Claim
"[P]hysical entry of the home" is the "chief evil" against which the Fourth Amendment protects. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980). The Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement generally requires police to obtain a warrant based upon a judicial determination of probable cause prior to entering a home. Id. at 585-86. However, there are a few well-defined circumstances in which a warrant is not required. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Thacker, 328 F.3d at 252-53. In the instant case, the Defendants admit they entered Barr's home without a warrant. Accordingly, unless one of the warrant exceptions applies, Barr's Fourth Amendment rights were violated.
The Defendants claim that the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement justified their warrantless entry into Barr's apartment. Exigent circumstances exist in four situations: "(1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, (2) imminent destruction of evidence, (3) the need to prevent a suspect's escape, and (4) a risk of danger to the police or others." Thacker, 328 F.3d at 253 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 1994)).
The Defendants claim that the case sub judice involves the fourth situation — that the officers' warrantless entry into Barr's apartment was justified because of the risk of danger to others. The "`risk of danger exigency' most frequently justifies `warrantless entries in cases where the Government is acting in something other than a traditional law enforcement capacity.'" Thacker, 328 F.3d at 253 (quoting United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1996)). Indeed, "the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid." Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392.
The Defendants contend that this is such a case — that a female they reasonably believed to be in Barr's residence was in need of immediate aid. The Defendants claim that the following facts created the exigency: Barr's neighbor placed a 911 call regarding a domestic disturbance at Barr's residence; when the officers arrived the neighbor informed them that he "had heard loud arguing coming from Mr. Barr's apartment and it sounded like a female was getting killed" and that he heard a woman scream "if you don't stop you are going to kill me;" when the officers went to Barr's apartment, Barr admitted that he and his fiance were fighting and claimed the situation was over; Barr refused to let the officers speak with the female and refused to let the officers into the apartment to insure that the female was safe and uninjured.
Barr neither disputes the Defendants' factual contentions nor even addresses whether exigent circumstances exist in this case. Instead, Barr only argues that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches of the home. [Court File No. 35 at 3-4]. Generally, Barr is correct; however, as discussed above, exigent circumstances is an exception to the warrant requirement.
Based on the undisputed facts viewed in the light most favorable to Barr, the Court finds that exigent circumstances justified the Defendants' warrantless entry into Barr's apartment. Based on the 911 call and the direct interview with the neighbor, the officers reasonably believed there was a domestic disturbance in Barr's apartment and the female victim may have been killed or seriously injured. Further, when the officers went to Barr's apartment, they did not know Christianson was not inside, and Barr refused to let the officers speak to her or come inside to insure her safety. These facts created exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless entry into Barr's apartment. Accordingly, Barr's unlawful entry claim will be DISMISSED.
C. Excessive Force Claim
The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's right to be free from the use of excessive force by law enforcement. Neague v. Cynkar, 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 2001). Excessive force claims are reviewed under the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001).
The `reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. . . . Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chamber, violates the Fourth Amendment. The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989) (internal quotation and citation omitted); accord Saucier, 533 U.S. at 204-05; Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 493 (6th Cir. 2004).
Whether an officer's use of force was reasonable turns on the facts of each case. Relevant to the inquiry are the following: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) the immediate threat the suspect poses to the safety of the officer or others; (3) the suspect's resistance; and (4) the possibility of flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Dunigan, 390 F.3d at 493. Further, the extent of a plaintiff's injury, though not crucial, is also considered in adjudicating excessive force claims. Neague, 258 F.3d at 508; Magrum v. Meinke, 332 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1079 (N.D. Ohio 2004). Indeed, "when there is no allegation of physical injury, the handcuffing of an individual incident to a lawful arrest is insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment." Id.
In the instant case, the Court finds that Officers Kyle and Mason did not use excessive force in arresting Barr. As viewed in the light most favorable to Barr, the facts indicate Officer Kyle entered the apartment alone and attempted to arrest Barr, but Barr admittedly resisted. The two struggled for three or four minutes and eventually ended up on the ground, with Barr on his back. Barr managed to get up on his knees at which point Officer Mason entered the apartment. Together Officers Kyle and Mason handcuffed Barr. Barr sustained an abrasion to his elbow when Officer Kyle tried to handcuff him; however Barr admittedly suffered no other abrasions, bruises, or cuts on his entire body. Further, during the struggle Officer Kyle did not use his flashlight, his baton, his pepper spray, his boots, or his weapon to subdue Barr. Based on these facts, the Court finds that neither Officer Kyle nor Officer Mason used excessive force in arresting Barr. Accordingly, Barr's excessive force claim will be DISMISSED.
E. Failure to Adequately Train Claim
Inadequate training of officers may serve as a basis for liability under § 1983 "only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of individuals with whom the officers come into contact." City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989); accord Cherrington v. Skeeter, 344 F.3d 631, 646 (6th Cir. 2003). "Only where a failure to train reflects a `deliberate' or `conscious' choice by a municipality . . . can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983." Id. at 389. The Sixth Circuit recognizes two situations in which inadequate training, or a failure to train, could be the result of deliberate indifference: the first "is failure to provide adequate training in light of foreseeable consequences that could result from the lack of instruction, as would be the case, for example, if a municipality failed to instruct its officers in the use of deadly force," Cherrington, 344 F.3d at 646 (internal quotations and citations omitted); the second "is where the city fails to act in response to repeated complaints of constitutional violations by its officers," Id.
Initially, the Court notes that Barr's failure to train claim against the City must be dismissed because he cannot establish a constitutional violation by an individual officer. To be clear, a municipality can only be held liable for a failure to train where the plaintiff establishes a constitutional violation by an individual officer. Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986)); see also Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, 390 F.3d 890, 900 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Heller, 475 U.S. at 799). As discussed above, the Court finds that neither Officer Kyle nor Officer Mason violated Barr's constitutional rights. Consequently, the City necessarily is not liable to Barr under a failure to train theory.
Further, even assuming an officer violated Barr's constitutional rights, Barr's failure to train claim must still be dismissed because Barr fails to establish that the City's inadequate training is the result of deliberate indifference. Indeed, in his response to the summary judgment motion, Barr points to no evidence indicating the City was deliberately indifferent. Barr even admitted this lack of evidence in his deposition, where he recognized he has no knowledge of the policies, procedures, or training programs of the City. [Court File No. 26, Barr Dep. at 60]. Accordingly, Barr's failure to train claim will be DISMISSED.
F. State Law Tort Claims
1. False Arrest
To prevail on his Tennessee common law claim of false arrest, Barr must prove that he was arrested without probable cause. See Coffee v. Peterbilt of Nashville, Inc., 795 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tenn. 1990); McLaughlin v. Smith, 412 S.W.2d 21, 26-27 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1966). As discussed above, Officers Kyle and Mason had probable cause to arrest Barr for committing a crime involving domestic abuse, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 36-3-619(a). Consequently, Barr's false arrest claim will be DISMISSED.
2. Assault and Battery
Under Tennessee common law, assault is "any act tending to do corporal injury to another, accompanied with such circumstances as denote at the time an intention, coupled with the present ability, of using actual violence against that person." Thompson v. Williamson County, Tenn., 965 F.Supp. 1026, 1037 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) (quotation and citations omitted). Battery is "any intentional, unlawful and harmful (or offensive) contact by one person with the person of another." Id. at 1038 (quotation and citation omitted). An indispensable element of assault and battery is that the act be intentional. Id.
To the extent Barr brings an assault and battery claim against Officers Kyle and Mason, the claim must be dismissed. Initially, the officers claim an absolute defense in Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-7-108. Section 40-7-108 provides that a "law enforcement officer, after giving notice of such officer's identity as such, may use or threaten to use force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an individual suspected of a criminal act who resists or flees from the arrest." Barr admits that he was fighting back and struggling with the officers when they tried to arrest him. [Court File No. 26, Barr Dep. at 93]. And, as discussed above, in light of this struggle the officers only used that force reasonably necessary to accomplish Barr's arrest: Officer Kyle struggled with Barr in an effort to handcuff him, but never used his baton, flashlight, pepper spray, or weapon; during the struggle Barr sustained only one mark on his elbow. [ Id. at 90]. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 40-7-108, the officers were authorized to use this force and Barr's assault and battery claim will be DISMISSED.
Further, even assuming Officers Kyle and Mason committed the tort of assault and battery, the officers are immune from such a claim. The Tennessee Government Tort Liability Act ("GTLA"), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-101 to 29-20-407, prohibits suits against governmental employees where the governmental entity has waived its sovereign immunity from such suit. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b). The GTLA waives a governmental entity's sovereign immunity from suits for injuries proximately caused by an employee's intentional tort of assault and battery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2); Limbaugh v. Coffee Med. Ctr., 59 S.W.3d 73, 84 (Tenn. 2001). Consequently, the GTLA prohibits a plaintiff from bringing an assault and battery claim against governmental employees. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(b); Alexander v. Newman, 345 F.Supp.2d 876, 886 (W.D. Tenn. 2004). Accordingly, Barr's assault and battery claim against Officers Kyle and Mason will be DISMISSED.
Insofar as Barr brings an assault and battery claim against the City, the claim must also be dismissed. As noted above, the GTLA waives a governmental entity's sovereign immunity from suits for injuries proximately caused by an employee's intentional tort of assault and battery. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205(2); Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 84. In such suits, the governmental entity is only "liab[le] where the injuries at issue were proximately caused by its negligence in failing to exercise reasonable care to protect [an individual] from the foreseeable risk of an employee's intentional assault and battery." Limbaugh, 59 S.W.3d at 76; Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205. Consequently, the governmental entity cannot be sued directly for the intentional torts of assault and battery, but merely for assaults and batteries caused by a negligent act or omission of the governmental entity. Id. at 84; accord Alexander, 345 F.Supp.2d at 885-86.
In the instant case Barr fails to offer any evidence that the City was negligent, even assuming Officers Kyle and Mason committed the tort of assault and battery. Barr offers no evidence that the officers' assault and battery was foreseeable. Nor does Barr offer any evidence that the City was negligent in failing to protect the citizens from such an assault and battery. Because Barr presents no evidence of the City's negligence, the assault and battery claim against the City will be DISMISSED.
In sum, the Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Court File No. 26] will be GRANTED and each of Barr's claims will be DISMISSED.
A separate judgment will enter.
JUDGMENT
In accordance with the accompanying memorandum, the Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 [Court File No. 26] is GRANTED. Barr's complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Defendants shall recover their costs of this action. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close the record in this case. This is a FINAL JUDGMENT.SO ORDERED.