Opinion
No. CV 04-4002307S
October 13, 2005
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO STRIKE
This case arises from water damage to the plaintiffs' property caused by the defendant's claimed failure to monitor fire and sprinkler alarm systems. The plaintiffs, tenants of the building, move to strike the first and second special defenses of the defendant's revised answer and special defenses to the first amended complaint, filed on February 3, 2005. In its memorandum in opposition, the defendant argues that its client agreement with building managers, Partridge Square, Udolf Properties and Roger Udolf, contained suit restrictions limiting recoverable damages and rendering the present action time barred.
I.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of . . . allegations of [a pleading] . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted) Fort Trumbull Conservacy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[A] motion to strike the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M. Services, Inc., 268 Conn. 283, 292, 842 A.2d 1124 (2004). "[T]he court is limited to the facts alleged in the [pleading]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corp., 240 Conn. 576, 580, 693 A.2d 293 (1997). "A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 588. "[The court] note[s] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in a pleading] need not be expressly alleged . . . It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a [pleading] challenged by [an opposing party's] motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted. Where the legal grounds for such a motion are dependant upon underlying facts not alleged in the . . . pleadings, the [movant] must await the evidence which may be adduced at trial, and the motion should be denied." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Labor v. C.J.M Services, Inc., supra, 268 Conn. 292-93. "A [motion to strike] may be filed by either party: a defendant can [move to strike] the complaint; a plaintiff can [move to strike] a special defense . . ." Nowak v. Nowak, 175 Conn. 112, 116, 394 A.2d 716 (1978). "The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Danbury v. Dana Investment Corp., 249 Conn. 1, 17, 730 A.2d 1128 (1999). "In . . . ruling on . . . [a] motion to strike [a special defense], the trial court [is obligated] to take the facts to be those alleged in the special defenses and to construe the defenses in the manner most favorable to sustaining their legal sufficiency." Connecticut National Bank v. Douglas, 221 Conn. 530, 536, 606 A.2d 684 (1992).
II.
"The proposition that one who was neither a party to a contract nor a contemplated beneficiary thereof cannot sue to enforce the promises of the contract merits little discussion." Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc., 173 Conn. 567, 570, 378 A.2d 599 (1977). See also Reynolds v. Owen, 34 Conn.Sup. 107, 111, 380 A.2d 543 (1977) ("Generally, enforcement of a contractual obligation depends on privity of contract"). The plaintiffs are not parties to the client agreement referenced in the defendant's special defenses. The defendant insists that the client agreement precludes the plaintiffs' claims because their status as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement is inferable from the claims asserted. This agreement allegedly limited the amount of damages recoverable and required a claim to be filed within one year. Because each alleged breach of due care was premised on duties set forth in the client agreement, the defendant concludes that this "action in contract is for the breach of a duty arising out of a contract" and thus untimely. Gazo v. Stamford, 255 Conn. 245, 263, 765 A.2d 505 (2001). The defendant cites Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81 (1981); United States Fidelity Guaranty v. Sonitrol Services Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford, Docket No. CV 93 0134267 (July 29, 1996, Arnold, J.); and Hanover Ins. Co. v. American District Telegraph Co., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 88 0232346 (December 4, 1991, Stengel, J.) ( 5 Conn. L. Rptr. 324) as permitting the application of contractual limitations to non-parties' claims.
The special defenses are deficient because the plaintiffs' complaint sounds in negligence, not contract. In United States Fidelity Guaranty v. Sonitrol Services Corp., supra, Docket No. CV 93 0134267 and Hanover Ins. Co. v. American District Telegraph Co., supra, Docket No. CV 88 0232346, the court modified the plaintiff insurance companies' recovery according to limitation of liability clauses in their insureds' contracts. In Stowe v. Smith, supra, 184 Conn. 198, the court determined, inter alia, that the "plaintiff could choose to proceed in contract, tort, or both" to recover benefits conferred in a will prepared in strict accordance with the defendant and testatrix's inter vivos contract. Here, unlike the plaintiffs in United States Fidelity Guaranty v. Sonitrol Services Corp., supra, Docket No. CV 93 0134267, Stowe v. Smith, supra, 184 Conn. 194, and Hanover Insurance Company v. American District Telegraph Company, supra, Docket No. CV 88 0232346, the plaintiffs are not successors in interest to or express beneficiaries or subrogees of the contracting parties' rights or obligations. Contrary to the defendant's claim, allegations of negligence based on contractual duties are permissible irrespective of possible third-party contract claims. Gazo v. Stamford, supra, 255 Conn. 259. The plaintiffs should not be subjected to suit limitations contemplated by the contracting parties. See Owen C. Little Sons, Inc. v. Beizer, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV93 0343199 (July 21, 1994, Martin, J.) ( 12 Conn. L. Rptr. 157) ("[A] contract cannot be enforced against a [person] . . . not a party to the contract").
In Russo v. Conair Corporation, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 03 0483600 (June 30, 2004, Skolnick, J.) ( 37 Conn. L. Rptr. 416), the court granted "the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendants' first special defense . . . because the defendants improperly challenged the cause of action [using] a special defense deficient in supporting fact."
For the reasons stated, the motion to strike the special defenses is granted.